Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1942, China

893.00/14876

The Ambassador in China ( Gauss ) to the Secretary of State

No. 553

Chungking , July 30, 1942.
[Received September 1.]

Sir: I have the honor to enclose a memorandum prepared by Mr. Vincent, Counselor of Embassy, on the subject of “The Chinese National (Kuomintang) Government; its Leadership and Influential Elements”. His analysis or diagnosis of Kuomintang leadership is the result of his contacts with and observation of officials in Chungking over the past year. As he states, the subject does not lend itself to precise treatment. The memorandum, in view of the subject matter, is necessarily more suggestive and speculative than factual but it furnishes a valuable background and guide to interpretation of Kuomintang attitudes and actions present and future and as such should prove useful to the Embassy and the Department.

Respectfully yours,

C. E. Gauss

[Enclosure]

Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in China ( Vincent ) to the Ambassador in China ( Gauss )

[ Chungking ,] July 22, 1942.

As an aid to an understanding and interpretation not only of day to day occurrences and attitudes with regard to China’s participation in the war but also of what may be expected from the Chinese Government in the long view with regard to prosecution of the war and plans for the peace, I have attempted the following analysis of the leadership and influential elements in the Kuomintang or National Government.

The Kuomintang controls the Government. There is no active opposition. But the Kuomintang is a congeries of conservative political cliques whose only common denominator and common objective is desire to maintain the Kuomintang in control of the Government. Within the party individuals and elements manoeuver to maintain or increase their influence. The fact that personalities are more prominent than principles in influencing and deciding policy makes for difficulty in an analysis of the Party leadership. Broad generalizations on the basis of similarities or “isms” would be misleading.

Chiang Kai-shek is the undisputed leader of the National Government and of the Kuomintang (National People’s Party). He is President of the Executive Yuan (Premier); he is Commander in Chief of the Army; and he is Chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang. He is supreme in the Government, in the Army, and in the Party.²⁷ The Chairman or President of the National Government, Lin Sen, is an elder statesman of no appreciable influence. Chiang’s leadership is undisputed and supreme but it does not follow that it is absolute. He is not a dictator. His leadership is subject to modifications by influential elements within the Party and the Government. The political elements which he leads are held together by the personal force and political acumen which he exercises.

In the years since the establishment of the National (Kuomintang) Government at Nanking in 1927, the Kuomintang has become increasingly conservative, selfishly as much as politically conservative; in short, “preservative”. The patriotic appeal to resistance to Japan has in recent years been effectively used as a substitute for what should have been an earlier appeal of ideas, ideals, and constructive reform. Already at the outbreak of hostilities with the Japanese in 1937, the Kuomintang was suffering from a want of any applied idealism in its policies and undertakings. Lip service was given to the Three Principles of Dr. Sun Yat-sen but principal attention was directed toward the eradication of dissident political and military groups. The Party had become a sterile bureaucracy depending upon the monied interests and the military for its support. Japanese aggression united the people in a wave of patriotism, relatively strong for China, and in support of the Government’s policy of resistance. Even the communists and other minor parties joined in supporting the Government for a time. This support was subsequently rejected by the Kuomintang controlled Government when, in 1939, it ceased to be hard pressed by the Japanese; and today the communists are virtually outlawed and other dissident elements are suppressed through control of the press and through the more direct method of secret service espionage and arrest. By these methods new blood, new thought, and new inspiration have been discouraged—prevented—from coming into the Party with the resultant bureaucratic sterility that now characterizes the Kuomintang Government.

The influential personalities and elements that compose and control the Kuomintang under Chiang are described as a “congeries” because their association together in the Kuomintang is fortuitous and expedient. They are not held together by ideal or principle. They are held together by a common desire for self-preservation, by the external pressure of Japanese aggression and by the personality of the Generalissimo. They are grouped together and described as “cliques” because of the strong personal character of the groupings. Personal loyalties play a larger role in determining the composition and relations of the groups than do political or social concepts. The term “conservative” in describing this congeries of cliques is employed in a generic rather than a political sense; that is, they are bent on conserving what they have, which is control of the Government of China.

Most intelligent Chinese are intellectual liberals, mildly predisposed toward social liberalism but readily discouraged by racial and mass inertia. Many of the members of the Kuomintang were men of that type. The Kuomintang’s failure to solve any of the major economic and social problems of China, once it had formed a Government at Nanking in 1927, was caused by a strong desire to utilize the most immediate means for establishing and maintaining itself in power. Chiang Kai-shek, after sweeping north to the Yangtze on a revolutionary program, made his peace in Shanghai with the bankers and landlords and took into his fold such reactionary warlords as he could attract to his camp. Thereafter commenced the long battle to subdue the communists and liquidate non-cooperative military and political elements. The Kuomintang’s failure to effect reform became as much the cause as the result of its conservatism. Faced with a lack of popular enthusiasm and support because of its failure to provide solutions for the pressing social and economic problems, the party leadership has had perforce to concentrate on conserving its position against a potential—a probable—translation of this lack of enthusiasm into actual opposition. Hence the adoption of repressive measures to control and eradicate opposition; to enforce party discipline and inculcate through educational and training systems loyalty to so-called party ideals. “Party tutelage”, the professed prelude to the institution of a democratic system, has become an end in itself rather than a means toward the end of putting into effect Dr. Sun’s ideal of socially and economically democratic government. Political unity, held out as a prerequisite to the accomplishment of social reform and the institution of democratic government, has been perverted into a means of achieving a high degree of centralized bureaucratic control. Japanese aggression has been both an aid and an excuse for this tendency which was all too apparent, however, even prior to 1937.

(The foregoing general remarks regarding the character of the Kuomintang are made to indicate its position in the internal administration of the country. They are in no sense meant to disparage the role which the Kuomintang has played in leading and maintaining for five years resistance to Japan. It merits and has received high praise for its steadfast pursuit of the policy of resistance—not only physical resistance but resistance against a natural or racial tendency to seek compromise terms. It has also merited support in far greater degree than it has been given, for I think it will be generally agreed now that real and substantial aid to the Chinese forces during the years 1937–40 would have been sound policy. It is ironical, now that we are willingly committed to all practical assistance to China, that transportation difficulties prevent material support from reaching China in consequential volume.)

Personalities rather than ideas, as I have stated above, are the strongest influence in the Kuomintang Government. In any enumeration of the persons under Chiang who are credited with being the most influential—influential not only from the standpoint of their position within the Government or Party but from the standpoint of their relations and influence with the Generalissimo—five names usually stand out. They are: Dr. H. H. Kung, Vice President of the Executive Yuan and Minister of Finance; Dr. Chen Li-fu, Minister of Education who, with his no less influential brother, Chen Kuo-fu, heads the “C–C” clique; General Chang Chun, Chairman of the Szechuan Provincial Government and leader of the Cheng Hsueh Hsi (Political Science Society); General Ho Ying-chin, Chief of Staff and Minister of Military Administration; and General Tai Li, head of the powerful military secret police with the title of Director of the Statistical and Investigation Office of the Military Affairs Commission. In varying degrees, these men are important in their own right, as outstanding members of groups and as leaders of powerful organizations. There are of course the names of many officials that could be added to the list, officials who are associated with the five officials mentioned above or who have independent positions of influence but on a lower plane than those mentioned. Some of the more important of these are: Tai Chi-tao, President of the Examination Yuan, Chu Chia-hua, Vice President of the Examination Yuan; Dr. Sun Fo, President of the Legislative Yuan; Wang Shih-chieh, Minister of Information and Publicity; Wong Wen-hao, Minister of Economics; Hsu Kan, Minister of Food; Dr. Wong Chung-hui, Secretary General of the National Defense Council; General Wu Teh-chen, Secretary General of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee; General Ho Yao-tsu, head of the Generalissimo’s personal or household Secretariate or Aide-de-Camp organization (Shih Tsung Shih); Generals Hu Tsung-nan and Chen Ch’eng, commanders of two of the most powerful armies, “Whangpoa Cadets”, and favorites of the Generalissimo; and Generals Pai Chung-hsi and Li Tsung-jen, leaders of the Kwangsi group. The place and influence of the foregoing will be the subject of treatment in connection with the following discussion of the position and role of the five outstanding leaders.

Dr. H. H. Kung is the dominant figure in Chinese finance. For ten years he has been Minister of Finance, or, as it is sometimes put, the “obliging compradore” for his brother-in-law, Chiang Kai-shek, a circumstance which has insured his continuation in office against opposition and charges of incompetence. He has faithfully administered the finances of the country in a manner to meet the financial needs of the Generalissimo which has generally meant that he has administered them in a manner having little regard for sound financial practice according to Western standards. The insistence of the other brother-in-law, T. V. Soong, upon administration of the finances along relatively modern and sound lines was largely responsible for his “retirement” from office in favor of Kung. It is in fact a question whether Kung, considering the vastness of the country, general governmental administrative inefficiency, and difficulties imposed by Japanese aggression, has not carried on about as well as could be expected; whether a more competent Minister, from the western point of view, would not have succumbed where Kung has at least staved off financial collapse. Anyway, Chiang Kai-shek seems to be satisfied, which is sufficient to quiet opposition to Kung.

Kung has in a measure the support of the banking and landed interests in the country primarily because he has avoided measures which might antagonize them. He espouses no radical social program that is contrary to their interests. However, his plans for government monopolies and socialization of certain industries arouse suspicion among business interests, and the gravity of currency inflation is beginning to frighten financial interests. There are indications that landed and banking interests, which gave their support to the Kuomintang in 1927, are cooling toward the Party, and might be persuaded to withdraw their support if they were not frightened of the consequences of doing so; that is, if they knew where they could safely transfer their support.

In the course of his ten years in office, Kung has been able to establish for himself a loose following among younger officials in the Government and to some extent among field officers of the Army who look to him for special financial assistance. This has been partially due to patronage, partially due to a certain feeling of attachment which the genial descendant of Confucius inspires among associates, and partially to a kind of negative or reflex feeling that, in comparison with many of the party leaders, he represents a relatively liberal point of view. He has been described as the “political tent” under which those who find or desire no place in the ranks of the political cliques find shelter.

In an ill-defined way, Kung may be said to be the leader of the American returned student (“Christian”, “YMCA”, “modern”) type of Chinese; of those Chinese with a “western” as distinguished from an “eastern” outlook; of those Chinese who advocate cooperation with America and England. This is a leadership which he shares with the Soong family. In this position, as in his position as manager of the nation’s finances, he faces strong potential competition from his brother-in-law, T. V. Soong. There are many Chinese who look upon Soong as the “white hope” of a reconstructed “modern” China. But the competition between the two is a matter which one feels can be managed within “the family”. Madame Chiang and Madame Kung are believed quite capable of handling the situation in addition to their “task” of exerting considerable influence on government policy, especially foreign and financial. The Soong family is, through T. V. Soong, in charge of foreign relations, and through Kung, in control of finances. Chiang’s supreme position assures this and also assures that there will be no open breach in the “clan” front. The clan is the focal point and chief support of those Chinese with western or Anglo-American ideals and sympathies. Chiang’s dominant position, his background and outlook enable him to maintain an equilibrium and to enforce cooperation between this “western” group and the group which may be loosely described as “eastern” in its outlook and ideals. He is matrimonially and in a sense politically allied to the former but he is temperamentally in the latter camp.

At this point it seems appropriate to insert a brief mention of Dr. Sun Fo, son of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, and Madame Sun, wife [widow] of Dr. Sun and sister of Mme. Chiang and Mme. Kung. Sun Fo is President of the Legislative Yuan (the Legislative Yuan does not legislate; it simply puts into legislative form decisions of the party). He is not a man of ability and his influence, which is limited, is dependent entirely upon the fact of his being the only son of Sun Yat-sen. He endeavors, largely through speech making, to create for himself the position of leader of a liberal wing of the Party but with no marked success. He has few retainers of prominence in the Government, the outstanding one being Foo Ping-sheung, Political Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs. Madame Sun Yat-sen is now in Chungking only by force of circumstances. She maintained her residence in Hong Kong until forced to leave after the Japanese attack on the island. Her name means much to the radical and younger elements in and out of the Party but she lacks the force actually to assume a position of leadership. She is vaguely, idealistically, and quietly radical. She is not active in politics.

Dr. Chen Li-fu, Minister of Education, is, with his elder brother, Chen Kuo-fu, the leader of the very influential “C–C” clique. Chen Kuo-fu is head of the Central Broadcasting Administration and is Chief of the Personnel Section of the Generalissimo’s private Secretariate. Between them, the Chen brothers are in virtual control of education and propaganda. With their adherents they hold twenty-three places on the Central Executive Committee (the highest organ of the Party) which is the largest and most powerful block in the Committee. The “C–C” is in fact the strongest and most influential element in the Kuomintang. Notable adherents to the clique are Ku Cheng-kang, Minister of the recently organized Social Welfare Ministry, Hsu En-tseng, Vice Minister of Communications and chief of the party Secret Service, Pan Kung-chan, Vice Minister of the Central Publicity Board, and Chang Tao-fan, Chairman of the Central Cultural Committee of the Kuomintang.

The clique is in control of the Party police, a secret organization which investigates the conduct of party officials in the national and provincial governments and also maintains a close supervision over educational institutions and teaching throughout the country.

It is not easy to ascertain just what the clique stands for in national life. It is of course primarily interested in the perpetuation and increase of its own power. But it is also looked upon by the radicals and liberals as the most reactionary group of officials in the Kuomintang. Chen Li-fu is an engineer (graduate of Pittsburgh University) and somewhat of a philosopher. Chen Kuo-fu has been intimately associated with party affairs during the thirty years of his adult life. Their father befriended Chiang Kai-shek in his early days which probably accounts for a “Chinese bond” which exists between them and the Generalissimo. The Chens and their followers are nationalistic—national socialist in modern parlance. Given a completely free hand, party tutelage under their guidance would become absolute party dictatorship. In Europe they would probably be called “fascists”. The “moderating leaven” of China saves them from that. They are not anti-foreign; but neither are they pro-foreign. They are “eastern” and nationalistic in their outlook. They evince little sympathy with democratic concepts of government. With the rest of Kuomintang officialdom, they are anti-communist. Chen Li-fu speaks and writes with almost religious fervor of the great part which Chinese culture, Chinese philosophy, the Chinese art of thought life must play in the future up-building of China and the east. He wants technical and material assistance from the west; but that is all. Chen Kuo-fu speaks very little; is very little in the public eye; but behind the scenes he is a potent force for party discipline—party discipline in line with the undemocratic ideas of the “C–C” clique.

At this point it is convenient to insert mention of the President and Vice President of the Examination Yuan, Tai Chi-tao and Chu Chia-hua respectively. The Examination Yuan is the department of the government charged with the duty of supervising and investigating the conduct of government (as distinguished from Party) officials. Tai Chi-tao is an elder statesman of the Party. He is not active in the Government, preferring to study the classics, a course which it is understood has led him away from the original Kuomintang concepts (he was once a “revolutionary”) to advocacy of paternalistic government along the lines of the early “Middle Kingdom”. His influence in the Government is almost wholly personal and stems from his close association with Chiang Kai-shek. They were fellow students in Japan; have remained close friends since. It is understood that Tai sends to Chiang each week at the request of the latter a digest result of his week’s perusal of the classics.

Chu Chia-hua is active in the Government. He exercises considerable influence through his “management” of officials, especially officials of the lower grades and those out in the provinces. He is a German returned student and is credited with being an admirer of the nazi form of government. Although neither Tai Chi-tao nor Chu Chia-hua are directly associated with the “C–C” clique (Chu is in fact used somewhat by the Generalissimo as a foil to the “C–C”) Tai’s paternalism and Chu’s nazi leanings lend support to the “C–C” ideas and measures for party government.

General Chang Chun, former foreign minister and present Chairman of the government of Szechuan Province (the stronghold and support of the National Government for the past four years) is an intimate and influential friend and advisor of the Generalissimo and by virtue of this association is looked upon as the leading member of the so-called “Political Science Society” (Cheng Hsueh Hsi). Chiang and Chang were fellow students in Japan and have been closely associated ever since. The Cheng Hsueh Hsi is no longer an organization, as it was in the early days of the Chinese Republic, with well denned policies and aims^*. It has become simply the name applied to a certain type of Chinese officials who, by training, character, and political outlook are conveniently grouped together. Their outlook is conservative; it is “eastern” in contradistinction to the “western” outlook of the Anglo-American trained group. Many of the outstanding figures were students in Japan but the group cannot be called pro-Japanese. They are, if an appellation is needed, thoroughly pro-Chinese. The Cheng Hsueh Hsi members generally were probably not imbued with much enthusiasm for resistance to Japan at the inception of hostilities, favoring compromise arrangements, but they have supported the Government in its policy of resistance.

It is difficult to ascertain with any degree of certainty just what officials today are considered to be adherents or “members” of the Cheng Hsueh Hsi. Chang Chun has been named as the leading member. Wu Ting-chang, Governor of Kweichow, is a highly respected and capable official who ranks high in the group. Others are: Wang Chung-hui, Secretary General of the Supreme National Defense Council, former Foreign Minister and Judge of the Hague Court; Chang Chia-ngau, Minister of Communications; Chen Yi, Secretary General of the Executive Yuan; Tsiang Ting-fu, Director of the Political Affairs Department of the Executive Yuan; Chen Pu-lei (also close to the “C–C” clique) departmental chief in the Generalissimo’s headquarters secretariate (Shih Chung Shih); Wong Wen-hao, Minister of Economics; Wang Shih-chieh, Party Minister of Information (Wang is also somewhat in the orbit of the “C–C”); Hsiung Shih-hui, former Governor of Kiangsi and now head of the Chinese military mission in Washington. General Wu Teh-chen, Secretary General of the Kuomintang and as such titulary second ranking man in the party, was at one time identified with the Cheng Hsueh Hsi. His influence is by no means commensurate with his position. Many provincial officials are associated with the Cheng Hsueh Hsi and some military commanders by training and outlook are Cheng Hsueh Hsi in character. Ho Ying-chin is an outstanding example.

These officials have been described as the intellectuals of the government and party. It is true that as a group they are the best trained men in the government. They are familiar with the form and functioning of government according to the best Chinese standards. Although they maintain a high respect for “things Chinese”, they are not opposed to such western technique and technical processes as can be safely grafted on the Chinese system without altering its character. Many have a broad—a modern—outlook but they are looking through Chinese eyes always. Their influence is largely personal. They do not have the backing of an organization or machine or of military or popular groups except in so far as they personally find favor with those groups. Generally speaking the Cheng Hsueh Hsi membership finds Dr. Kung distasteful and there have been undercurrent attempts to displace him. When Kung was ill last winter Chang Chun was advocating Wu Ting-chang as his successor. There is no particular antagonism between the Cheng Hsueh Hsi and the “C–C” but where the latter is reactionary the former is only conservative. Speaking generally, the group members may be counted upon to use their influence against any form of radicalism without opposing improvements which they consider consonant with Chinese life and institutions. They believe in China; that is, in the Chinese in a Chinese way.

General Ho Ying-chin as a young man participated in the Chinese Revolution in 1911 and since that time he has been active in both military and party affairs. Like so many of the prominent officials of the Kuomintang, he studied in Japan for a period. Since 1930 he has been Chief of Staff and Minister of Military Administration. While he has no army immediately under him, he has been able through his long administration of military affairs to establish a strong position with the army, particularly with divisional and lesser commanders who look to him for preferment and promotion. The fact that he was at one time chief instructor at the Whampoa Military Cadets Academy (Canton) gives him a position of influence with the group of army officers known as the “Whampoa Cadets”. General Ho also wields considerable influence in Party politics. Stories that he is pro-Japanese should be discounted. There is no evidence to support such stories. He is, like his fellow party members in the Cheng Hsueh Hsi, “eastern” in his viewpoint. Incidentally, his relations with Cheng Hsueh Hsi members are good. Anti-communism is, with him, as with so many of the Chinese military officers, an obsession. This gives rise at times to the suspicion that he may be more interested in liquidating the communist forces than in defeating the Japanese, and to the feeling that Ho and others of his mind would view a Russian victory over Japan in the Far East with only slightly less misgivings than a Japanese victory. There is reason to suspect that this state of mind consciously or unconsciously prompts Chinese insistence that Japan be eliminated first after which full attention can be turned to aiding Russia defeat Germany. Dr. Kung only recently in conversation with me outlined his plan of strategy along those lines. Nothing would be more agreeable to a large body of Kuomintang officials than to eliminate Japan while Russia was still fully engaged in Europe, their thought, of course, being that Russia would then have little say in the eventual peace settlement in the Far East.

Stories that General Ho’s relations with General Chiang Kai-shek are not on a friendly basis would seem to have as little foundation in fact as stories that he is pro-Japanese. Reports indicate the contrary and, whereas Ho enjoys a position in the Government and Party which many think makes him the logical successor to Chiang, there is no indication that he would lend himself to any scheme to supplant Chiang.

Tai Li, as Chief of the Statistical and Investigation Office of the Military Affairs Commission, is chief of the secret military police. Operatives under his control are estimated to number at least 100,000 men. Tai Li is a military man, a Whampoa Cadet, and as such a member of the “Whampoa” clique in the army. And Tai Li is the completely trusted subordinate—and guardian—of the Generalissimo, subject only to the Generalissimo’s orders. He does the inside investigation jobs for the Generalissimo; he is in charge of the Generalissimo’s personal bodyguard; he, with his organization, is the medium through which much unofficial “business” is done both in China and abroad; and he is efficient.

Being head of a strong and secret organization and having the personal confidence of the Generalissimo gives Tai Li a position of “influence” in the Government and in the Army of no mean proportions. His identification with the strong “Whampoa” clique in the Army strengthens his influence. His organization is at times utilized to counterbalance the Party police under the “C–C” clique—an illustration of one of the fundamental tenets of Chiang’s policy in controlling the Kuomintang, that is, the maintenance of an equilibrium of forces by means of checks and balances. General Tai is, however, much more than a check or balance. He is the personification of the latter day repressive tendencies of the Kuomintang.

Although the primary objective of this memorandum is discussion of influential elements in the Party and Government, it is believed that a useful purpose will be served, somewhat in continuation of the discussion of General Ho Ying-chin and General Tai Li, by giving a brief account of the leading figures in the Army. Army commanders continue to enjoy a large degree of independence in the areas in which they are stationed. Warlordism is not dead and with the return of peace, it will require strong management to prevent its active recrudescence as a major political factor in China. Even now in the midst of war army commanders are understood to be hoarding material against the day when they may have to defend their position and prerogatives against a demand for demobilization and the institution of civilian control.

General Hu Tsung-nan, with headquarters at Sian, Shensi, is credited with having the largest and best equipped body of soldiers in China under his command. Directly and indirectly he commands over 400,000 men stationed in the area extending from western Honan through Shensi to Kansu. The area is considered as being “politically” very strategic. Theoretically Hu is under the commander of the 8th War Zone (General Chu Shao-liang); practically, he is under the Generalissimo only. It is Hu Tsung-nan’s troops who quarantine the communist forces in northern Shensi. He is actively and thoroughly anti-communist. He was a leading spirit in the organization known as the “Blue Shirts”, a semi-military, semi-political body of men charged with the duty of keeping the Army free from contamination from liberal or subversive influences. The organization was disbanded because of the odium attached to colored shirts but another group is being developed to take its place—the San Min Chu I (the Kuomintang Three Principles of Dr. Sun) Youth Corps. This Corps is trained along strict lines of Party loyalty and discipline. Civilian as well as military officials are enlisted. It, as the “Blue Shirts” before it, has a strong flavor of fascism.

Hu Tsung-nan is a leading member of the Army clique known as the “Whampoa Cadets”. Although his relations with General Ho Ying-chin are understood to be good, he enjoys direct relationship with the Generalissimo which removes him from control by Ho. He is one of the Generalissimo’s most trusted lieutenants. He is also an intimate of his fellow “Cadet”, General Tai Li. Together they make a strong pair. General Hu’s troops have done virtually no fighting since 1938, although they are the best equipped in China. The Russians complain that the best of the material which they sent into China during 1938–40 went to this non-fighting organization. Hu’s job would seem to be primarily the quarantine of the communists and the maintenance of a safe base for retreat from the south and east to the northwest in case of necessity. In this job he seems to have the full support of the Generalissimo.

General Ch’en Ch’eng, also a “Whampoa Cadet”, and also a favorite of the Generalissimo’s, is commander of the strategically important 6th War Zone which covers western Hupeh, western Hunan, and eastern Szechuan. It is the area in which a Chinese offensive, with the recapture of Ichang as the initial objective, would produce immediately advantageous results. But General Ch’en Ch’eng, although considered an able commander, has done little to distinguish himself in recent years. At one time he was looked upon as the logical successor to General Chiang, but that day is long past. His importance today derives from the confidence which Chiang reposes in him.

General Li Tsung-jen and General Pai Chung-hsi are military commanders with political affiliations as leaders of the Kwangsi faction which in 1936 started an abortive rebellion against Chiang but since the outbreak of hostilities against Japan, has cooperated loyally with the Government. Li Tsung-jen is commander of the 5th War Zone with headquarters at Laohokow, Hupeh. He is a good soldier and has under him two good vice commanders in Generals Sun Lien-chung and Li Pin-hsien. General Pai Chung-hsi is Vice Chief of Staff in Chungking. He has no army. He is credited with being the best strategist in the Chinese army. In addition to his leading position in the Kwangsi party, he wields a considerable influence as the outstanding Mohammedan in the Chinese Government. Loosely associated with Generals Li and Pai is General Chang Fa-kwei (Old Ironsides) who is commander of the 4th or Kwangsi War Zone. He is a good soldier and popular with the people. The 7th or Kwang-zung War Zone is commanded by General Yu Han-mou with a very low reputation as a soldier but in the good graces of the Generalissimo because he “turned” loyal during the 1936 Kwangsi-Kwangtung rebellion.

General Ku Chu-tung, commander of the 3rd War Zone (principally Chekiang, Kiangsi and Fukien provinces) which has in recent weeks been the scene of successful Japanese offensives, is a Ho Ying-chin man. The aging and inactive General Yen Hsi-shan is commander of the 2nd or Shansi War Zone. Other commanders meriting mention are General Chiang Ting-wen, 1st War Zone in Honan; General Chu Shao-liang, 8th War Zone with headquarters at Lan-chow; General Hsueh Yueh, 9th or Hunan War Zone; General Yu Hsueh-chung on the Shantung-Kiangsi border (former “northeast”—Manchuria—man) and General Wei Li-huang on the Hopei–Chahar border. The list would not be complete without the names of General Lung Yun, semi-independent Chairman of the Yunnan Government and commander of the mediocre Yunnan army; and Generals Fu Tso-yi and Ma Hung-kuei, theoretically commanders under Chu Shao-liang (mentioned above) but actually semi-independent warlords in the provinces of Suiyuan and Ninghsia respectively.

The foregoing description of Kuomintang leadership (in Government and Army as well as Party) is suggestive rather than conclusive. The very nature of the set-up precludes precise interpretation and statements with regard to position, function, and meaning. The individuals, elements, and cliques operate within a Party and Government framework in a highly personal manner. However, some general deductions are permissible.

It would seem to be clear from the foregoing that General Chiang Kai-shek is the undisputed leader. His leading position derives as much from the personal loyalties he commands as from the offices he holds. In large measure the latter derives from the former. It follows that Chiang, committed to resistance to the Japanese, will be able to pursue his policies without major hindrance. There is no doubt that his supporters exercise a modifying influence. In the matter of resistance, for instance, there is reason to doubt that some of his supporters are as convinced of the wisdom of all out Chinese resistance in cooperation with America, England and Russia as the Generalissimo has indicated himself to be. The conservative or “preservative” instinct of the Party follows through to the Army, units of which are suspected of unwillingness to expend their strength, desiring to conserve their strength against the day when it may serve a useful purpose in internal “adjustments”. The proposition of “containing” Japanese troops in China is bad psychology. The Chinese have for five years been trying to get rid of the Japanese.

While there is an unquestionable lack of matériel to carry on any major offensive against the Japanese, there is also a lack of offensive spirit, partially explained by the attitude of mind described above. Hence, resistance may be expected to continue, but it may be expected to continue to be “Chinese resistance”; not the active resistance which western military critics desire and western eulogizers portray. Harm has been done by both groups. The Chinese deserve much credit for the resistance they have put up against the Japanese but no useful purpose is served by great expectations for the near future. We may count on resistance under Chiang and count on his having the continued, if at times and in some quarters conditional, support of his associates.

(It is highly improbable that a situation will arise which would cause Chiang voluntarily to retire, and there is not believed to be the will or the power in or out of Party ranks to cause his involuntary retirement. Only a widespread lack of confidence in ultimate allied victory could bring about Chiang’s retirement. Should he be fortuitously removed from the scene the probabilities are that either Ho Ying-chin would succeed him or a compromise candidate, such as Tai Chi-tao, would be put forward and supported by General Ho, the Chens and Chang Chun with Ho taking the commandership of the army under arrangement with such powers as Hu Tsung-nan, Tai Li, etc., with the Chens taking over full control of the Party, and with Chang Chun assuming the Presidency of the Executive Yuan. Kung would probably be eased out and Soong influence would diminish. This is purely speculative but indicates broadly what might be expected. The attitude toward resistance, under such a set-up, would depend largely upon the fortunes of war at the time. There would be a tendency away from collaboration with the allied powers, the “eastern” as distinguished from the “western” viewpoint would be unchallenged, and a policy of “watch and wait” with regard to the war would prevail. The principal preoccupation would be maintenance of internal unity.)

With regard to internal administration under the present leadership, it is obvious that the situation is heavily weighted on the side of conservatism, political and selfish. Effective measures for financial, economic and social reform cannot be expected from the present leadership either now or in the post-war period. Whether or not the Kuomintang as presently constituted will be able to maintain its leadership after the war is a question which hinges on unpredictable developments. There are younger elements in the party which are liberal minded. They are numerous and intelligent but they occupy subordinate posts and have little influence. There are also liberal groups outside the party; and there is the communist element stronger potentially than actually. If Russian armies prove to be a major factor in defeating the Japanese armies the liberal and communist elements will undoubtedly be strengthened. The Kuomintang, faced with this situation, could adopt two courses. It could readily put into effect long overdue measures for social and economic reform. By so doing it could gain the support of the liberal elements in and out of the Party and cut the ground from under the communists. On the other hand, frightened by liberal and popular criticism and fearful of the communists, it could go to the extremes of reaction, adopting oppressive and suppressive measures to kill all opposition and to maintain itself in power. Under the present leadership the latter alternative seems to be the more likely of the two. All the trappings for state socialism along nazi lines are present: a strong party control under the “C–C” clique; an effective gestapo under Tai Li; and a military power and organization, headed by Ho Ying-chin, thoroughly asocial in its outlook and bent on maintenance of its position and prerogatives in the national life.

This is the darkest side of the picture. It is possible that the current of social reform—that the demand for making victory a people’s victory and peace a popular peace, as opposed to a peace of nationalism and class interest—will be so strong that the Kuomintang will be swept along with it or swept away to give place to the younger progressive elements in the country. Those elements are present and if given a chance could make the Kuomintang a vital force for instituting social as well as political democracy in China. But these progressive elements must be “given” the chance. The conservative opposition is too strong for them to “take” it. Whether or not they are given the chance will depend very largely on outside influences and pressure. There will be no voluntary relinquishment. The Chens and the Tai Lis must go, the warlords and the landlords must be subordinated to the national interest. This having been accomplished, the Kungs and the Soongs and the Cheng Hsueh Hsi might be fitted into a liberal regime, and the Chinese communists would probably cooperate with it.

After victory, China will emerge as the strongest Far Eastern Nation. It will be one of the major tasks of the post-war period to utilize our influence and support to the end that liberal elements are enabled to assume a position of leadership in the government of China.

John Carter Vincent

27. Marginal notation: “Also at beginning of war was made ‘Tsung-tsai’, Director General of the K. M. T., having all the rights formerly enjoyed by Sun Yat-sen.”
28. The Cheng Hsueh Hsi stems from the party that grouped itself around Kang Yu Wei, the Chinese political reformer of the late 1890s. They were known as the Wei Hsing Pai (Reform Party) and advocated moderate progressive change in opposition to the radical revolutionaries. After the revolution of 1911, the group became known as the Cheng Hsueh Hsi and was especially active during the parliamentary period in Peking (1912–15). The members were largely intellectuals, familiar with the technique of government. Liang Chi-chao was one of the early leaders of the group. After the breakdown of parliamentary government and the beginning of the “warlord period” the group had little influence except as individuals, although a loose organization of sorts was maintained. Their influence was strongest in provincial governments. When Chiang Kai-shek’s northern conquest reached the Yangtze valley in 1926, when he had broken with the communists, made his peace with the Shanghai bankers and established his government at Nanking, need was felt for men competent in government administration. At that time Yang Yung-tai was the recognized leader of the Cheng Hsueh Hsi. Chiang made him governor of Hupeh province and having placed him in this important position he called other members of the group into the government. [Footnote in the original.]