851R.00/131: Telegram
The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Matthews) to the Secretary of State
[Received 11:45 p.m.]
7408. In private conversation with an American officer friend of long standing, Major Desmond Morton of the Prime Minister’s office spoke with some bitterness yesterday of what he termed “the State Department’s obstructionist tactics” in opposing the British Government’s desire to send a high ranking political adviser to French North Africa “to relieve General Eisenhower of some of the burden [Page 496] of diplomatic and political negotiations”. The officer in question (who knows none of the background) said that according to Morton the British desire to send someone of Cabinet rank “whose authority would be comparable to that of Casey13 in the Middle East”. (Please see my telegrams Nos. 7323, December 24, 2 p.m.; and 7325, December 24, 6 p.m.14) Morton added that this political adviser would not have a status similar to that of Murphy “because Murphy is a member of General Eisenhower’s staff”.
There is no doubt in my mind that our friends here, particularly the Foreign Office, are really unhappy at what they consider the secondary role they have had to play in the North African negotiations. The suggestion of the dangers of crossing wires with General Eisenhower in the extremely delicate and difficult task confronting him should some independent high Allied authority appear on the spot strikes no responsive chord in these quarters. I even hear of occasional casual allusions to “the inexperience of the State Department and of American Generals” in handling French affairs and of our lack of “real understanding of the French state of mind”.
The Department may wish to read the foregoing in connection with my telegram No. 7407, December 29, 6 p.m.;15 and with the following sentences appearing in the Foreign Office Political intelligence summary for the week ending December 16:
“The most recent authoritative reports from Algiers do not paint a very rosy picture either of French or of Arab morale. It is probable that three quarters of the population are sympathetic to the Allies, with an inclination, at any rate in some quarters, to show friendliness chiefly towards the British, but it cannot be said that morale is high, or that there is so much enthusiasm for the Allied cause as to create a real widespread desire for active cooperation.”