851.01/834½
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle)
M. Tixier came in to see me today, at his request. The conversation, which lasted more than an hour, was filled with every kind of emotion.
He began by asking whether I knew whether de Gaulle were coming. He said he understood he had been invited, but for a few days or more he had had no word from de Gaulle. I said I had no special information, but that my understanding was that he was coming. M. Tixier asked why it was kept so secret. I said that quite frequently when distinguished people were coming nothing was said to anyone, so that the plane voyage should not be interrupted.
M. Tixier then asked whether we had seriously considered the possibilities of the situation. When President Roosevelt had talked to André Philip, he had indicated that he felt the victim of an injustice regarding his French policy, and had shown some resentment. General de Gaulle, as Tixier knew, was not only filled with a sense of injustice, but was brim full of bitterness. He thought that when the two men met there would be a very violent scene.
I said I had great respect for the common sense of both men. Plainly, our task was to work out a common basis on which all Frenchmen could fight the common enemy; and the principle, as Tixier had himself said on a previous occasion, must be the unification of French resistance. This was a task full of the greatest difficulty and of the most dramatic paradoxes; but it remained, nevertheless, the duty of all of us to try to work it out.
Tixier said that he had counseled de Gaulle to accept the fact of Darlan merely as a military fact, for the time being; that in view of the actual military situation, indeed, there was nothing else to do. But if Darlan ever entered France, especially at the head of a French army equipped by Americans, there would be civil war at once. Tixier said that he himself would join the hundreds of thousands who would fight and die rather than let Darlan, and men of his kind, attempt the reconstitution of France, in view of the fact that they had been traitors and had played the role of traitors for two years. In General de Gaulle’s case, Darlan had condemned him to death and published his sentence of death as a traitor in every French town, terribly impressing the sentiment of France. De Gaulle could never forget that he had begged Darlan to take the fleet and go to North Africa and do, two years ago, what our [Page 549] forces are attempting to do now; and that Darlan had sternly refused. For this reason, French Africa had remained virtually inactive and had contributed nothing to the fight against Germany until the present. And for this reason the French sailors at Toulon had clung to a point of honor, namely, that they would resist anyone, no matter who it was, and eventually had sunk their fleet and virtually committed suicide, in a magnificent, but sterile, gesture.
I said that the past was unalterable, but that by taking thought we might be of some help to the future. The fact was that the French fleet had sunk itself on an order given by Darlan in 1940, designed to prevent it from falling into the hands of the enemy. Quite irrespective of what one thought of Darlan for the moment, he had undeniably brought North Africa to the side of the United Nations, and brought French armies into active cooperation, at length, against the common enemy. These were military facts, which no one could deny.
Tixier said that no one was readier than he to recognize the military fact. But did it mean that the last man who had finally seen the light must now be accepted by men who had been fighting all the time, and who had been arrested, tortured and killed by Darlan’s orders? Having no ready answer to this, I said that I supposed that none of us could reach a result in high statecraft by merely indulging in bitterness. In fact, I said, the men who subordinated themselves most to the true interests of France would probably have the greatest recognition in the end. General Giraud, for instance, who had had every reason to feel much as they had, had nevertheless accepted a military command in North Africa, resigning any desire to play a role, and was now actively fighting the Germans. This had been the courageous act of a big man, and I considered that the less everyone thought of their own position and the more they thought of France which was now completely in the power of a brutal enemy, the more they could let older matters lie, and devote themselves to a common cause.
Tixier then reverted to the visit of General de Gaulle. Would the State Department, he asked, endeavor to prevent a rupture between President Roosevelt and General de Gaulle? He thought that the skeans were loaded for a complete explosion. His intimation was that perhaps General de Gaulle had been brought here to do just that, and destroy himself.
I said that Tixier had lived in the United States long enough to know us fairly well. This was not a government of intrigue. We did not bring people to Washington for the purpose of breaking something, but for the purpose of endeavoring to make something. [Page 550] Of course, General de Gaulle could destroy himself in passion; but I trusted that he would not do that.
Tixier said that he proposed to do everything possible to prevent that from happening. He hoped we would help. I said that I thought he could count on every cooperation from this Department.
Tixier then said that he thought the one man who really understood de Gaulle best was Admiral Stark,—rather indicating that he wished Admiral Stark were here while this was going on. I noted the suggestion.
To make a diversion, I said that I understood Admiral D’Argenlieu, former High Commissioner for New Caledonia, was arriving in San Francisco today. The Army had asked what the diplomacy of his reception should be, and I had told them to receive him, naturally, with the courtesies which would be accorded to an Allied Admiral.
Tixier finished this part of the conversation by saying that he hoped we could make use of General Catroux, who, he said, was a good general and a great African expert. In this regard he stood somewhat on a par with Giraud. I made no comment, except to say that the talents of everyone could be employed.