811.248/686: Telegram
The Ambassador in China (Gauss) to the Secretary of State
[Received 3:09 p.m.]
936. Naval Attaché’s telegram 110541, August 11, to Navy Department87 regarding United States Air Force in China carried notation of my request that contents of message be communicated to State Department.
Chinese have been critical of our failures to give them military aid while substantial American support flows or is diverted to other theatres of the war. This criticism has been partially offset by remarkable record made by our small air force in China which has favorably [Page 132] affected Chinese morale, military and civilian. I am concerned over political repercussions and effect on Chinese morale which would result from decrease or cessation of American air activity in China due to our failure to provide support and replacements and speedily to reinforce present small air strength now here.
There has been a tendency (1) to endeavor to justify American air operations in China solely on grounds of their preventing a collapse of Chinese resistance, and (2) more recently to integrate an American Air Force in China with plans for retaking Burma and thus to justify its existence in relation to those plans. Without underestimating the importance of our support in bolstering Chinese morale and in making effective Chinese resistance or importance of retaking Burma (plans for which seem to be premature and impractical in present circumstances), I believe that an American air force has a distinct offensive mission in China quite independent of considerations mentioned above; that it has a positive self-justifying contribution to make in the general offensive against Japan. It does not appear to me that so few planes can be so effectively employed in any other theater of the war. Chennault’s operations during past months seem to me to have demonstrated this. Not only can he continue with a proper force (1) to give effective aid to Chinese ground forces in offering resistance to what we may expect to be an increasing Japanese pressure, and (2) to contain in China and inflict substantial losses on Japanese air units which otherwise could be diverted to areas in which American forces may be operating, but they should be able, given proper support, (3) to attack Japanese supply routes from Japan southward thus assisting in our operations in South Pacific area, and (4) eventually to carry out raids on Japan from Chinese bases as such bases are retaken.
I consider foregoing a conservative estimate of potentialities of an American air force in China and, therefore, recommend that the most earnest consideration be given to establishing and supporting such a force here.