893.00/14882

Memorandum by the Second Secretary of Embassy in China ( Davies ) to Mr. Lauchlin Currie, Administrative Assistant to President Roosevelt 28

Messages From Chinese Communists

During Mr. Currie’s stay in Chungking a representative of General Chou En-lai, Communist representative at the Chinese capital, delivered to me several messages for Mr. Currie.

Somewhat by way of background, he reported with amusement that the day on which Mr. Currie arrived in Chungking the Generalissimo [Page 227] crossed the river from his summer residence and met General Chou for the first time in “nearly a year”. The trip into Chungking was apparently solely for the purpose of meeting with General Chou. The Generalissimo was said to have expressed great solicitude for General Chou’s health (the latter has been ill for some weeks but is recovering) and to have urged the Communist leader to make use of General Chiang’s residence on Mount Omei to regain his health. It was stated that General Chou was at a loss to explain this concern over his welfare and other sudden demonstrations of Central Government cordiality to the Communists until he learned that Mr. Currie had arrived.

This incident, General Chou’s representative stated, illustrated the Central Government’s sensitiveness to American opinion. During Mr. Currie’s last visit, he continued, relations between the Central Government and the Communists improved. The same development appeared to be occurring during Mr. Currie’s second visit.

It was indicated that General Chou wished to have a talk with Mr. Currie. However, when I later reported that Mr. Currie considered it impolitic at this time to meet General Chou, the reply seemed to be accepted with understanding and in good part.

There were two special messages which General Chou desired to be delivered to Mr. Currie. (1) The Chinese Communists hope that the American Government will take steps which will insure the use of lend-lease supplies in accordance with the purpose of such American aid. The fear was expressed that unless the American Government maintained a firm and constantly watchful attitude on this score lend-lease supplies would be hoarded for use after the war in maintaining the position of the ruling faction. (2) The Chinese Communists would welcome a visit to Communist-controlled areas by one or several representatives of the American Government. It was suggested that the Generalissimo could reasonably be requested to grant permission for such an inspection tour on the grounds that the American Government should, in view of the possibility of a Japanese attack on Siberia, have first-hand information with regard to this vital border region and the Communist armies. American Army officers were mentioned as the most logical officials to be sent.

My informants described a strange situation in Sinkiang Province, the description of which I have been unable to verify. These Communist sources stated that, alarmed by recent attempts of the Central Government to extend its influence in Sinkiang Province, the Chairman wrote a letter to Stalin offering to place Sinkiang under Soviet protection. It was stated that the Chairman received a reply from Molotov to the effect that the Soviet Government maintained good relations with the National Government of China and could deal only [Page 228] with that Government. Upon receipt of this rebuff, the Chairman was said to have become highly incensed, discharged four Chinese Communists acting as provincial departmental chiefs (Finance and Education were mentioned), executed his younger brother who was a Soviet sympathizer and prohibited trade with the Soviet Union. The Chairman’s actions were declared to have caused the Soviet Government to turn over to the Central Government of China copies of Chairman Sheng’s letter to Stalin and Molotov’s reply. The recently redoubled activities of the Central Government in the Northwest—Pai Chung-hsi’s and Wong Wen-hao’s prolonged visits—my informants explained, were Chungking’s reactions to the above-described developments.

There were also reported instances of numerous secret arrests during the final week of Mr. Currie’s visit. It was not suggested that there was anything significant in the timing of the arrests. Practically all of those detained or taken without knowledge of family or friends were small officials from the “Three Northeastern Provinces”. No Communists were detained, because “there are 600,000 Communist troops”. The “Northeasterners” are, however, a weak and scattered group. The arrests were not made by Tai Li’s organization, according to my informants, but by the Kuomintang’s party police. It was said that while the Party may investigate it does not have the authority to make arrests. The foregoing was told me by way of demonstrating that the Four Freedoms are not lived up to in Chungking.

John Davies
  1. Delivered on August 25 to the Department by Mr. Davies personally.