740.0011 European War 1939/14276: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State
[Received 6:55 p.m.]
1563. For the President, the Secretary and Under Secretary only. As the Soviet-German war enters the third month of hostilities I find it possible to form a somewhat clearer view of the course events are taking. It is obvious, for example, from the recent admissions of the Soviet war communiqués and from the observations made by General McFarlane of the British Military Mission5 on his visit to the Smolensk front that the renewed German offensive is directed against the Leningrad and Ukraine areas, especially the latter, and that for the moment at least the center or Moscow drive has been suspended. It seems probable that despite the recent exhortation of Marshal Voroshilov to the people of Leningrad6 to defend the city with their lives, Leningrad will be taken or cut off by the Germans although the failure of the Finnish-German forces to make appreciable progress during the past month on the Karelian Isthmus and between Lakes Ladoga and Onegin may delay that event for some time, and in any event should permit the Soviet forces to withdraw in good order over the Vologda railroad line. In this connection it seems by no means improbable that the Finnish war effort is being directed primarily toward the leisurely recovery of the territory lost in the Finnish-Soviet war rather than toward an invasion of the Soviet Union7 and is, therefore, proceeding with extreme caution to conserve Finnish manpower as much as possible.
The German operations in the Ukraine seem designated, at least for the immediate present, to destroy the Soviet armies in that area rather than to occupy key cities such as Kiev. It would appear that the movement through Gomel has the double purpose of surrounding and cutting off Kiev while at the same time threatening the right flank and rear of Budenny’s armies, coming down the east bank of the Dnieper River. The ultimate objective of both the drives through Gomel and the Ukraine appears to be Rostov, through which city all of the railroads and the pipe line from the oil fields and refineries at Baku, Grozny, Batum, and the Caucasus pass.
The loss of the Ukraine up to the Dnieper River need not be regarded as more serious than the loss of an important battle in a [Page 643] prolonged campaign involving vast area, but the German occupation of Rostov would have to be looked upon as a major reverse of vital significance inasmuch as it would drive a wedge between the Soviet Union and 85% of its oil production, of which only a very limited amount could thereafter be moved by water from Baku to Astrakhan. The German occupation of Rostov would also threaten the last Black Sea ports on which the Soviet Fleet could base itself to prevent the movement of oil by Germany from Batum across the Black Sea. With their steadily lengthening lines of communication it remains to be seen whether the Germans can force the Dnieper River which is about one-half mile wide with a few bridges) before Budenny can entrench his forces on the east bank. The halting of the other German drive through Gomel down the east bank of the Dnieper will depend on whether the Soviet General Staff has sufficient reserves and material immediately available to threaten the German flank from Moscow. In any event, as long as Moscow is not surrounded, the further the German forces advance beyond Gomel the greater will be the danger to them of a major reverse.
In so far as concerns the center of the front, I am convinced that the German losses in both men and material in the battle for Smolensk, which continued uninterruptedly for well over 3 weeks, were exceptionally severe and that they will not risk a frontal attack on Moscow unless and until they have made substantial further progress to the north and south of the capital.
The loss of Nikolayev appears to have cost the Soviets not only their great grain elevators and perhaps the contents as well, but also several naval units, as Lozovski admitted yesterday at his press conference that “a battleship and cruiser under construction at Nikolayev were destroyed before the city was abandoned.” I have reason to believe that four destroyers were also lost.
Soviet propaganda continues to emphasize the successful role of the so-called guerilla forces left behind the German lines. It is not improbable that these forces, which are in part regular army units, are in fact slowing up the German advance and inflicting appreciable casualties and substantial damage to material.
Despite the reported bombings of Berlin there has been no retaliatory attempted mass German bombing of Moscow for several days, although the suburban areas are sporadically bombed at night.
There is little I can tell you regarding the political aspects of the situation at the moment. The most important recent event has been the joint message to Stalin. This, as I have reported, has been given the widest possible publicity by the press and other controlled agencies of the Government and has elicited through those agencies expressions of gratitude and praise from the “workers, collective farmers and intelligentsia.”
[Page 644]An increasing number of reports are reaching me from credible sources of the favorable reception being accorded by the inhabitants of Moscow, and particularly the rural population, to German propaganda in the form of leaflets dropped from the air, urging them to cast off their Bolshevik masters and commissars, to rid the regime of the Jews, to have no fear of the impending occupation by German forces who will see to it that their land is restored to them—and messages of a similar character.
I have also heard during the past 3 days that there are clear indications of growing uneasiness on the part of the higher Soviet officials, and to a limited extent my own observations confirm this. In this connection it should be noted that during the past 2 weeks the Moscow newspapers have been stressing almost daily the urgency of preparing to meet gas attacks.
The morale of the general public remains exceptionally good, although by no means what it was 10 days ago.
There is but little reference in the press to the possibility of a conflict with Japan or with Iran. A press campaign against Bulgaria, however, is quite obviously in progress.
I have observed no noticeable change in the general economic aspects of life in Moscow. The food lines are about the same as at the beginning of the war and the essentials of life are available in limited quantities at controlled prices. Currency inflation, if it were being resorted to, could not be detected under the system that prevails here. A voluntary war loan is reported by the press to be in progress. The last published total of subscriptions was the inconsequential amount of 153,000,000 rubles.
The crops are said to be very good which I believe is the fact based on my own limited observations, with harvesting well advanced.
I have had no reports of serious disruption of rail transportation although I assume that considerable damage has been caused to some of the lines in the western part of the country as the result of persistent German bombing operations. Gasoline, while severely rationed, is still available in Moscow.
Over and above every other consideration the impressive fact remains that it is nearly the first of September, the “blitzkrieg” has failed to achieve victory, the Soviet armies continue to give battle on a front of over 1500 miles, and although a great deal of territory has been yielded, the Germans have not yet succeeded in occupying any of the three major cities of European Russia. In 60 days the winter of from 7 to 8 months duration will begin, with the country covered by a blanket of snow and ice many feet in depth with the few roads that do exist impassable and a temperature of from 30 to 50 degrees below zero. I gravely doubt that any armies can operate under these [Page 645] conditions other, perhaps, than limited forces consisting of men who by inheritance and since childhood have endured the frightful hardships of a Russian winter.
- Lt.-Gen. F. N. Mason-McFarlane, head of the British Military Mission to the Soviet Union in 1941. His visit to the Smolensk front was made on August 21.↩
- The exhortation was published on August 21, 1941.↩
- For correspondence concerning the relations between Finland and the Soviet Union, see pp. 1 ff.↩