851.85/490: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Leahy) to the Secretary of State
[Received 4:55 p.m.]
490. Reference Department’s 76, February 5, 8 p.m. The Foreign Office official handling matters connected with French shipping in Indochina requested us to call urgently this morning. He confirmed that negotiations between the French and Japanese authorities, conducted through the Governor General of Indochina, had been in progress for some time but that no definite solution had as yet been arrived at. Yesterday the Japanese Embassy in Vichy had informed the Foreign Office that unless a solution could be reached by April 5, the Japanese Government intended to seize for its own use the entire 100,000 tons of French shipping now in Indochinese and other Far Eastern ports. The official said that in view of this situation, the French Government intended to offer the Japanese Government a solution what he described as “local agreement” as opposed to “governmental agreement”. According to this local agreement, the French authorities at Hanoi would be instructed to try to persuade the Japanese to accept the following proposal:
Of the available 100,000 tons of French shipping in Far Eastern waters the French Government would agree.
- (1)
- To barter to the Japanese Government 59,000 tons composed chiefly of the larger vessels and 7,000 tons of smaller shipping now in Indo-Chinese and the Far Eastern ports for traffic on the Shanghai–Manila–Japan run but not to Manchukuo ports;
- (2)
- These ships would not transport war material or troops;
- (3)
- These ships would operate with French captains and crews and would fly the French flag;
- (4)
- An additional 20,000 tons of French shipping would be chartered to the Japanese Government under the same conditions enumerated above but with the right given to the French Government to operate them on the Indochina-Madagascar run;
- (5)
- The remaining 14,000 tons composed chiefly of smaller vessels would remain to France and would be operated in the Indochina coastwise trade.
The official expressed the hope that the conclusion of such a “local agreement” if acceptable to the Japanese (which he considered doubtful) would not be construed by the United States Government as “an unfriendly act” and as “making French vessels available for use against the United States”.
He emphasized the urgency of the matter and added that the French Government was naturally anxious to endeavor to prevent by all means at its disposal the seizure of all French merchant shipping in the Far East. He felt that the proposed “local agreement” was under the circumstances the only solution possible.
Subsequently the Embassy received a visit from another official in the same Department whose attitude has always proved helpful and friendly in the past. After confirming the situation outlined above he remarked that he felt that the United States would have to weigh carefully the pros and cons of such a proposed “local agreement” which if put into operation would free a considerable number of Japanese merchant seamen for other duties while permitting a commercial traffic advantageous to Japan. On the other hand, a failure to come to terms with the Japanese would almost certainly lead to the immediate seizure by Japan of the entire 100,000 tons of French shipping involved.
He offered in the strictest confidence and as his personal opinion that it would be advisable for our Government to protest energetically and immediately on grounds of neutrality against any such agreement.