740.0011 P.W./621: Telegram
The Minister in Thailand (Peck) to the Secretary of State
Bangkok, November
15, 1941—2 p.m.
[Received 5:40 p.m.]
[Received 5:40 p.m.]
520. Legation’s 504, November 6, 5 p.m.
- 1.
- As signs multiply of Japanese preparations for offensive action in some direction from Indochina and of “allied” measures in opposition, the Thai Government feels increasing anxiety over the part it must play in the struggle. The Government continues to exhort the people to avoid offenses to any nation. The Prime Minister has published a denial that Thailand is pro-British and ungrateful to Japan as asserted in a Japanese news article. The Thai recommendations have refrained from obvious military protective steps lest the Japanese seize on them as pretexts for action. Underlying these feeble efforts to stay out of the impending struggle there is a general conviction that a Japanese attack is coming and that after a futile resistance Thailand must capitulate unless effective [American] and British aid is forthcoming. The Japanese are reported as warning the Thais that this aid will be only “lip service”.
- 2.
- In a very confidential interview on November 13, the Minister for Foreign Affairs told me the Government had finally determined to establish a “Supreme Command of the Armed Forces” as was done during the hostilities with Indochina. He said the Government knew the Japanese would demand an explanation and had decided to give no explanation but the general right of self-defense. He [again?] reaffirmed Thai determination to resist invasion and he again pleaded for the gasoline, lubricating oil and airplanes already asked. He stated, however, that Thailand offers in the main a flat terrain, that in about 1 month the ground will be dry and firm enough to bear 10 ton tanks and that successful defense will be extremely difficult and in fact impossible unless Britain and America oppose Japan with their military forces. He said that the Government would feel a little encouragement in facing the struggle if given only a “ray of hope” of British and American armed support.
- 3.
- The Kurusu mission30 seems to me the final appeal to peaceful measures before Japan pleads vital necessity and further extends her war of conquest. The British Minister has informed me that he has received telegrams indicating that the American Government has promised the Thai Minister that if Japan invades this country and [Page 343] Thailand resists them American assistance will be given similar to that afforded to China. The Minister for Foreign Affairs has not mentioned to me this reported promise. It is a question how long the Thai Government would survive a determined Japanese attack unless they [are strengthened?] by such assistance. There is reliable information that present plans are to remove the capital in an emergency to Chieng-mai, roughly 450 miles from Bangkok, in the comparatively mountainous northwest, 60 [miles?] from the Burma border. The British Minister has casually suggested to me the possibility that the Government might, if it desired, remove to the extreme south and join its forces with the British. Japanese press items reprinted here have recently alleged that the United States had sold this country two naval vessels and two lots of planes, the latter being Martin bombers in the Netherlands East Indies. A Thai communiqué concerning the latest report states that, if the United States were to supply arms, friendly relations with that country would be correspondingly enhanced. I am not aware how much truth underlies these various reports but I venture to observe that munitions supplied by Great Britain and the United States to Thailand in the month that still intervenes before the earliest probable moment of Japanese invasion would be of greater encouragement and assistance toward resistance than if supplied after the country had been demoralized by bombing and military penetration.
- 4.
- In estimating possibilities particular account must be taken of the Prime Minister. It is alleged that the Japanese have access to him through private unofficial sources. It is conceivable that the Japanese might promise Thailand restitution of large portions of Indochina which the Thais regard as “lost territory”. The Thais are passionately devoted to obtaining redress of these “ancient wrongs” and the opportunity might blind them to the danger of becoming a puppet nation of Japan. I recommend that to offset the threats and persuasion applied by Japan and [to?] Thailand and to reinforce their will to resist we immediately supply the Thais with limited planes and fuel and give them an assurance of some sort of military aid in parallel action with Great Britain.
- 5.
- In conclusion I suggest that the American and British effort to prevent Japanese domination of the western Pacific would be strengthened politically by announcing a determination to protect the integrity of Thailand. Otherwise in all the south of China the struggle will relate only to territorial possessions.
Peck