761.9411/114: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State
[Received 10:50 p.m.]
805. In the course of a conversation yesterday the German source known to the Department stated to me that the German Government “had not been entirely satisfied with the Soviet-Japanese Pact”. He expressed the opinion that the Soviet Government’s motive in signing the pact had been to put itself in a position to join the Tripartite Pact if it chose to do so or to be safeguarded against a Japanese attack in the event of a German invasion. He does not think, however, that [Page 960] a German attack on the Soviet Union is imminent but believes that rumors of such an attack have been put out by Berlin and will be sustained in order to inspire fear in the Soviet Government in an endeavor to force it to join the Tripartite Pact, increase deliveries to Germany or accede to other German demands which he anticipates will shortly be made. He expressed the opinion in this connection that the “Soviet Union is now at the crossroads” and that it must shortly either join the Tripartite Pact or at least “go along with the new order”, or “face an attack by the German Army along a front from the Baltic to the Black Sea”. He believes that the Soviet Union will decide “to go along” and in doing so will “take what it can get” in reward.
He believes that Stalin “has been tremendously impressed by the collapse of Yugoslavia as, being a Georgian and a mountaineer, he respects force and had assumed that the Yugoslavs with their mountainous country could resist the German mechanized equipment for a long period of time.”
He expressed the opinion that Stalin’s jovial behavior toward the Germans present at the railroad station at the time of Matsuoka’s departure and the editorial (see my 777 April 16, 1 p.m. and 802 of April 19, 2 p.m.79) in Pravda foreshadow an attempt by the Soviet Government to improve its relations with Germany which he admitted had “deteriorated in recent months”. In this connection he said that the German Government knows how to deal with the Soviets and that he expects Germany will now assume “a more severe and disagreeable attitude toward the Soviets than at any time since August 1939 as experience has taught Germany that when it wants anything from the Soviet Government the way to get it is to be stern and disagreeable.[”] He added that the Soviets consider that when they are well treated by another power it is a sign of weakness or of the desire to curry favor, whereas stern and disagreeable treatment indicates to them self-confidence and strength on the part of the other government which instills fear and results in concessions.
He expressed the opinion that the German military successes throughout Europe thus far have been due almost exclusively to its possession of large mechanized forces and that the defeats sustained by other powers including Britain had been occasioned by the absence of adequate mechanized equipment. He said that modern war is a war of tanks, armored cars and mechanized equipment and that any country which does not possess such equipment in quantities comparable to those Germany puts into action obviously could not resist an assault.
[Page 961]He admitted that Matsuoka gave Stalin “certain assurances” with regard to the surrender of the Japanese concessions in Northern Sakhalin but expressed doubt that Matsuoka “could put it through.”
He implied that the recurrent rumors of invasion of England are put out from Berlin for the purpose of immobilizing as many British forces as possible in England and added that such rumors may be expected periodically throughout the duration of the war.
- Latter not printed.↩