Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1941, General, The Soviet Union, Volume I

740.0011 European War 1939/19382

Memorandum Prepared in the Division of European Affairs

[Washington,] June 21, 1941.

Policy With Regard to the Soviet Union in Case of the Outbreak of War Between the Soviet Union and Germany

Reports which are coming in regarding the situation in Eastern Europe make it clear that we should not exclude the possibility of outbreak of war in the immediate future between Germany and the Soviet Union. In case war does take place we are of the opinion that our policy with regard to the Soviet Union, at least during the early stages of the conflict, should be as follows:

(1) We should offer the Soviet Union no suggestions or advice unless the Soviet Union approaches us.

(2) In case the Department is asked by parties other than a representative of the Soviet Government if it intends to give aid to the Soviet Union in the event of German-Soviet conflict, the reply should be that we have as yet not been approached by the Soviet Government on this subject.

(3) If the Soviet Government should approach us direct requesting assistance, we should so far as possible, without interfering in our aid to Great Britain and to victims of aggression or without seriously affecting our own efforts of preparedness, relax restrictions on exports to the Soviet Union, permitting it even to have such military supplies as it might need badly and which we could afford to spare.

(4) Such economic aid as we might give the Soviet Union in the form of materials should be extended direct on the basis of mutual advantage and not in cooperation with any third power.

(5) We should steadfastly adhere to the line that the fact that the Soviet Union is fighting Germany does not mean that it is defending, struggling for, or adhering to, the principles in international relations which we are supporting.

(6) We should make no promises in advance to the Soviet Union with regard to the assistance which we might render in case of a German-Soviet conflict, and we should take no commitment as to what our future policy towards the Soviet Union or Russia might be. In particular we should engage in no undertaking which might make it appear that we have not acted in good faith if later we should refuse to recognize a refugee Soviet Government or cease to recognize the Soviet Ambassador in Washington as the diplomatic representative of Russia in case the Soviet Union should be defeated and the Soviet Government should be obliged to leave the country.