851.01/798
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Welles)
| Participants: | The President, |
| M. André Philip, | |
| M. Adrien Tixier,80a | |
| Mr. Welles. |
The President this morning received M. André Philip and M. Adrien Tixier of the de Gaulle National Committee.
The President received them in the most friendly way and at the outset of the conversation said that he believed it would be useful for him and General de Gaulle to sit down and talk together and that he would be glad if M. Philip would let General de Gaulle know that he would be glad to welcome General de Gaulle in Washington when it was convenient for the General to come here. He said that he understood that the agreement expressed by Mr. Churchill81 and himself to the suggestion earlier made by General de Gaulle that he be permitted to send a delegation to Algiers to confer with General Giraud had not been availed of by General de Gaulle on the ground that he did not wish to confer with General Giraud in view of the latter’s acceptance of a military command at the hands of Admiral Darlan.82
The President reiterated the position he had publicly taken three days ago with regard to Admiral Darlan.83 He emphasized the fact that the operations undertaken by the United States in North Africa subordinated all other considerations to the achievement of a victory by the United States and the allied powers and that nothing should be permitted to detract from the achievement at the earliest possible date of that victory in order that the liberation of France might thereby be advanced. The President made it emphatically clear that the appointment of Admiral Darlan was based solely on military considerations and that if at any moment the President had reason to believe that Admiral Darlan was not satisfactory in that position, he would at once remove him therefrom. He stated that this applied equally to all other authorities in Northern Africa. The President made it equally clear that so long as the United States was the occupying power in North Africa, the final decisions would be reached solely by the occupying power.
[Page 547]The President then went on to explain that the operations undertaken by the United States and Great Britain in North Africa were of a very extended character and that it was premature as yet even to discuss with any precision that part of Europe which would be invaded from North Africa. He made it clear that it was therefore impossible as yet to foresee how or where the first step towards the liberation of Metropolitan France would be undertaken, but expressed it as his policy that until all of France were liberated the sole decision as to what, if any, Frenchmen would administer the liberated territory was a matter solely for this Government to determine.
M. Philip and M. Tixier both immediately and categorically stated that this was not at all the policy upon which the de Gaulle Committee would agree. They said that they had made quite different plans and that their plans envisaged the creation of a provisional French Government which, while recognizing the military supremacy of the occupying forces, nevertheless, would conduct with complete autonomy the administration of every part of liberated France whether in North Africa or Metropolitan France. They went on to assert that they would never “permit” any liberated French town, village, or farmhouse to be administered by foreign powers and that their decision in this regard was final.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
It is noteworthy that throughout the entire conversation which lasted some fifty minutes, neither one of them expressed the slightest gratitude or recognition of the liberation of North Africa by American forces, but insisted over and over again in almost exactly the same words that the administration of North Africa must be in their own hands “not later than two or three weeks from now which will give you time to occupy Tunisia.”
After this had gone on for some time, I suggested to the President that the interview might terminate and that the practical suggestion which he had made at the outset of the interview had better be carried out, namely, that if General de Gaulle came to Washington, the President and General de Gaulle could discuss questions of high policy together.
- For M. Tixier’s account of this conversation, see General de Gaulle’s War Memoirs, Unity, 1942–1944, Documents, p. 94.↩
- Winston S. Churchill, British Prime Minister.↩
- Adm. Jean François Darlan, former French Deputy Premier and Commander in Chief of French military forces.↩
- For text of the President’s statement, see Department of State Bulletin, November 21, 1942, p. 935.↩