865C.01/13
The Secretary of State to Admiral William D. Leahy, Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy
My Dear Admiral Leahy: With reference to your letter of December 10, 1942 concerning General Eisenhower’s recommendation that administration under American policies of territories liberated in North Africa cease at the eastern boundary of Tunisia and that civil administration in Tripolitania be considered as coming within the sphere of the British Chief Political Officer in the Middle East, I have consulted the British Ambassador and have obtained the advice of his Government as follows:
It is the view of the British Government that the dividing line ought clearly to be on the frontier between Tunisia and Tripoli. The Ambassador’s letter continues;
“They point out that relations between Tunisia and Tripoli, both social and economic are of the slenderest. Communications are extremely bad and there is no railway. Contact between the two territories before the war was minimized owing to Franco-Italian hostility in the Colonial sphere. It is true that there is a large Italian Colony in Tunisia, but this by itself does not seem to be an argument for drawing a dividing line elsewhere than at the frontier between French and Italian territory.
From the political and administrative point of view it would be inconvenient and illogical to divide Tripoli from Cyrenaica seeing that they were both part of the same administration, and it would obviously be more satisfactory that there should be only one occupying power so as to avoid any divergence of local policy.
[Page 487]The British Chiefs-of-Staff have not yet had an opportunity of discussing the question with their United States colleagues but as a result of preliminary discussion amongst themselves, they take the view that on military grounds the land boundary between the Command of the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, and the Allied Commander-in-Chief should be the frontier between Tunisia and Tripolitania; and they consider that the military and political boundaries should be the same since political control and maintenance of internal security are so closely interlocked.
There are well established economic contacts between Tripolitania and Cyrenaica and it would be undesirable for these to be sundered by a political or administrative dividing line.
The Tripoli–Tunisia frontier has long been an effective currency frontier with exchange control operating on both sides, so as to separate the financial systems of the two territories completely. The whole of the former Italian possessions in Africa except Tripolitania are already under British administration, and arrangements of long standing which have worked quite satisfactorily are in force with regard to the status of the local currency. In particular, an exchange rate of one pound equals 480 Lira has been firmly established. The British Forces have now, in fact, entered Tripolitania and have started to apply the 480 rate there. There is also the point that unless the Tripoli–Tunisia frontier is preserved, United States dollars will find their way into the whole of North Africa, including Egypt and perhaps further into the Middle East. This will be embarrassing to the currency authorities concerned in the same way as widespread use of dollars in Poland after the last war was an embarrassment to the Polish authorities. It would also presumably be unwelcome to the United States Government.
In view of these important practical considerations, I am sure you will agree that the Tripoli–Tunisia frontier is the logical line of division between the two spheres of responsibility.”
Sincerely yours,