Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1940, The British Commonwealth, The Soviet Union, The Near East and Africa, Volume III

711.61/799

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Welles)

[Washington,] November 27, 1940.

The Soviet Ambassador called to see me this afternoon. I went over with him point by point all of the problems set forth in the memorandum attached herewith,²¹ prepared by the European Division, which had to do with the machine tool controversy and with our own complaints against the Soviet Government.

Rather to my surprise, the Ambassador’s attitude was most conciliatory and friendly, and, while he complained vehemently, as was to be expected, with regard to the decisions reached by the Administrator of Export Control, he stated that his reception both by Colonel Maxwell and by the committee headed by Mr. Philip Young had been exceedingly courteous and friendly and that every consideration had been given to the arguments which he had set forth. He again insisted, however, that the Soviet Government be permitted to obtain the thirty-four machine tools now in ports of the United States and that the Administrator of Export Control be requested to reconsider the decisions reached with regard to List C. I stated to the Ambassador that as he well knew, the Department of State had to be guided in matters of this kind by the decisions reached by the experts in charge of national defense problems and that I was sure he would realize that public opinion in the United States would never sanction in times like these the overruling by officials of the Department of State of the competent authorities in charge of the national defense program. I said, however, that I would be glad to discuss the matter once more with Colonel Maxwell and that I would then let the Ambassador know the result of such conversation.

The Ambassador adopted a sympathetic and responsive attitude when I read to him a list of the American complaints against the Soviet Government but classified them as of minor importance compared with the grievances of the Soviet Government against the United States. I said that it seemed to me impossible to weigh in the balance the importance of the complaints of one side or of the other and that as he and I had agreed, our conversation should be directed towards the removal of legitimate causes for complaint in the interest of paving the way to a more profitable relationship between the two Governments. The Ambassador said that he would take up all of the complaints I had read to him once more with his Government. He mentioned one or two of these complaints on the ground that he felt the cause therefor had already been removed. I insisted, however, that the principle of permitting individuals claiming American citizenship to go to the American Embassy in Moscow and there be afforded the opportunity of proving their citizenship to our own authorities was one of the greatest importance and one upon which we must insist. He appeared to be responsive in this regard.

The Ambassador brought up again the question of the Baltic ships. I said that it seemed to me that he and I must recognize that we were up against a question of principle here upon which this Government was not prepared to yield and upon which I assumed, from what he told me, the Soviet Government was not prepared to yield. I said if there were any practical way of solving the question of the Baltic ships without bringing up the question of principle, I would be very glad to consider it. I asked him what the attitude of his Government had been with regard to the requisition of Baltic ships in British ports by the British Government. The Ambassador said the Soviet Government had objected vigorously. He then remarked that he thought a practical solution which would not raise the question of principle would be for the authorities of the United States to issue clearance papers to the Baltic vessels which desired to proceed to Baltic or Russian ports. I said that I would give the entire question further consideration.

The Ambassador complained that the arrangement which had been agreed upon with regard to the visits of Soviet engineers to the Wright Aeronautical Corporation in Paterson was not being carried out. I told him that I would be happy to have this matter looked into immediately.

Upon the conclusion of the discussion of these matters, which took a very considerable period, I asked the Ambassador whether he had any information with regard to recent political developments affecting his Government which he felt disposed to communicate to me. The Ambassador said that the reports regarding Molotov’s visit to Berlin²² had been greatly distorted and were completely fantastic. He said that he was authorized to state to me that the foreign policy of the Soviet Union remained completely independent after Molotov’s visit to Berlin and that the policy of the Soviet Union would continue to be a policy of complete neutrality and of avoidance of participation in war. He stated that the Soviet was anxious to enlarge its commercial relations with Germany and that his Government believed that as a result of the visit, progress in this regard would be made.

I said to the Ambassador that as he knew, this Government regarded with the utmost interest the situation of China and that it was prepared to give further material assistance to China. I stated that the maintenance of the independence and integrity of China was a primary objective in the foreign policy of the United States, The Ambassador stated that he was authorized likewise to say that the policy of the Soviet with regard to China was identical with that of the United States.²³ He agreed that insofar as Russia and the United States were concerned, there was no conflict of interest between them in the Pacific, but that, on the contrary, their objectives were similar. I asked the Ambassador if it was true that his Government had ceased to give material assistance to China in recent months. He stated that so far as he was informed this was not correct and that in a recent conversation which he had had with Dr. T. V. Soong,²⁴ Dr. Soong had assured him that Russian military supplies were still being received by the Chinese Government from the Soviet. The Ambassador expressed great interest in Japanese movements in southern Asia. He expressed the opinion that Japan was probably preparing through Indochina and Thailand some movement against Singapore from the rear. I said that this might well be the case although some attack against the Netherlands East Indies was, of course, likewise possible. I said that I had no very clear impression as yet that the Japanese Government had in fact determined what course it was going to pursue. I stated that it seemed to me undoubtedly true that Japanese activities in southern Asia would be far less in scope and extent if the Chinese Government had both the moral and material support of Russia.

S[umner] W[elles]

21. Supra.
22. Molotov visited Berlin November 12–14, 1940. German accounts of the conversations held are published in Departmet of State, Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939–1941 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1948), pp. 217–255.
23. Concerning the attitude toward China, see memorandum of November 27 by the Under Secretary of State, p. 237.
24. Chairman, Board of Directors, Bank of China; former Finance Minister of China.