741.6711/25: Telegram
The Chargé in Iran (Engert) to the Secretary of State
Tehran, October 23, 1939—10 p.m.
[Received October 24—6:15 p.m.]
[Received October 24—6:15 p.m.]
128. My 59, May 23, 9 a.m., paragraph 3, 76, July 26, 11 a.m., paragraph 26 and 120, October 17, 9 a.m. Also despatch No. 1701, October 10th.7
- (1)
- News of failure of Turkish negotiations in Moscow and mutual assistance pact between Turkey, Britain and France8 was received in Iran with mixed feelings. Although there is strictly speaking no public mind there are a number of shrewd and competent political observers whose sparse and guarded comments occasionally reflect reactions of both the Government and the middle classes. The first impression is that there appears to have been a certain relaxation of [Page 624] the tension which had been created by the establishment of a virtual Russian protectorate over the Baltic States. It had been feared that Turkey would be induced to sign something which might sacrifice Rumania whereupon Iran’s turn would follow soon. This danger seems now much less imminent.
- (2)
- Iran as a signatory of the Saadabad pact9 is obviously interested in the Anglo-French system of alliances and guarantees which Turkey has now definitely joined. German failure to localize the war and the determination of the democracies to fight to a finish have put Iran in a singularly delicate position and she realizes that it may ultimately lead to a complete reshaping of her foreign policy. Opinions are divided whether the Saadabad pact is destined to assume an ever increasing importance or whether recent events have not practically destroyed it. It must be frankly admitted that the moral issues involved in the war have so far made little appeal to either Iranian public or Government with the notable exception of the Foreign Minister whose sympathies have always been on the side of the democracies. Self interest being the determining factor in the Shah’s policy he dreads the thought of being obliged to sign any defensive pacts with either Great Britain or Russia.
- (3)
- This feeling is all the stronger because the treaty signed by Turkey is regarded as of little use against Soviet aggression which is precisely the danger that is looming increasingly large. Unlike Bulgaria or Yugoslavia Iran was never on friendly terms with Russia even before the last war, and the threat from the north is an ever present factor in her political and social life. Iran resents of course that Germany should have strengthened Moscow’s hands in the Middle East but she does not fear Nazi aggression. Unless therefore Turkey shows willingness to fight Russia if necessary Iran will remain skeptical as to the practical value of cooperation with Turkey and the democracies.
- (4)
- New Turkish Ambassador9a who has just been transferred hero from Paris tells me that Turkey was not prepared to subordinate her own vital interests to the wishes of either Russia or Great Britain or anybody else but that it so happened that these interests coincided at the present time with the aims of the democracies. He intimated that Ankara’s pride had been wounded by the Soviet’s neglect to inform it of the negotiations with Hitler and of the decision to invade Poland.
- (5)
- German propaganda in Tehran had until the last hoped for the defection of Turkey but is now spreading the report that Turkey had simply been “bought” by England and is trying to sow discord [Page 625] between Iran and Turkey by making it appear that the latter was intent on compelling Iran to abandon her policy of neutrality.
Engert