740.0011 European War 1939/9306: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union ( Steinhardt ) to the Secretary of State

585. The British Ambassador59 told me this afternoon that 3 or 4 days ago he had received a telegram from Eden60 instructing him to suggest to the Soviet Government that it “take some action” in an endeavor to restrain Yugoslavia from joining the Tripartite Pact. He said that he had called on Vyshinski and had made the suggestion. Later in the day Vyshinski sent for him and in the language of the Ambassador quite obviously had “been [apparent omission]” for having even discussed the subject with him for he informed Cripps rather sharply that the Soviet Government could find no basis for discussing with the British Government political subjects extraneous to the relations between the two countries “as long as Halifax61 continued to interfere with shipments from the United States to the Soviet Union” and as long as the matter of the Baltic ships and gold was not satisfactorily adjusted.

Cripps said he had replied that if this was the attitude of the Soviet Government he would make it a point in the future not to bring to its attention, as he had in the past, matters which he thought might be of interest to it and in this connection referred to the information which he had given Vyshinski after his talk with Eden concerning Turkish fears of a Soviet attack in the event of German aggression against Turkey (see my 504, March 15, 9 a.m.62). Cripps said that after this report Vyshinski had endeavored to soften the full impact of his previous remarks but that he was left with the distinct impression that the Kremlin had been extremely displeased at Vyshinski’s having even discussed the matter with him.

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Cripps also told me that shortly after his second visit to Vyshinski the latter had sent for the Yugoslav Minister, said that Gavrilovic63 had later told him that Vyshinski had said that according to information received by the Soviet Government, the Yugoslav Government had already made its decision to join the Tripartite Pact and that the Soviet Government therefore considered it “too late to do anything about it”. Gavrilovic said Vyshinski had added, however, that should it develop in the course of the next few days that Yugoslavia did not join the Tripartite Pact the Soviet Government would then consider what, if any, action it contemplated taking.

The Ambassador made it perfectly clear that he believed that any “action” contemplated by the Soviet Government would be solely diplomatic.

Steinhardt
  1. Sir Stafford Cripps.
  2. Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
  3. Viscount Halifax, British Ambassador in the United States.
  4. Not printed. For substance of Russia’s note of March 11, 1941, to Turkey in which latter was told in effect she could, in case of attack by a third country, rely upon the non-aggression pact in effect between the two countries, and the substance of Turkey’s note of March 15 in reply, see telegram No. 30, March 19, 8 p.m., to the Ambassador in Turkey, p. 611.
  5. Milan Gavrilović, Yugoslav Minister in the Soviet Union.