740.0011 European War 1939/26733: Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

1133. (1) During November and December Schmittlein, then in charge of Fighting French affairs here,6 carried on an active campaign among Russian officials and members of the Diplomatic Corps against our policy in North Africa. He became so emotional on the subject that occasionally even impugned the motives of the United States implying that it was prepared to make a compromise peace [Page 488] in Europe which would leave Germany and the various Quislings in a dominant position, so that full attention could be devoted to the war in the Far East. On December 7 I had a personal talk with him and pointed out in a friendly manner how foolishly he was behaving. He expressed regret at having talked so irresponsibly and since, although continuing to condemn our policies, has not so far as I am aware questioned our motives.

(2) The Soviet press during November and early December carried numerous Tass reports quoting foreign press criticism of our policy towards Darlan, and minor Soviet officials during that period also on various occasions expressed a lack of understanding of, and even dissatisfaction with, this policy. There was the general impression, therefore, among members of the Diplomatic Corps that the Soviet Government did not approve our attitude towards Darlan. It was probably with the idea that they were following a line pleasing to the Soviet Government that the Czechoslovak Minister and to a lesser extent the Yugoslav Minister have also displayed a tendency to question our policy. Both of these Ministers have shown a friendly attitude towards the United States in the past, and apparently have not questioned our motives so far as Darlan is concerned.

(3) Garreau, the de Gaulle diplomatic representative, has now returned from a visit to London. He called on me yesterday and during our conversation referred with considerable bitterness to our North African policy. He said that he did not question our motives but felt that we were making a serious blunder since Darlan was a traitor condemned to death by the de Gaulle Government, and that French officials adhering to him were minor Quislings. He said that he or any patriotic Frenchman would not hesitate to shoot Darlan on sight. Patriotic Frenchmen were astonished at the attitude displayed by the United States. In view of this attitude he now regretted that the Fighting French had declared war on Japan. They would have been in a better position if they had remained neutral so far as the Far East was concerned. Ninety-nine percent of the population of France considered the Fighting French as the true French Government. Even if the Fighting French did not have the support of the majority of the French people, they were determined to gain control of France and would fight to do so if necessary. He felt that if America should pursue its present policy France might be pushed into civil war. He expressed especial annoyance at the appointment of Murphy as the President’s representative in Algiers. He said that the contact between de Gaulle and the United States was through American military authorities, whereas Darlan would now be able to approach the American Government through diplomatic channels.

Henderson
  1. Maj. Raymond Schmittlein, Military Attaché.