Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1941, The Far East, Volume V

892.24/83: Telegram

The Minister in Thailand (Peck) to the Secretary of State

Bangkok, November 6, 1941—5 p.m.
[Received 10:04 p.m.]

504. Department’s 137, November 3, 10 p.m.

1. Both the British Minister and I in suggesting that 24 fighter planes be transferred to Thailand from Singapore, had in mind their replacement from the United States. I have asked the Naval Attaché now in Singapore to report whether surplus planes exist there.

2. I venture to suggest below factors relevant to a consideration of American policy with respect to Thailand. Whatever may have been the Thai feeling toward Japan during the Indochina incident, the Government and people now undoubtedly dread and desire to escape Japanese domination in any form. Following the Japanese move into Southern Indochina in July, a policy of resistance was adopted and the Government was [strengthened?] in this by press reports of August 6 and 7, quoting the Secretary of State as asserting that the United States would regard American security and possessions in the Pacific as threatened by Japanese demands for military advantages in Thailand and quoting the British Foreign Secretary as stating that threats to the independence of this country would endanger the security of Singapore. (See Legation’s telegram No. 403, August 8, 3 p.m.²⁵). This opposition is being maintained in spite of the admitted fact that without extraneous aid forcible resistance to the expected Japanese invasion could result only in making the country a battlefield in the destruction of cities and military centers by bombing and military occupation of a large area. Opposition has consisted in rejecting Japanese importunities that the country join the “co-prosperity sphere”, recognize the Nanking régime, and grant commercial credits and a rubber export quota. It is fair to say that this stubborn opposition to Japanese schemes has been of considerable advantage to the United States and Great Britain because if Japan had acquired a dominant position in this country it would have had a favorable position from which to negotiate for seaports and airfields and to obstruct American and British access to the tin and rubber resources here. If Thailand had in any important particular during recent months sided with Japan as the self styled champion of Asia against American and British imperialism the benefit of Japan’s program would have been immense. As things stand Great Britain has been left undisturbed in control of three fourths of the tin output and our joint rubber purchases begun October 18 are proceeding at the rate of over 3,000 tons monthly. Our extensive missionary enterprises are continuing without the molestation they have encountered in Japanese controlled areas. The military implications of a possible Japanese domination of this country whether acquired by intimidation or invasion seem to concern us in a general way because of the possible advantage to Japanese strategy and in particular as threatening American aid to Thailand through Burma but on the whole military considerations concern Great Britain more than the United States. The United States during the progress of hostilities is under no specific obligation to assist Thailand to maintain its independence whatever may be our future obligations under general pronouncements once victory over aggression is achieved.

3. I have been informed of the purport of reply from the British Government to the inquiry of the Thai Prime Minister concerning British intended action in the event of a Japanese invasion. Apparently this draft can be reduced to an undertaking to give Thailand aviation gasoline and lubricating oil for military purposes at once, the 36 pieces of artillery over a period of about 9 months and a promise to occupy Southern Thailand with armed forces when the invasion takes place in the north. Disregarding other considerations this seems a small return to make for the practical advantages we are receiving and for the risk Thailand is incurring through repudiation of Japanese overtures. If it could be done it would certainly be preferable to preserve this country as a political and military entity rather than to envisage partition of the country as a temporary expedient. Moreover, it happens that the British owned tin mines and all the rubber plantations are in the south and if they were saved and the bulk of the country abandoned to Japan a hostile propaganda would allege this to be proof of our merely selfish aims in the Orient.

4. Indochina and Thailand will be dry and suitable for military activities from January to April inclusive. Presumably bombing and parachute attacks could take place at any time. In the meantime those leaders who support a policy of independence in this country must fight the counsels of despondency and of expediency. In China Japan has overwhelmed areas and armies many times greater than those of Thailand. No amount of supplies given [the] country or courage on its own part could guarantee successful resistance to a determined Japanese assault. But the public and private utterances of officials here incline me strongly to believe that if we assist the Government to acquire the aviation gasoline, lubricating oil, and fighter planes for which it is pressing there will be no surrender until forcible resistance has been tried and has failed. This will give us valuable respite to prepare for further developments. If the Japanese were to be convinced not only that invasion would be opposed by Thailand with force but would meet with serious retaliation from the United States and Great Britain there is strong probability that the studied invasion would be abandoned altogether. I venture the further suggestion that if our attempt to prevent Japan’s southward expansion were inspired by the aim of preserving the independence of Thailand as well as saving our own possessions the cause of democracy would derive greater advantage from the effort than otherwise since this dual purpose would convince the people of Asiatic countries that we are champions of their liberty.

Peck

25. Not printed.