740.0011 European War 1939/10966: Telegram
The Consul General at Beirut (Engert) to the Secretary of State
[Received May 18—1:30 p.m.]
144. In view of Vichy’s 543, May 13 to the Department, my 143, May 1466 and the report that Vichy had capitulated to Berlin, I called on the High Commissioner late tonight upon his return from Damascus in order to make a last appeal to him to weigh most carefully all factors and considerations before he committed himself beyond recall.
I began by saying that I had come to see him unofficially as an old and sincere friend of France; that I had seen France in several of her most heroic hours during the last war and that my wife like so many other American women had been decorated for war work by the French Government. I knew him to be a man combining the qualities typical of the French soldier of courage, patriotism and enlightenment who doubtless realized that it was his and our business to think about the future civilization and the greatness of France. As on many previous occasions I would therefore speak my mind with the utmost frankness and he need make no reply to anything I said unless he particularly wished to do so.
I then explained to him the attitude of the United States Government and people toward aggressor nations in much the same manner as I had explained it to Iranian Prime Ministers and Ministers of Foreign Affairs during the last 3 years and as the Department was informed in my numerous telegrams on the subject from Tehran. I added that the American people had really not been morally neutral since the Italian conquest of Ethiopia and many of them had abandoned neutrality in Manchuria 10 years ago. We then began to distinguish definitely between nations devoted to decent international relationships and those committed to a policy of force and malice.
Today there was an ever-widening field of American anxiety and the President and Secretary of State had repeatedly declared that we could not view with equanimity a predatory world dominated by [Page 706] fear. The American people were therefore showing an increasing interest in the wider aspects of the Middle Eastern problem and were quite openly inclined to support anybody willing to help liberate civilization from aggression. New manifestations of idealism were animating our nation and we were appealing to all likeminded peoples and individuals to take a firm stand on moral grounds against brutality and treachery.
Now that the Axis was about to cast its death-like pall over the Levant States I wished the High Commissioner to pause and ponder the enormous responsibilities that rested upon his shoulders not only in respect of the true interests of France but the entire civilized world and the native races entrusted to his care. I hoped he viewed the situation with a proper sense of perspective and proportion: for the past 4 months I had been witnessing in Syria the characteristically transparent tricks of Nazi technique which always precede a Nazi assault upon a new victim. He himself had spoken to me about them and we now knew that they were the preliminaries of the far more serious events of the last few days which I feared were precipitating the French and Syrians into a position from which there would soon be no escape.
But as Syria was not yet invaded the whole world felt that the right of the Axis Powers to interfere should be repudiated, for by obtaining important strategic concessions they could thrust a spearhead into the Middle East which might affect the whole military and naval situation at the eastern end of the Mediterranean. I reminded the High Commissioner that the American people were unflinchingly committed to the uttermost support of the British Empire and that when as in this case the whole course of the war was at stake we could hardly be expected to remain indifferent. We believed there was a true employer [sic] between the French and British Empires and the United States and it would be tragic if a portion of the French possessions were needlessly turned over to the enemy to the detriment of the common cause. The French could count implicitly on the sympathy and benevolence of the United States so long as they did not actively assist the Axis. Today the responsibility of barring the way happened to be his and I felt sure that not even Nazi pressure could permanently submerge the old French spirit. General Dentz replied that he agreed with much I had said and thanked me for being so frank. He would be equally outspoken and tell me that the world would not be in such a mess if the United States had joined the League of Nations. As regards American support for Britain, he realized its magnitude and sincerity but doubted whether it could be decisive. Rightly or wrongly German armies had created the impression [Page 707] of invincibility. He believed if the United States had declared war on Germany a year ago the moral effect would have been immense and might at least have saved Southeastern Europe and the Balkans. Today he doubted whether it would make much difference especially in view of Japan’s and Russia’s enigmatic attitudes. He personally also felt uncertain whether Great Britain had sufficient forces in the Middle East to cope with determined Axis thrusts, particularly as he feared Turkey would cave in.
Referring to his own position he said politicians had been the ruination of France and he was glad Pétain was a soldier everybody trusted; and if, as seemed to be the case, the Marshal found it necessary to yield, he (Dentz) for one was not prepared to question the decision and he would continue to obey his instructions. Vichy was probably influenced by the belief that Germany’s military grip on the Continent of Europe could no longer be broken and by the fact that collaboration with Germany was the only way to get the prisoners back. Whatever the reason he was sure Pétain knew a great deal more about the needs of France than he did and it was about time the French became disciplined enough to follow one leader instead of arguing every point ad infinitum.
Incidentally he pointed out that the Americans were making the same mistake the British made when they speak of the French Empire. There never really was a French Empire, only France and her colonies. Without France the colonies amounted to nothing and were helpless compared to the British Dominions.
The High Commissioner thought I took too gloomy a view of the local situation. It was true that some 15 German planes had come, and, thank God, gone again, but he did not think many more would arrive if the hostilities in Iraq came to an end soon. He had no intentions of turning the Levant States over to the Axis but he admitted very readily that the present concessions might lead to others. As to the war material shipped to Iraq, he had no choice for under the terms of the armistice such material was no longer, strictly speaking, French.
Finally he referred to the possibility hinted at by me that the situation might bring about military action by Great Britain and possibly armed conflict with the French forces. He said “Unless utterly unforeseen events should occur I do not believe you need fear such a contingency which I should consider as regrettable as you do.”
Repeated to Vichy.
- Latter printed infra.↩