845.01/120
Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Murray)23a
Reference is made to Ambassador Winant’s telegram no. 5253 of November 4, midnight, concerning Prime Minister Churchill’s interpretation [Page 185] of Article 3 of the “Roosevelt–Churchill Atlantic Declaration.” It may be recalled that Mr. Churchill informed the House of Commons on September 9, 1941 that this article, dealing with “the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live”, is applicable only to European nations under Nazi occupation and does not relate to “the development of constitutional government in India, Burma or such parts of the Empire”, which may be regarded as a separate problem to be handled in accordance with previous declarations in regard thereto.
It was Article 3 of the Declaration which prompted the Premier of Burma to visit London in order to ascertain the applicability of this article to Burma and discuss the future of Burma with British officials. Upon being informed of the inapplicability of Article 3 to Burma and of the unwillingness of the British Government to enter into detailed discussions of the future status of Burma at the present time, the Premier of Burma expressed his keen disappointment and is quoted in the press as stating “I cannot foresee what the attitude of my people will be when I explain the response of the British Government to my request.”
It is to be expected that the attitude of the British Government, as expressed in Mr. Churchill’s address to Parliament and by the nature of the reply to the inquiry of the Prime Minister of Burma, will have repercussions in India, which may be of a serious character and which may serve to impede further India’s contribution to the war.
The Prime Minister of Burma has expressed a desire to call upon the President while passing through the United States on his return to Burma. In this connection, reference is made to Mr. Welles’ memorandum of August 6, 1941 to the Secretary in which it was stated that “this Government is not warranted in suggesting officially to the British Government what the status of India should be, but were the President disposed to take the matter up I should imagine that he would wish to discuss it in a very personal and confidential way directly with Mr. Churchill.” In view of the fact that Mr. Churchill has now offered an interpretation of the Roosevelt–Churchill Declaration, and, in view of the possible forthcoming call of the Premier of Burma upon the President, it is considered that there may be greater justification than there has been heretofore of an effort on the part of this Government to assist in a solution of problems involved in the political status of India and Burma.
It is suggested, therefore, that it may not be inopportune at the present time to submit this matter to the President for his consideration, with possible reference to Mr. Winant’s telegram no. 3365 of August 1, 11 p.m., recommending that a suggestion be made to the British Government to grant dominion status to India. As has been indicated by the Division of Near Eastern Affairs in memoranda [Page 186] dated August 12, and October 16, 1941,24 the political situation in India appears to be deteriorating rapidly. It is considered inevitable that such a deterioration will prevent India from putting forth its best effort to help win the war. In view of the expressed views of the President regarding the policy of this Government in assisting Britain to defeat Hitler, it is believed that the President may wish to consider what steps may be taken to check the uncooperative movement in India in order that India may make a greater contribution to the prosecution of the war. Accordingly, the attached letter to the President25 has been prepared for the signature of the Secretary.
- Addressed to the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle), the Under Secretary of State (Welles), and the Secretary of State.↩
- Neither printed.↩
- Not printed; the draft letter reviewed the Indian situation and suggested that President Roosevelt might feel justified in taking this question up in a personal way with Mr. Churchill (740.0011 European War/16403).↩