740.0011 European War 1939/12185: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State
[Received June 18—4:40 a.m.]
1162. Department’s 797, June 14, 2 p.m. I am wholeheartedly in accord with the line of policy which the Department has decided to adopt in its relations with the Soviet Union as set forth in its 2113, June 14, noon, to London.83 As I have urged in my telegrams to the Department I have been convinced for quite some time that a firm policy such as outlined is best calculated to maintain our prestige in [Page 765] Moscow and to prepare the ground for the important developments with which we will ultimately be confronted. My observation of the psychology of the individuals who are conducting Soviet foreign policy has long since convinced me that they do not and cannot be induced to respond to the customary amenities, that it is not possible to create “international good will” with them, that they will always sacrifice the future in favor of an immediate gain, and that they are not affected by ethical or moral considerations, nor guided by the relationships which are customary between individuals of culture and breeding. Their psychology recognizes only firmness, power and force, and reflects primitive instincts and reactions entirely devoid of the restraints of civilization. It is [I am] of the opinion that they must be dealt with on this basis and on this basis alone. I feel fortified in these views, which I arrived at independently, by conversations with Count von [der] Schulenburg, who has on several occasions told me quite frankly that more considerate treatment was accorded German interests and the German Government by the Soviet authorities during the period when the violence of the German campaign against the Soviet Union was at its height than at any time prior or subsequent to that period. It has been my own experience that on every occasion that either the Department or the Embassy has made concessions to the Soviet Government, or has approached it in a spirit of friendly cooperation or good will, these gestures have been received by the Soviet authorities with marked suspicion and a disposition to regard them as evidence of weakness, whereas on each occasion that our attitude has stiffened the Soviet authorities have regarded our demeanor as evidence of self-confidence and strength and have promptly reacted by a more conciliatory attitude which has noticeably increased our prestige. Nor have I found any evidence of resentment or bitterness at the reciprocal application of unpleasant measures. As in the case with all primitive people it is important, however, that retaliation should not be carried to the point at which it may be regarded as provocation, and every such act should be clearly identifiable in each instance as retaliation for something the Soviet Government has done or failed to do. If so identifiable, it does not appear to provoke further retaliation, but on the contrary, frequently results in a relaxation or complete withdrawal of the action which provoked the retaliation.
I believe that the entire policy of the Soviet Union during recent months has centered on a desire to avoid an attack by Germany, and that while the Soviet Government has little liking for Britain, it has great respect for the United States. I am convinced, moreover, that if the policy which the Department has now laid down is strictly adhered to without deviation, the prestige of the United States will be enhanced, irrespective of the future course of American-Soviet relations.
[Page 766]I deem it of the utmost importance that our prestige here be enhanced inasmuch as it is in my opinion implicit in the ultimate solution of existing international relations that the Soviet Union will sooner or later turn to the United States in an endeavor to escape the consequences of having precipitated the European war and of its aggressive exploitation thereof.