Office of the Historian

762.9411/251: Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

Tokyo, April 18, 1941—5 p.m.
[Received April 18—1:15 p.m.]

577. Embassy’s 517, April 7, 7 p.m.73

1.
In a conversation yesterday with the confidant74 mentioned in the telegram under reference, Dooman75 brought out the following points during a discussion which followed the suggestion that the United States use its good offices to bring about an end of the China conflict:
(a)
By joining Germany and Italy in an alliance, Japan had assimilated the Far Eastern problem with the European problem, and it would be idle for Japan to suppose that, so long as she remained an ally of Germany, termination of the China conflict of itself would stabilize her relations with the United States;
(b)
Japan has concluded a treaty with Russia, the ostensible purpose of which is to promote her own security, even though she has never concealed her fear of Russia, her mistrust of the Soviet Government, and her dislike of communism. One could therefore properly suppose that her real purpose in concluding that treaty lies outside of the treaty’s stipulations. The pursuit of policies erected on a foundation of distrust, suspicion and the attainment of ulterior objectives through devious methods must inevitably have disastrous consequences;
(c)
By linking herself to such countries as Italy and Germany and by relying in the conduct of her foreign relation[s on] expediency and opportunism, Japan has brought herself to such a pass that other nations in planning the defense of their legitimate interests have no choice but to take into account only the sinister aspirations of the extremists in this country and to discount entirely the peaceful protestations of the moderate elements. To illustrate, the countries opposed to Japan’s alliance are obliged to take under notice the views of the activists with regard to the southern advance rather than the declarations of those who say that Japan seeks economic developing in the South Seas by peaceful methods.
2.
The confidant brought back today from his principal76 an oral message substantially as follows:
(a)
When previously in office the principal had not only brought about the defeat of a project to conclude an alliance with Germany and Italy but he had brought to the attention of the American Government a proposal for the taking of steps to avert the war in Europe and to settle the Far Eastern question.77 His proposal had not [Page 959] been regarded with favor.78 Therefore, it sat with ill grace upon the United States to place upon Japan entire responsibility for the situation created by Japan’s having joined the Axis. However, he would emphasize that the rescript issued by the Emperor when the alliance was concluded stipulated that the alliance was to be used as an instrument for peace, and that, although Japan would not fail if occasion arose to honor its obligations under the alliance, the primary preoccupation of the Government is to seek to carry out the Emperors wishes as set forth in the rescript.
(b)
He could say in the strictest secrecy that the Cabinet had adopted a resolution at its last meeting (note: presumably on April 15) that the southward advance should be prosecuted only by peaceful means, and that a public declaration to that effect would be issued in the near future (note: the confidant expressed as his personal opinion that the declaration would not be issued until after Mr. Matsuoka’s return from Moscow). However, the policy laid down in the resolution would lie outside the compass of any situation which might be created by drastic economic pressure on Japan or by foreign naval dispositions having the character of a blockade against Japan.
(c)
With regard to the treaty with the Soviet Union, he deeply deplored the arising of the conditions which caused his Government to enter into the treaty. However, by balancing the mutual obligations of Germany and Japan with regard to their respective relations with [the] Soviet Union, the treaty would serve, he thought, to prevent the extension of hostilities.
3.
Dooman had remarked yesterday to the confidant that, while the prevailing opinion appeared to be that the principal was being groomed for an even higher office, it was our belief that the principal had entered the Cabinet only to strengthen it and to help it to remain in power. The message was returned that the principal deeply appreciated the comment and that the comment was entirely correct.
Grew
  1. Ante, p. 128.↩
  2. Named Fujii.↩
  3. Eugene H. Dooman, Counselor of Embassy in Japan.↩
  4. Baron Kiichiro Hiranuma, Japanese Minister without Portfolio, who was Prime Minister in 1939.↩
  5. See telegram No. 234, May 18, 1939, 5 p.m., from the Ambassador in Japan, Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. ii, p. 1.↩
  6. See the Secretary of State’s reply, Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. ii, p. 6.↩