761.91/195: Telegram

The Chargé in Iran (Engert) to the Secretary of State

120. Since the Legation’s 112, October 3, 2 p.m., I have had several informal talks with the Minister for Foreign Affairs4e and the Soviet Ambassador.

(1)
Both assure me that no trade agreement has as yet been signed because neither side is willing to surrender what it considers vital interests. Without of course referring to the specific rumors mentioned in my No. 112 they admit that their economic problems are closely interwoven with political problems. But the Foreign Minister said frankly that Iran must preserve economic freedom as much as possible for without it she could probably not long maintain her political independence. He also intimated that normal negotiations were extremely difficult in “the present atmosphere” and that Iran was carefully watching her frontiers.
(2)
The Foreign Minister appeared much impressed by the firmness shown by Finland and referred to President Roosevelt’s telegram to [Page 623] Moscow5 as a “noble gesture”. He added that according to his information the Soviets were at present particularly bitter against Great Britain and the United States because they realized that a fundamentally successful democracy was the most dangerous enemy bolshevism could have. Moscow was now hoping that even victorious democracies would be too exhausted to stop Russian denomination [domination] in Eastern Europe and Near East and the furthering of Communist aims. And by that time the Soviets might be ready for open war against the capitalist world. He thought it was useless to put down Hitler only to let a much worse enemy of society take his place but it would require statesmanship of a very high order on the part of all democracies to prevent it. He himself did not believe the Soviets would ever become “good neighbors”.
(3)
Iran’s foreign policy appears to be in a fluid state because the Government must tread carefully if it is to remain on equally good terms with Russia and Great Britain. The Shah undoubtedly wants to go his own way and has on the surface adopted an attitude of detachment toward the European war. He is above all intent on avoiding if possible the recurrence of the unfortunate experiences during the last war. He will probably do nothing reckless nor deliberately provoke displeasure in Moscow but many factors are already conspiring to make his task a very awkward one.
Engert
  1. Mouzaffar Aalam.
  2. See telegram No. 194, October 11, 1939, 5 p.m., to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, Foreign Relations, 1939, vol. i, p. 967.