Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1942, China

740.0011 Pacific War/2803

The Ambassador in China (Gauss) to the Secretary of State

No. 570

Chungking, August 12, 1942.
[Received September 11.]

Sir: I have the honor to enclose copy of a despatch⁸⁶ from Second Secretary of Embassy John Davies, Jr., attached to the American Military Mission, submitting copy of a memorandum prepared by him for Lieutenant General Joseph W. Stilwell appraising the China-Burma-India situation; an appraisal which I assume was desired by General Stilwell in connection with what I understand to be his recommendation, or contemplated recommendation, for a joint American-British-Chinese expedition to retake Burma, strike at the Japanese in French Indo-China and Thailand, and reopen the Burma Road to supply and energize the China theater for air attacks on Japan proper and on Japanese lines of communication and supply to the south.

General Stilwell has casually mentioned, but not discussed his plans with me. I am told, however, that his proposals would contemplate the training and equipment in India—where American lend-lease materiel and equipment intended for China are now available but cannot be moved into China for lack of sufficient air transport—of several Chinese divisions which, with a number of British divisions, and perhaps three American divisions, as an American “token” force, with appropriate air and other support, should constitute an expeditionary force under American high command, to retake Burma. There are already several thousand Chinese troops in India or Assam, being part of the Chinese force that escaped from Burma.

Mr. Davies’ memorandum suggests that the British have no intention of attempting to retake Burma in the foreseeable future for the same reason displayed in the lack of interest in an aggressive defense of Burma, that is, the conviction that no Asiatic possession is worth any appreciable diversion of strength from the British Isles; that the war will be won in Europe; and that at the peace conference lost possessions will revert to Britain with clear title. The memorandum asserts—with what authority, I do not know—that there are adequate British forces in India for an expedition to retake Burma. The memorandum fails to consider the situation in the Middle East as it threatens the security of India, nor does it consider the internal situation in India and its relation to any decision to send British troops—principally Indians—on an expedition to Burma. It seems to me that another important factor in any Burma campaign would be the question of the proposed future status of Burma, the decision on which might affect the attitude of the Burmese toward the proposed expedition into their country.

In examining the China situation, Mr. Davies asserts that it is China’s policy to conserve rather than to expend Chinese military strength, China’s confidence being placed in American sea and air power—and perhaps Russian military and air strength—to defeat the Japanese. Mr. Davies suggests, however, that China might be persuaded to join in a second Burma campaign; an opinion in which I concur, although it is known that at the time that Generalissimo Chiang ordered the participation of Chinese forces in the defense of Burma there were those among his military advisers who strongly urged against the sending of more than a “token” force to the Burma front.

The proposed Stilwell expedition against Burma, however—if it has actually been recommended; a point on which I have no positive information—would, in my opinion, require substantial naval and air support, and, it seems to me, should be undertaken only as a carefully synchronized measure in a grand strategy for a general offensive against Japan—from Australia, by sea against Japan’s outlying naval and air bases in the Pacific, by overwhelming naval force against Japan proper, and by aerial attack from Siberian or any other available bases.

Major operations against Japan on such a scale could not likely be undertaken until the fortunes of the United Nations in the European theater permit of the necessary diversion of man power, aerial force, naval strength, and shipping, materiel and supplies in sufficient volume to the Pacific area.

Meanwhile, as to the China front, earnest consideration should be given to extending such practical, substantial aid to China as may be possible to permit China to continue to maintain resistance to Japan and to contain the Japanese force now in this country. It has been demonstrated that even limited American air support—that is, planes and American personnel—can be of vital and substantial assistance to China in aid to the Chinese ground forces, in attacking Japanese air and other bases and shipping and lines of supply and communication, and in sustaining and improving Chinese morale. I am of the opinion that the present very limited air support—more restricted than intended due to the diversion of planes and personnel to the Middle East—should be increased to the point possible with existing Chinese air bases, reserve supplies of aviation gasoline, bombs, et cetera (and their replenishment by reasonable air transport facilities). The American air force in China, under the command of Brigadier General Claire Chennault, who formerly headed the American Volunteer Group of the Chinese Air Force, has demonstrated what can be done with so little under the conditions existing in this theater of the war by an efficient and experienced officer who has made long observation of Japanese aerial tactics and has shown courage, resource and sound judgment in actual combat operations.

The American Army Air Force in China should be increased and maintained and supported, within the limits of the available facilities in China, as the one real and substantial contribution that we can make to China at the present stage of the war. A substantial air transport supply service will be required to maintain this force alone. This service should be provided and extended as rapidly as possible to permit of regular supplies of essential raw materials for the continued necessary operation of China’s small arms arsenals and ammunition factories.

Respectfully yours,

C. E. Gauss

[Enclosure]

Memorandum by the Second Secretary of Embassy in China (Davies)

The China-Burma-India Theater—A Reappraisal

In any appraisal of the China-Burma-India theater the following factors should be kept in mind:

(1) The objectives of the Chinese Government are (a) to insure its own perpetuation and domestic supremacy and (b) to come to the peace table as militarily powerful as possible.

(2) The policy of the Chinese Government is therefore to conserve rather than to expend its military strength, counting on American air and sea power and possibly the Russian Army and Air Force to defeat the Japanese.

(3) It may be possible to induce the Chinese High Command to assume the offensive only if it is persuaded that its expenditure of military equipment will immediately be replaced, and with interest.

(4) It follows that the transfer of lend-lease supplies to China without any quid pro quo demands will result in the supplies being hoarded and not in their use against the Japanese, as is the intent of lend-lease legislation.

(5) For the same reason that they displayed no interest in an aggressive defense of Burma, the British appear to have no intention of attempting to retake Burma in the foreseeable future. That reason would seem to be a British conviction that no Asiatic possession is worth any appreciable diversion of strength from the British Isles; that the war will be won in Europe; and that lost possessions will at the peace conference revert with clear title to the British if those colonies remain up to the termination of hostilities under enemy occupation, whereas if those possessions are reoccupied with Chinese and American assistance British title may be compromised.

(6) While activation of the Chinese will require a combination of generous inducement and firm insistence upon Chinese fulfillment of their side of the bargain, the galvanization of the British into a counter-offensive against Burma can probably be accomplished only by pressure from the highest American source on London together with the commitment of a token American force to the reconquest of Burma, which commitment may be expected to force British parallel action. There are enough British Empire troops in India for the job.

(7) The reconquest of Burma is a prerequisite to (a) the fullest utilization (through the reopening of the Burma Road) of China as a base from which to inflict injury on Japan where Japan is most critically vulnerable, or (b) the opening of a second front in southeastern Asia (Thailand and Indochina).

(8) The recent Burma campaign demonstrated the absolute necessity of effective central command in any combined military action in this theater. Both Chinese and British generalship in this theater has been utterly incompetent and lacking in offensive spirit. If an attempt is to be made to retake Burma and open a second front, supreme command must be in American hands, and it must be made effective.

(9) The principal factor limiting American action, present and potential, in China, Burma and India is a logistic one. Always when planning there must be kept in mind the 12,000 miles of sea supply lines to India, the inefficient overloaded railways across India, the Japanese submarines in the Bay of Bengal, the trickle of supplies by air transport from Assam into China, and the problem of motor fuel which increases by geometric progression each stage that it is removed eastward from Kunming. The limitation of the long sea supply line cannot be eradicated. But the recapture of Rangoon and the Andaman and Nicobar Islands would go far toward eliminating the other restricting factors.

So much for a few of the basic factors to be kept in mind. It may be useful at this point to proceed to general comment and an examination of some of the courses of action open to us.

Considering the disposition of Japanese military strength and China’s geographic position in relation to that disposition and considering the possibility of putting into action the currently idle Chinese and British military strength, the conclusion is borne home that probably nowhere in this war can we do so much with so little as in the China-Burma-India theater. Realistic American diplomatic bargaining and pressure plus American military commitments (the extent of which would be scarcely noticeable in the Western European or Russian theaters) can launch a train of action in this theater promising a maximum return for a minimum investment.

The cheapest effort we could make would be to confine ourselves to the operation of a relatively small air force from existing bases in free China. This would not involve an attempt to retake Burma. The supplying of this force would be accomplished by air transport from northeastern India. Because of this logistic limitation, it would probably be impossible to maintain long-range four engine bombers as part of the force. Medium bombers and pursuits would have to do the job. Within their range of operations in occupied China are many Japanese installations, much Japanese shipping and aviation and tremendous quantities of Japanese supplies, all of which are already being reduced with conspicuous success by the pitifully small American Army air force now in China. Yet this is not going to defeat Japan.

If Burma is retaken, the port of Rangoon made accessible to American shipping and the Burma Road reopened, our increased effort can be concentrated on intensifying and expanding the activities of the American air force in China to include long-range bombardment of industrial Japan and Japanese shipping in the Formosan straits and the South China Sea. Sustained bombing of these two objectives will do more toward defeating Japan than any other single operation. It is attacking the roots and trunk of the thorn tree rather than the outer branches and brambles. Furthermore, such an operation will tend to draw Japanese strength back toward Japan and Formosa and so reduce the threat to India and Siberia. If our plan is to concentrate on the China theater, American ground forces committed to the retaking of Burma might logically be used in the protection of advance American bases in East China.

A third choice also envisages the reoccupation of Burma and the reopening of Rangoon and the Burma Road. But instead of concentrating our efforts on air operations against Japan and the Japanese lifeline southward, we would, leaning heavily on the manpower of our allies, undertake an offensive southeastward from China and Burma. The land offensive would be supported by naval action in the southwest Pacific. These coordinated operations would be designed to cut into Japan’s southern salient, so vulnerable from the west, and to reduce the Japanese threat to Siberia or, if Japan has by the time this second front is opened attacked the Soviet Union, to relieve the Russians by diverting and dispersing Japanese strength southward.

John Davies

Chungking, July 31, 1942.

86. Not printed.