892.24/91
Memorandum by the Adviser on Political Relations (Hornbeck)
Reference, the question of planes for Thailand; the aide-mémoire handed to Sir Ronald Campbell on November 6; and especially Bangkok’s telegram 504, November 6, 5 p.m.
In handing to Sir Ronald Campbell the aide-mémoire under reference I stated that the reply therein contained to the British Government’s [Page 338] inquiry need not put an end to consideration by my Government and Sir Ronald’s Government of the question of planes for Thailand. I said that it seemed to us that as a matter of practical procedure and of political practicability, it would be more feasible for the British than for us to put planes into Thailand. I pointed out that in either case the planes would be American planes. The British could set them down in Thailand more quickly and with less publicity than could we.
In the light of developments in Indochina and of the approach made to us by Chiang Kai-shek, the pressure both upon this country and upon the British of supplying aid to China is increased. It seems to me that at this moment it is highly desirable that we and the British make a special and extra effort to reinforce the morale and the capacity to resist of both the Chinese and the Thais. In both cases the maximum of advantage would flow from direct supplying of planes by the British, with the indirect supplying by us. This might be effected by a conclusion of an arrangement whereunder we might undertake that for every plane which the British supply from Singapore or Burma or India we will send to the British one or more planes by way of replacement.
It is of course a fact that for each plane that we send to the Far Eastern and Indian Ocean theaters, we send one less plane to the European and Mediterranean theaters. However, the number called for in order to produce certain psychological and military effects in the Far Eastern situation is small and the potential advantages of such investments in that area are large.
There would be warrant for urging upon the British a release of some planes from Singapore even if it could not be arranged that replacement would be made immediately from this country. We have been placing substantial air forces at Manila, and every plane that we send there contributes substantially toward increasing the security of Singapore. In the light of the combined British, Dutch and American preparations of the past few months in the general area under consideration, the likelihood of a Japanese attack upon Singapore or the Malay Peninsula has been greatly diminished. At this point the British might well move planes from Singapore into China and into Thailand, with some arrangement for a recall in certain eventualities, without great risk so far as Singapore is concerned (but, of course, with substantial risk so far as Hong Kong is concerned).26
- As reported in a memorandum of November 18 by the Liaison Officer (Wilson) to the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hamilton), this matter was a subject of discussion at the Liaison Meeting held on November 12; and “The consensus of opinion was that if any action concerning these planes should be taken, the initiative should come from the British without any urging from the United States.”↩