740.0011 European War 1939/9200: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State
[Received 6:10 p.m.]
423. Department’s secret 240, March 1, 11 a.m. While of course I do not know the considerations which the Department had in mind in proposing this action, I venture to point out that the cynical reaction of the Soviet Government to approaches of this character would lead it to regard gesture as neither sincere nor independent, and my visit to Molotov might be made the subject of Tass8 communiqué or be imparted to the German Government, notwithstanding any previous assurances to the contrary. Furthermore, should the Soviet Government have no advice of its [own?] tending to confirm our information regarding German attack, and especially should developments fail to [Page 714] confirm the information, our action would thereafter be regarded by the Soviets as having been merely an attempt to drive a wedge between the Soviet Union and Germany, at British instigation. On the other hand, should the Soviet Government already possess information of this character, our action would be regarded as confirmatory and might lead to one or more of the following consequences:
- (1)
- It might hasten the conclusion of a Soviet-Japanese political agreement9 of possibly even more far-reaching scope than heretofore contemplated by the Soviet Government.
- (2)
- It might cause the Soviets to consider a deal with Germany at Turkey’s expense.
- (3)
- In view of the presence of large numbers of German troops in northern Norway, it might tempt the Soviets to consider the occupation of Finland.10
- (4)
- It probably would be availed of to justify renewed demands by the Soviet Government on the United States for further concessions and increased assistance.
- (5)
- It might accelerate Soviet assistance to Germany in an endeavor to avoid or postpone a German attack.
Pending receipt of the Department’s reply, I shall defer requesting an interview with Molotov.