740.0011 European War 1939/14025: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State

1522. For the President, the Secretary, and the Under Secretary only. The official communiqués of the past 3 days refer to fierce battles along the entire front from the Arctic Ocean to the Black Sea. The recent announcement of fighting at Staraya Russa, whence operations designed to cut the Leningrad–Moscow line would appear to be feasible, coupled with the announcement that Smolensk had been evacuated several days ago and that Kirovograd and Pervomaisk have [Page 641] also been relinquished, and Stalin’s statement to me that Nikolaev was being abandoned and that the situation in the Ukraine “is very strained,” would appear to indicate that the renewed German offensive is meeting with some success particularly in the south.

Odessa, Kiev, Moscow, and Leningrad, the key cities of European Russia, are all now threatened by the German advance, although the threat to Moscow does not appear to be as immediate as that to the other cities mentioned. Whether the Germans can capture or cut off any one or more of these cities in sufficient time to prevent the withdrawal of large Soviet forces and military and industrial equipment to the east is a question upon which sufficient information is not obtainable to permit me to pass a considered judgment. However from the meager information that I have, I am satisfied that substantial quantities of industrial machinery are being removed to the east daily.

While I can discern no significant change in general conditions in Moscow I believe the loss of Smolensk has finally convinced the general public of the seriousness of the present military situation.

I am convinced that regardless of the course which military developments may take, the present regime is not likely to make peace with Germany so long as sufficient power of resistance remains to ensure the grip of the Government on the unoccupied areas of the country. A series [of] major military defeats would of course have a serious effect upon the Soviet masses and would bring to the surface much latent discontent with the present regime. This, however, I believe would not be of great importance except in the areas occupied by Germany. The Stalin regime has not in the past been disturbed by popular disaffection, and I see no reason why it should be in the near future. The control which is exercised through the O. G. P. U., the party, and the bureaucracy is complete, and if the people can be fed and the army remain loyal, I believe these highly developed organs of control will remain effective. Furthermore, it seems improbable that Hitler could or would offer peace terms which would give any assurance to Stalin that he would remain in power. As the people of the Soviet Union have made untold sacrifices for a great many years in order that the Soviet Government might create what they have been led to believe is an invincible army and inasmuch as their confidence and morale must be adversely affected by the loss of such cities as Smolensk and by the discouraging news which may impend, I am pursuaded that American and British support will have a very important bearing in strengthening their morale and in shaping Stalin’s policy, such as tending to discourage him from accepting any overtures which Japan might make.

Steinhardt