740.00112 European War 1939/4621½

The British Embassy to the Department of State

Memorandum

1.
His Majesty’s Government have recently reviewed their policy regarding supplies for North Africa and their considered views are set out in various telegrams which are paraphrased below:—
2.
First, they do not regard the stability and prosperity of North Africa as an end to be pursued for its own sake. If it is impossible to divert supplies from the enemy, then it is in the American and British interest that the territories should be poor. His Majesty’s Government believe that the lack of supplies; e.g., oil, binder twine, sacks and piece goods for the natives has kept exports to France low during the last year. On the other hand, French resistance to German invasion of North Africa will depend on the development of the war and on what military assistance the United States and Great Britain can give them and not on whether they are poor or prosperous.
3.
His Majesty’s Government feel, therefore, that any unconditional shipments into North Africa should be limited to the bare minimum required to maintain United States influence in North Africa and that it should be constantly impressed on the French in North Africa that the amount of Anglo-United States assistance they receive will depend on the degree to which they are willing to help the United Nations so that any extension of supplies which the French desire beyond this bare minimum will be conditional upon their willingness to sell to the United Nations supplies which they need and which they desire to deny to the enemy.
4.
The goal to which His Majesty’s Government would like to work would be a barter of the exportable surplus of North Africa against supplies from the United States. This proposal is based upon their desire to detach French Africa from France and close by other means than force the leak in the blockade made by shipments from North Africa which it is not possible to control. In this connection reference is made to the British Embassy’s informal memorandum of December 19th to the State Department.58
5.
If the United States Government feel that this is not an opportune moment to proceed with so ambitious a program, His Majesty’s Government suggest that American supplies should be used as a lever to prevent shipment to the enemy from North Africa of vital war materials, in particular, wool and skins, cobalt, manganese, molybdenum, and if possible, the balance of the rubber shipped in the François L.D. In this connection reference is made to the attached memorandum58 summarising the importance of these supplies for the German war effort.
6.
As regards oil, His Majesty’s Government have no wish to see supplies made available in North Africa, but would be prepared if the United States Government think it desirable, to revert to the offer made in October 1941 of a provisional quarterly quota of some 30,000 tons of petroleum products, (The details of this offer are set out in Mr. Wyndham White’s59 letter of October 20th, W.T.834/155/41,58 to Mr. Villard60) in return for solid advantages, that is to say, agreement to sell to the United States the materials referred to above and to stop the transit of oil and other materials from France through North Africa to the enemy in Libya. This latter is in the view of His Majesty’s Government a cardinal point on which they think the United Nations should make a firm stand. Transit trade, no less [Page 245] than the re-export of American oil, is previous aid to the common enemies and a direct blow at British troops in Libya. His Majesty’s Government assume that the United States Government would insist that the reports of re-export of oil should be cleared up before further supplies are shipped.
7.
If the North African programme were developed on the lines set out above, the French would clearly wish to add to the North African service two of the three vessels which have been reserved for their use under the agreement recently concluded between the French Embassy and the United States Maritime Commission. His Majesty’s Government would be prepared to agree to this allocation of tonnage and to waive their insistence on the withdrawal of equivalent tonnage from the Mediterranean provided that the French agree to charter to Portugal two tankers from the Mediterranean.
8.
Finally, we must expect continued pressure to be exercised by the enemy upon the French North African authorities and His Majesty’s Government would therefore have liked the French of all classes in North Africa to have heard of an offer (on the lines of the barter suggestion referred to in paragraph 4 above) which could be presented as a bold effort to preserve a part of the French Empire from economic ruin. The offer might well be turned down by the North African authorities but His Majesty’s Government think that there would be great propaganda value in making it. As matters now stand, the French in Africa have never received an offer sufficiently concrete, extensive or dramatic to attract them away from the Axis. Sooner or later they will have to choose between the United Nations and the Germans. It would be well if Frenchmen in Africa at least could know what the United States and Great Britain have to offer them.
9.
As regards the other French colonial territories, His Majesty’s Government adhere to the position they have taken hitherto that they would be prepared to extend the plan of economic aid to West Africa on condition that the whole of the groundnut and peanut oil crop were sold to the United States and Great Britain. They see no particular reason to agree to shipments to West Africa from other French colonies unless the United States and Great Britain get some quid pro quo. As regards Madagascar, there would be an advantage on balance in an agreement for the purchase of the whole output of mica, graphite and hides in Madagascar by the United States in return for supplies of harmless consumption goods. Moreover, if the United States Government wished to acquire the Reunion sugar crop as well, there would be no objection on the part of His Majesty’s Government. If the French Government were to insist [Page 246] on permission to run ships between Madagascar, Dakar and Casablanca, His Majesty’s Government would in the last resort agree provided:
(a)
The purchase proposal of the United States and British Governments were accepted in full;
(b)
Goods to be shipped were to be subject to approval and navicerted;
(c)
Ships were to call at Cape Town for control.

Great importance is attached to (c) in view of the possibility of smuggling graphite, etc.

  1. Not printed.
  2. Not printed.
  3. First Secretary of the British Embassy in the United States.
  4. Not printed.
  5. Henry S. Villard, Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs.