851.85/451: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Leahy) to the Secretary of State

258. An informant considered thoroughly reliable has made it possible for us to peruse in the strictest confidence and to make copies of a note dated January 25, 1942 from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Japanese Embassy containing a counterproposal for submission to the Japanese Government relative to French shipping in Indochina. While Admiral Darlan on February 9 informed me that negotiations with Japan had not been completed and assured me (Embassy’s 214, February 9, 7 p.m.) that France would not agree to the use of these vessels for military purposes, this note nevertheless furnishes an interesting indication of the length to which the French Government is apparently willing [Page 679] to go in order to satisfy Japanese demands. We have no information as to whether this counter-proposal has proved acceptable to the Japanese Government.

The counter-proposal is made in reply to the Japanese proposal that all French ships of over 4,000 tons in Indochinese ports or at Shanghai should be chartered to the Japanese Government. Briefly summarized, its terms are the following:

1. The French Government agrees to the chartering of the following ships of the French merchant fleet in the Far East to the Japanese Government:

On the Manchukuo–Shanghai–China or Manchukuo–Shanghai–Japan run: Bougainville 7110 tons; Persee 5795 tons; Bernardin de Saint Pierre 10,086 tons; Leconte de Lisle 9877 tons.

These ships total 33,000 odd tons. In addition and to meet the Japanese request for a total of 50,000 tons the French Government agrees to charter to Japan the Maréchal Joffre of 11,732 tons, believed to be Manila, and the Sikiang, 7014 tons. The six vessels, totalling 51,700 tons, would be reserved to traffic benefiting Japan exclusively. They would be chartered in full (conquenne) to Japan and would operate with Japanese crew and officers and under the Japanese flag.

(b) [2?] For the Indo-China–Shanghai and Indo-China–Japan run, the French Government would be willing to charter to the Japanese Government the Aramis (17,537 tons) and the D’Artagnan (15,100 tons) a total of 32,000 odd tons.

Since the Indo-China–Shanghai–Japan traffic is of interest to commercial exchanges with Indo-China, the French Government would like to have the above mentioned vessels operate under a time charter with French officers and crew and under the French flag. The French Government, however, would be willing to agree that the movements of these ships should be controlled by the Japanese authorities while their commercial operation should remain in the hands of French companies. It is further stipulated that the above mentioned ships will engage only in purely commercial traffic to the exclusion of troops and material or contraband of war.

The remainder of the note refers to three vessels of over 4000 tons to be placed on the Saigon, Haiphong and Indo-China runs respectively and concludes with clauses providing for the safeguarding, operation, payment, eventual return and replacement of these vessels.

The agreement is for a period of 6 months and is automatically renewable for further periods of 6 months unless 1 month’s previous notice of denunciation is given. The agreement would also come to an end 1 month after an armistice signed between the Japanese [Page 680] Government and the Anglo-Saxon Governments. The note requests the Japanese Embassy to inform the Foreign Office whether the foregoing proposals meet with the approval of the Japanese Government and concludes with the statement that these proposals represent the maximum concessions which the French Government is prepared to make.

Copies of the note being forwarded by air mail.

This proposal of the French Government if it has been or should be accepted by Japan would appear to being [be in?] direct opposition to the demand made by the President in his message to the Marshal (your 88, February 10, 7 p.m.59) that French ships will not be used by Italy, Germany, and Japan “in the furtherance of their acts of aggression in any theater of war whatever”.

Leahy
  1. Ante, p. 131.