893.24/1404
Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hamilton) to the Secretary of State
Reference first paragraph of attached copy of a memorandum of conversation21 held on May 26, 1942 between Colonel Louis Johnson, Colonel Herrington, and officers of the Department, in regard to various aspects of the Burma campaign, and especially the statements of Colonel Johnson and Colonel Herrington that, with the loss of Burma, “all possible routes to China are closed”, that “even the air freight route is no longer feasible”, and that “the effect on China has been catastrophic and it is the opinion of the speakers that the Chinese no longer intend to fight”.
With regard to the question of air supply routes to China, it should be mentioned that Mr. W. R. Bond of the China National Aviation Corporation, who established and maintained an efficient airplane service between Hong Kong and Chungking over Japanese held territory, is firmly of the belief that an air supply route can be successfully operated between India and China over Japanese held territory in Burma, provided that the necessary airplanes and equipment can be obtained.
With regard to the opinion expressed by Colonel Johnson and Colonel Herrington that the “Chinese no longer intend to fight”, it may be recalled that in his telegram no. 578 of May 20, Ambassador Gauss at Chungking stated that, while the situation in China admittedly had serious possibilities, the Embassy had so far perceived no evidence of lack of determination on the part of the Chinese to meet the threat, nor had the influence of potential defeatist elements increased. The Ambassador expressed the belief that, even if the Japanese should successfully invade Yunnan and advance on other fronts, such as in Hunan–Chekiang and in the northwest, the National Government would not collapse or disintegrate nor would the Japanese be able to destroy it. The Ambassador recommended that, if at all practicable, the Chinese request for increased American air support should be met, not only because of its practical effect on the course of military operations against the enemy, but also because of the psychological effect on the Chinese Government and people of such American assistance.