Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1941, General, The Soviet Union, Volume I

740.0011 European War 1939/17085: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

London, December 4, 1941—midnight.
[Received December 5—4:06 a.m.]

5876. For the Secretary and the President. Some days ago the Prime Minister and Mr. Eden mentioned to me informally the possibility of Mr. Eden going to Moscow to meet Stalin. I met with Mr. Eden late last night and he told me they had come to a definite decision and that they [Eden] planned to leave Sunday. For security reasons as well as for political reasons they want no mention made of his trip at this time. I asked him if he would prepare a memorandum for me for your information which he has done and which I received this evening. I know he will be interested in any comments you might wish to make on it. He told me in some detail the things he proposed to accomplish and I feel personally that they would have your approval. The memorandum follows.

“The United States Government will no doubt be aware that in conversation with Mr. Harriman and Lord Beaverbrook during the Moscow conference, Stalin mentioned peace objectives, the payment by Germany of war damage, and the possible extension of the Anglo-Russian agreement of July 12 to a treaty of alliance not only for the period of the war but for the post-war period as well. There was no serious discussion of these points at the time. But on the 11th November, in response to a suggestion that His Majesty’s Government should send two senior generals to discuss military matters at Moscow, the Prime Minister received a message from Stalin [in] which he expressed the desire that clarity should be established in the relations between the two Governments and the view that it was necessary for this purpose that an understanding should be reached not only on military matters but on war aims and on plans for the post-war organization of peace. The terms of the message were such as to leave no doubt that Stalin was in a mood of suspicion and even resentment to a degree that might adversely affect the cooperation of the two Governments in the prosecution of the war, and His Majesty’s Government decided that every effort must be made to dissipate these feelings.

2. Fortunately, a few days later, a verbal message was received from Stalin through the Soviet Ambassador, evidently designed to soften the asperities of the former message, and we seized this opportunity of informing Stalin that our intention was to see the war through to the end in alliance with Russia and that when the war was won we expected that Soviet Russia, the British Commonwealth and the United States of America would meet at the council table of the victors as the three principal partners and agencies by which Nazis would have been destroyed. We added that the fact that Russia is a Communist state and Britain and the United States are not and don’t intend to be was not an obstacle to our making a good plan for our mutual safety and rightful interests. Stalin was also informed that I should be ready to meet him in the early future at Moscow or elsewhere to discuss both military questions and the field of war aims and post-war aims.

3. Stalin has heartily welcomed this proposal and it is intended that I should proceed in the very near future.

4. I intend, of course, to make it clear from the outset that the association of the United States Government in the matter of war aims and postwar aims is of essential importance, that our obligations to them and to our allies have to be taken into account and that the United States Government must be kept fully informed.

5. On the other hand, the Soviet Ambassador indicated some time ago that his Government felt that they might have been consulted beforehand regarding the issue of the Atlantic Charter⁷⁴ (although, of course, M. Maisky announced at the Inter-Allied Conference on September 24⁷⁵ his Government’s agreement with its fundamental principles) and our accumulated information leads us to suppose that certain suspicions of our intention exist in Stalin’s mind which it is essential, if possible, to eradicate. These appear to be:

(a) That we aim at excluding Russia from the peace and postwar settlement.

(b) That we shall not be prepared to take what the Soviet Government may regard as sufficiently drastic measures at the peace settlement to render Germany innocuous.

6. Our main aim in the conversations will be:

(a) As far as possible to allay the suspicions and resentment referred to in the immediately preceding paragraph.

(b) For the rest to give Stalin as much satisfaction as possible without entering into commitments.

(c) To secure his agreement to certain points to which Soviet assent is important, viz.,

I. Reaffirmation both of the Atlantic Charter, and of certain passages of Stalin’s speech of November 6, undertaking not to interfere in the internal affairs of other nations;

II. The principle of the disarmament of Germany;

III. The encouragement of confederations of the weaker European States.

7. His Majesty’s Government realize, of course, that Soviet participation in international postwar commodity schemes and studies of postwar reconstruction such as those which it is proposed that the two should undertake will require the consent of other participating governments. His Majesty’s Government are aware that this may give rise to some controversy.

But as the Soviet Government have shown a disposition to make the readiness of His Majesty’s Government to discuss with them postwar problems a test of confidence, we feel it indispensable to give the Soviet Government an indication of our own attitude in this matter.

8. His Majesty’s Government have so far reached no decision as to the extent to which the enemy powers should be required to compensate their victims for the spoliation inflicted upon them. The Soviet Government on the other hand have shown some inclination to expect indemnification in certain respects. In the forthcoming talk His Majesty’s Government hope to dissuade the Soviet Government from definitely committing themselves at this stage to such a policy.”

Winant

74. For correspondence on the Atlantic Conference meeting, August 9–12, 1941, between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, see pp. 341 ff. The text of the charter is printed on p. 367.
75. Called for the purpose of passing a resolution in support of the Atlantic Charter declaration; see British Cmd. 6315, Misc. No. 3 (1941): Inter-Allied Meeting Held in London at St. James’s Palace on September 24, 1941, Report of Proceedings.