Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1941, The British Commonwealth; The Near East and Africa, Volume III

740.0011 European War 1939/16403: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

London, November 4, 1941—midnight.
[Received November 5—5:10 a.m.]

5253. For the Secretary and Under Secretary. In reply to Department’s 4906, November 1, 6 p.m. I thought this background might be helpful. After article 3 of the eight points of the Roosevelt–Churchill joint statement¹⁵ was published, many people here and in the United States, I understood, felt that in broad language it cleared the principle. On September 9, the day the Prime Minister spoke in the House,¹⁶ he sent me over a copy of his speech as there were definite references to the United States.

I also found a paragraph which I asked him to eliminate. The following is a résumé of that paragraph and is contained in my despatch number 1497, of September 10, 1941.¹⁷

“The Prime Minister declared that questions had been asked as to exactly what was implied by certain points of the declaration but that it was a wise rule that one party to an agreement should not without consulting the other seek to put special or strained interpretations on specific passages and that he was therefore speaking today only in an exclusive sense. With this proviso (and with obvious reference to this Government who have inquired how paragraph 3 of the declaration—regarding ‘the right of all peoples to choose the form of Government under which they will live’—applies to certain areas under British rule) he went on to say that the joint declaration did not qualify in any way the various statements of policy which had been made from time to time about the development of Constitutional Government in India, Burma or such parts of the Empire. He recalled that the British Government was pledged by its declaration of August 1940,¹⁸ to help India obtain free and equal partnership in the British Commonwealth, and that it was also the Government’s considered policy to establish Burmese self-government. Mr. Churchill asserted that what had primarily been in mind at the Atlantic meeting was the revocation of the sovereignty of the European nations now under the Nazi yoke and the principles governing any alterations that might have to be made in their agreement. This was ‘quite a separate problem from the progressive evolution of self-governing institutions in the regions and peoples who owe allegiance to the British Crown’ on which he said the British Government had made separate and complete commitments entirely in harmony with the concepts of freedom and justice inspiring the joint declaration.”

I thought it ran counter to the general public interpretation of the article and that I thought it would have little support here and elsewhere and would simply intensify charges of Imperialism and leave Great Britain in the position of “a do nothing policy” so far as India and Burma are concerned. We talked up to a few minutes before he actually had to appear in Parliament to make the address. He told me that a vote of the Cabinet was in support of that passage, and he took the position that it was a matter of internal British politics. I was not able to change his determination to use this section of his statement.

Since then I have found that Amery¹⁹ had pressed the matter and the timing leads me to believe that not only because of questions in regard to the application of article 3 to India but also the request of the Burmese Prime Minister to come on here to discuss Burma’s future policy were responsible for the statement. I had luncheon with Amery and Minister U Saw last week. U Saw asked if he might call on the President on his way home. I hope this may be possible. He rather naively suggested that he felt it proper for the Prime Minister of a democracy to call on the head of the greatest democracy. U Saw had just left the King and described his interview, which lasted some 20 minutes, with him. He said that he had promised to support the British war effort. He made one brief official call on Eden,²⁰ his contact during his stay here has been through Amery. I found through Cadogan²¹ that he himself initiated his visit here. He had planned to discuss the future status of Burma and to inquire as to the effect of article 3 on this question.

Two of the morning papers, the Daily Express and the News Chronicle, carry articles stating his disappointment in the results of his visit. The following direct quotation appears in the Daily Express:

“I have not been able to get an assurance about self-government to take back to Burma now that my visit here is ended.

I know the Government and the British public are very busy at the moment with the war; I only want a definite assurance that Burma will be placed on the same level as the other members of the Empire.

The British Government has given an assurance to India and Burma that they will give those countries self-government one day, but when that day will come is another question.”

A further quotation taken from the News Chronicle follows:

“My only request was that before they free the countries under Hitler they should free the countries within the British Empire,” he said.

“I was anxious to find out from Mr. Churchill how the Atlantic Charter affected the future of Burma.

Burma has been unconditionally co-operating with Britain in her war effort, and yet when I come to Britain I cannot be taken into the confidence of the War Cabinet in the same way as the Dominion Premiers, because Burma has not Dominion status.

I came here to deliver a message of goodwill from my people, but I do think it is the duty of the leaders of this country to see that each and every part of the Empire taking its share of the war effort is contented.

I cannot foresee what the attitude of my people will be when I explain the response of the British Government to my request.”

This morning I again brought up this subject together with U Saw’s press comments with Mr. Eden. The latter called up Mr. Amery and got his permission to give me the text of a letter sent to the Burmese Prime Minister with the understanding that it be treated as secret and confidential. The text reads as follows:

“Your visit to this country has provided an opportunity for you to state your views as to the method of approach to the constitutional problem in Burma which will arise for discussion after the war, and for me to make clear, as I hope I have succeeded in doing, the sincerity of the intentions of His Majesty’s Government on this subject. I feel that the opportunity thus afforded for an exchange of information and ideas has been of great benefit is desired in the midst of the life and death struggle in which this country and Burma, and indeed the whole cause of free government in the world, are involved, it is not possible, as I the past few days realize, either to enter upon the detailed examination of and discussion required for the solution of these important problems or to anticipate of conclusions which must themselves be affected by that examination and by the situation at the end of the war.²²

The general aim of the policy of His Majesty’s Government has, however, been made clear in a number of declarations in recent years, the last of which was that made by Sir Archibald Cochrane²³ to the Burma Legislature on 26 August 19[40] in the course of which he stated that His Majesty’s Government will continue to use their best endeavors to promote the attainment of Dominion status as being the objective of Burma’s constitutional progress and that immediately the war is brought to a victorious end they will be willing to discuss the problems to be solved in Burma.

It is the intention of His Majesty’s Government that this discussion, to be conducted in collaboration with representatives of Burma, should cover all questions relevant to the methods by which the attainment of this declared aim can be facilitated and expedited, with a view to removing to the fullest extent that may be found practicable such limitations as stand in the way of the assumption by the people of Burma of complete self-government within the British Commonwealth.

I may add that His Majesty’s Government consider that conclusions reached on the questions to be discussed should be based on the merits of those questions themselves as affecting Burma and her relations with His Majesty’s Government, and will not allow them to be prejudiced in any way by the position in regard to the solution of similar problems elsewhere.[”]

Winant

15. Statement of August 14, 1941, known as the Atlantic Charter, vol. i, p. 367.
16. For text of speech, see Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 374, col. 67.
17. Despatch not printed.
18. British Cmd. 6219: India and the War: Statement issued with the authority of His Majesty’s Government by the Governor-General on August 8, 1940.
19. Leopold S. Amery, British Secretary of State for India and Burma.
20. Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
21. Sir Alexander Cadogan, British Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
22. This sentence is apparently garbled.
23. Governor of Burma.