Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1941, The Far East, Volume IV

761.94/1321

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State ⁸⁰

No. 5529

Tokyo, April 21, 1941.
[Received May 16.]

Sir: In connection with the conclusion on April 13 of the pact of neutrality between the Soviet Union and Japan and with reference to the Embassy’s telegrams nos. 480, March 29, 10 a.m., and 538, April 11, noon,⁸¹ I have the honor to outline as background material the following account of the course of the Soviet-Japanese negotiations leading up to the Pact, which has been conveyed to a member of my staff by the members of the immediate family of Mr. Togo, former Japanese Ambassador to Moscow.

According to the above-mentioned sources, in early October, 1940, Ambassador Togo, following negotiations begun in the summer,^* had reached a series of agreements with the Soviet Government consisting of the following: (1) a Soviet-Japanese non-aggression pact; (2) a permanent fisheries convention; (3) an agreement in principle for a commercial accord the details of which were to be worked out separately. In addition, the Soviet Government had given categorical assurances that following the signature of a non-aggression pact with Japan Soviet aid to General Chiang Kai-shek would cease. Although these agreements were to be ready for signature in early October, Mr. Matsuoka in connection with the reorganization of the Japanese Foreign Office and diplomatic service did not desire that Mr. Togo, who was already slated for retirement, should sign these agreements which represented a considerable diplomatic victory for Japan. He, therefore, brought about the recall of Ambassador Togo and sent in his place, Lieutenant-General Tatekawa who was to have the honor of signing the agreements. However, when the negotiations were resumed by General Tatekawa in the middle of November, 1940, following Molotov’s return from Berlin, the Soviet attitude completely changed and the negotiations made no progress largely, according to this source, because of the personal incompetence of General Tatekawa. The Soviet Union then for the first time presented a number of territorial and other demands as the price of the conclusion of a nonaggression pact and cessation of aid to China. These demands included (1) the cession by Japan of southern Saghalien; (2) certain islands of the Kurile and, in addition, important frontier rectification in favor of the Soviet Union of certain portions of the Siberian-Manchurian frontier, and certain “special facilities” for Soviet trade in Korean and Manchurian ports. As a result of these demands which were categorically and definitely refused by the Japanese Government, the political negotiations with the Soviet Union which in October had been virtually successfully concluded came to a standstill.

In the beginning of January, Mr. Matsuoka consulted with former Ambassador Togo as to the advisability of a personal visit to Moscow as a means of breaking the deadlock in the political negotiations, a suggestion which Mr. Togo strongly approved. It was decided, however, that in order to avoid too great an appearance of eagerness that the visit would be announced as one to Berlin and Rome which would likewise afford the Foreign Minister an opportunity of holding important consultations with Hitler and Mussolini. Despite the public announcement that the purpose of Matsuoka’s visit to Europe was to consult the German and Italian Governments, official Japanese circles in Tokyo, particularly in the Foreign Office, were well aware that the concrete aim of his trip was to attempt to rescue the negotiations with the Soviet Union which had broken down due to his “blunder” in changing ambassadors at an unpropitious moment. Consequently, in these same circles it was felt that Mr. Matsuoka would make every effort to obtain some form of agreement with Russia since to return empty-handed would seriously compromise his position. On the other hand, it was felt that if he obtained some political agreement with the Soviet Union on satisfactory terms his personal prestige would be so greatly enhanced that he might well succeed Prince Konoye as Prime Minister in the event of the latter’s resignation.

According to the same source, Mr. Matsuoka, during his first visit to Moscow en route to Berlin, was afforded little encouragement by Stalin as to the prospect of effecting a settlement on any reasonable terms and it was only during his stay on the return trip that the Soviet Government showed a disposition to accept a reasonable basis of negotiations and only at the very close of that stay was Soviet agreement to the pact forthcoming.

While it appears obvious that too much emphasis is placed on the personal element in explanation of the failure of Japan to obtain the desired agreement last autumn and that certain of the details of the foregoing account are colored by the same personal factor, in its main outline the résumé of the Soviet-Japanese negotiations coincides with information from other sources. It is for example true that in early October a Soviet-Japanese political agreement on terms favorable to Japan was believed imminent and in this connection it may be added, according to a member of my staff who was in Moscow at the time, members of the German Embassy there were quite outspoken in characterizing the removal of Mr. Togo at that time as a very serious political mistake on the part of the Japanese Government. The opinion may be offered, however, that in so far as the change of ambassadors had any effect on Soviet policy, such change was due less to the personality of the individuals than to the interval which elapsed between Mr. Togo’s departure on October 17th and the beginning of General Tatekawa’s negotiations with Mr. Molotov in November, since during this interval occurred the visit of Mr. Molotov to Berlin.

Possibly the chief interest of the foregoing information lies in the illustration it affords of the degree to which Soviet policy in the Far East, particularly towards Japan, varies in ratio to the state of Soviet-German relations.

Without going into details, which do not lie within the purview of this despatch, it can be stated that according to available information the periods in the Soviet-Japanese negotiations outlined above when the Soviet Government was adopting a conciliatory attitude toward Japan correspond in time with periods when Soviet apprehension as to Germany’s immediate intentions was greatest and, conversely, that the stiffened Soviet attitude in the negotiations with Japan followed the receipt of assurances by the Soviet Government as to Germany’s policy towards the Soviet Union. For example, during the months of September and October, 1940, it was reported that the Soviet Union was extremely uneasy as to the possibility of a complete reorientation of German policy in Eastern Europe which found its reflection in the apparent willingness of the Soviet Government to conclude a far-reaching political agreement with Japan on terms favorable to the latter; following Molotov’s return from Berlin the assurances which he obtained there as to Germany’s intentions were clearly not without effect in bringing about a revision of the Soviet attitude toward Japan and the demand for territorial and other concessions as the price for an agreement. This attitude remained adamant up to the German military successes in the Balkans which apparently again revived Soviet apprehensions as to the immediate future and it may be assumed were in a large measure responsible for the somewhat sudden decision of the Soviet Government on April 13 to conclude a political agreement with Japan.^†

There is little to be added to the opinions expressed in the Embassy’s no. 552, April 14, 6 p.m., in regard to the immediate effect on Japan and Japanese policies of the neutrality agreement with the Soviet Union. Subsequent information tends to confirm the view expressed therein that Mr. Matsuoka obtained an agreement of only a limited character designated as a pact of neutrality involving no Soviet commitment in regard to the question of Soviet aid to China.^‡ It may be, however, a mistake to place too great emphasis upon the negative character of the pact and thereby to underestimate its actual and potential significance. While it is true that the pact in itself changes little and adds little to the actual state of relations between the two countries, and may therefore be regarded as little more than a formulation in a public document of a previously existing situation, it should nonetheless be borne in mind that the Tripartite Pact itself insofar as Japan is concerned is affirmed by Japan, specifically in the imperial rescript which was issued when the alliance was concluded and by public declarations of its highest officials, to be designed primarily to prevent the extension of hostilities. Indeed even the conditions under which it becomes operative are not clearly defined and are left to Japan to determine. Furthermore all agreements concluded by the Soviet Union prior to and subsequent to the outbreak of the European war, with the exception of the short-lived treaties with the Baltic States, have been entirely negative in character. But it is precisely towards the continuance of such a negative policy on the part of the Soviet Union that, up to the present, Axis and Japanese diplomacy has been successfully directed, whereas the interest of the anti-Axis powers would lie in the adoption by the Soviet Union of a positive anti-Axis policy. Consequently any reaffirmation on the part of the Soviet Union of its intention to continue a negative policy of non-involvement in the present war and especially, in the present instance, of the extension of that policy to the Far East, must be counted as a diplomatic success for Japan and its Axis associates. Furthermore, even if the agreement is little more than a public statement of an already existing situation it nonetheless indicates on the part of the signatories a certain expectation that that situation will persist for at least the immediate future, and as long as the conditions which gave rise to the pact do persist the trend towards improvement in their relations will be likely to continue.

In regard to the general situation in the Far East perhaps the most important aspect of the pact for Japan lies in the implication which it contains in regard to future Soviet-Chinese relations. Although as indicated above, there is no evidence to justify the belief that the Soviet Union entered into any commitment in regard to China, which appears to have been excluded from Mr. Matsuoka’s discussions in Moscow, it remains a fact that the conclusion of a neutrality agreement with Japan would appear to be in direct violation of Article 2 of the Soviet-Chinese pact of non-aggression of August 21, 1937,⁸² and whereas in the latter pact Soviet policy in the Far East appeared to have one basis, namely support of the Chinese Republic, it now has two fundamentally contradictory points of departure. It would appear logical that should Soviet-Japanese relations, as predicted both in the Japanese and Soviet press, develop favorably on the basis of the neutrality pact, then, irrespective of Soviet assurances to China to the contrary, such a development would be accompanied inevitably by a progressive and gradual drift away from previous Soviet policy of aid to General Chiang Kai-shek. There have been indications in recent Japanese press comment which reveal that Japan is hopeful of some such development as a result of the agreement with the Soviet Union. Japan may therefore be expected to use every effort to cultivate its relations with the Soviet Union but in view of the history of the recently concluded negotiations, outlined above, it would appear that the future trend of Soviet-Japanese relations, will be in large measure determined by the progress of the European war and the extent of the real or potential German threat to the Soviet Union.

Respectfully yours,

Joseph C. Grew

80. Drafted by the Second Secretary of Embassy in Japan (Bohlen), formerly in the Soviet Union.
81. Latter not printed.
82. As quoted in the Japanese press, Moscow. Pravda on April 19, in reviewing foreign reactions to the Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact, declared that the first proposal for such a pact was made in July, 1940, by the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow and was accepted in principle by the Soviet Government but that discussions as to the terms delayed the final conclusion. [Footnote in the original.]
83. See Moscow’s telegram no. 762, April 13, 10 p.m. [Footnote in the original.]
84. See Moscow’s telegram no. 790, April 17, 2 p.m. [Footnote in the original; telegram not printed.]
82. Signed at Nanking, League of Nations Treaty Series, Vol. clxxxi, p. 101.