Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1941, General, The Soviet Union, Volume I

740.0011 European War 1039/12914

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State

[Washington,] June 26, 1941.

The Soviet Ambassador⁸⁸ this morning requested an opportunity of seeing me and I consequently received him late this evening.

After the Soviet Ambassador came in I commenced the conversation by stating that I wished to express to him in the name of this Government the regret of the United States that Russia had been the victim of a treacherous attack on the part of Germany.⁸⁹

The Ambassador then pulled out of his pocket the instructions sent to him by Molotov⁹⁰ on Monday,⁹¹ of which I had already been given a copy, and read to me the sentence to the effect that the Soviet Government and the Russian people would fight for the defense of the fatherland, the independence of Russia, and the liberty of the Russian people.

The Ambassador then stated that he would be grateful if I would announce to him what the policy of my Government might be in the war which had broken out between Germany and Russia.

I said that the policy of this Government had already been officially announced by the President and by myself⁹² and that in the light of that policy I was glad to say to him that any request which the Soviet Government might make of the United States for material assistance would be given immediate attention and such further consideration as might be found possible in the light of our own defense program and in the light of our policy of assisting Great Britain and other countries which had already suffered German aggression.

I said that the Ambassador had already received a practical demonstration of the policy so announced through the unfreezing of Russian blocked balances and the granting to the Russian Government of a general license covering Russian funds in this country,⁹³ as well as the statement which I had made yesterday making it clear that the President did not believe it to be in the interest of the security or the peace of the United States to issue a proclamation of neutrality under the terms of the so-called Neutrality Act.⁹⁴

Mr. Oumansky replied that he was deeply grateful for these two measures and that he was glad to say that the provisions of the general license granted to the Soviet Union were far less restrictive than he had at first feared. He said likewise that the unwillingness of the President to issue a neutrality proclamation was of very great importance to Russia and greatly facilitated her position in the Pacific. He told me in that connection that Russia now had on the Pacific Coast between 8 and 10 cargo steamers, some of them with a tonnage of more than 16,000 to 20,000 tons, and while these would be of great value in transporting supplies from the Western Hemisphere to Vladivostok, the requirements of Russia would now be far larger than those which could be met by the amount of tonnage thus available.

He asked if he might talk with Mr. Acheson about the question of pending orders of the Soviet Government for which export licenses had previously been refused, and I said I would be very glad if he would do so.

I asked him if he had any instructions from his Government as to the assistance which it hoped this Government might be able to furnish.

He said he had not received any instructions in that regard and that he was cabling today to ask them to send him a cable immediately indicating what their wishes might be. He said that he would communicate with me personally as soon as he received a reply to this message.

I told him that until I received such a message it was, of course, impossible for me to make any clearer statement than I had already made, but that I could anticipate the receipt of such a message by saying that should the Russian Government desire the sending from the United States of highly qualified communications engineers, or industrial or technical experts, his Government might be assured that this request would meet a favorable reply.

I also stated that I believed it to be in the interests of both countries for the Russian Government to permit American press correspondents to follow the course of the hostilities from the Russian side in order that the American public might have full and accurate information in this way.

He said he had already taken steps in that regard as he fully realized the importance of this, and that he was glad to say that one Associated Press correspondent was already this afternoon in a position where he could send reports from behind the lines.

He asked me if I could give him any information with regard to the situation in Europe or in the Far East. I assured him I had nothing with regard to the situation in Europe which I believed would be of any value to him and which he had not already seen in the press.

I said that with regard to the situation in the Far East,⁹⁵ it was my understanding from the reports I had today received that the situation in Japan had not yet clarified and that no statement of considered policy had yet been made public. I said that certain reports indicated that a change in government might be possible. He asked whether that implied an ousting of Mr. Matsuoka as Foreign Minister and I said that I had no detailed information on this subject but merely an indication that a change of government or a reorganization of the cabinet might be possible. I said I had not the faintest idea, should such a reorganization take place, what new line Japanese policy might take.

The Ambassador said that he was glad to inform me that his Government had already informed this Government that they would welcome the sending to Moscow of an American naval attaché and assistants,⁹⁶ and that he had suggested that they take the route across the Pacific and from Chungking by airplane to Moscow. He said this route was not only possible, but indeed quite rapid.

The Ambassador then referred to our conversations of the past year⁹⁷ and expressed regret that circumstances had made it impossible for the results to be more productive at that time. He said that he fully understood the circumstances then existing in so far as the policy of this Government was concerned. I said it was better for him and myself to agree that this was a matter of past history.

I said that of course the Ambassador would remember a conversation I had with him in January when I had shown the friendly disposition of this Government by informing him for the specific information of his Government of the fact that the United States knew that Germany was planning to attack the Soviet Union during the present month.⁹⁸

The Ambassador said he well remembered and that he had, of course, immediately, as I knew, communicated the message to his Government.

S[umner] W[elles]

88. Konstantin Alexandrovich Umansky.
89. The German attack had started on June 22, 1941.
90. Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.
91. June 23.
92. For the statement by Acting Secretary of State Welles on June 23, 1941, see telegram No. 836, June 23, to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, ante, p. 767, or Department of State Bulletin, June 28, 1941, p. 755. An account of the remarks made by President Roosevelt on June 24, 1941, is in the New York Times, June 25, 1941, p. 1.
93. See memorandum of June 16 by the Assistant Secretary of State, p. 763.
94. Approved November 4, 1939; 54 Stat. 4.
95. For correspondence with regard to the situation in the Far East at this time, see vol. iv, pp. 1 ff. and pp. 905 ff.
96. See memorandum of June 23, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs, p. 885.
97. For discussions concerning the alleviation of difficulties in the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, see pp. 667 ff.
98. No record has been found in Department files of such a conversation held in January 1941. For warnings of the possibility of German aggression against the Soviet Union, see telegram No. 240, March 1, 1941, to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, telegram No. 256, March 4, 1941, and the memorandum of March 20, 1941, by Under Secretary of State Welles, pp. 712, 714, and 723, respectively. See also Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New York, 1948), vol. ii, pp. 967–969, and Sumner Welles, The Time for Decision (New York, 1944), pp. 170–171.