Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1940, The British Commonwealth, The Soviet Union, The Near East and Africa, Volume III

861.24/436½

Memorandum Prepared in the Division of European Affairs

[Washington,] November 26, 1940.

For purposes of convenience there is attached an outline¹⁸ showing the present status of the conversations with the Soviet Ambassador. This outline divides the subjects which have been discussed or may properly be discussed into three major headings:

A. Soviet complaints or requests.

B. Extraneous matters which the Soviet Ambassador continuously endeavors to inject into the conversations.

C. American complaints or requests.

Soviet complaints or requests are divided into two groups:

1. Those on which no further action is called for;

2. Those still pending.

On the list of those still pending are six headings—namely, the machine tool problem, the moral embargo, the import of Soviet gold into the United States, a pledge of non-discrimination against Soviet trade in general, the alleged persecution suffered by Soviet citizens and officials in the United States, and the refusal of the Department to grant passports good for travel in the Soviet Union to American engineers.

The machine tool problem. It is understood that Mr. Oumansky is irritated at his lack of success thus far in obtaining more machine tools. The Administration of Export Control tells us that when Colonel Maxwell informed the Ambassador that the Administration could let him have only one machine tool valued at approximately $7000 out of some 103 tools valued at approximately $3,000,000, Mr. Oumansky replied that apparently the negotiations had returned to the point from which they had started, and that the matter must again be taken up through diplomatic channels. The situation seems to be as follows in regard to the negotiations between Colonel Maxwell and Mr. Oumansky:

Two lists of machine tools apparently were submitted by the Ambassador with the request that the decision to deny them export licenses be reconsidered. The first list, which was presented through the Department and which was discussed in the Department, was composed of some 61 machine tools which had already been manufactured and were awaiting shipment. The Administration permitted the export of 29 of the less complicated of these tools, retaining 32. The second list of 103 tools was composed of tools applications for export licenses covering which had already been rejected. Of this number, only about 80 could be identified during the course of a conversation early in November. On November 12, Colonel Maxwell, as has been pointed out, informed the Ambassador that only one of these machines could be released. It is understood that the remaining 20 have finally been identified and will be discussed by the Administration of Export Control on the afternoon of November 26. In any event, the Soviet Ambassador is disappointed at the results of his negotiations with Colonel Maxwell and will undoubtedly try to re-introduce the subject of machine tools into the current conversations.

It will be recalled that it has already been agreed in principle that notes will be exchanged with respect to the non-discrimination in connection with the purchase of Soviet gold by the United States Treasury, and with respect to Soviet trade in general. It is believed that for the present it would be advisable to postpone further detailed discussions on these points pending developments in other phases of our conversations and a clarification of Soviet international policy.

The Ambassador is almost sure to raise during the next conversation the question of the moral embargo since he has on previous occasions displayed some impatience at our delay in lifting it. In this connection he will probably again request that we give assurances that we will permit the Kellogg Company to sell the Soviet Government gasoline cracking equipment in the value of approximately $12,500,000.

With regard to alleged persecutions suffered by Soviet officials and citizens of the United States, there does not seem that much more can be said on either side. We might, perhaps, as a gesture, inform the Ambassador that we have gone carefully into the charges of persecution and discrimination and have convinced ourselves that there has been no organized or systematic effort to cause unpleasantness to Soviet officials and citizens in this country or to handicap them in their work. If we care to go so far, it might be added that we are preparing to inform the Department of Justice that the Soviet engineers employed by Amtorg are considered by the Department of State as Soviet officials and that it is to be hoped that the appropriate American law enforcing authorities will treat them with the courtesy due officials of foreign governments who possess no diplomatic immunities or rights. At the same time, it might be desirable to impress the Ambassador with the fact that Soviet officials in the United States not connected with the Embassy or with Soviet consular offices should realize that they are subject to American laws and should endeavor to conduct themselves in such a way that they will not be likely to come into conflict with the law enforcing authorities.

It is possible that the Ambassador may again raise the question of our refusal thus far to issue passports to American engineers good for travel in the Soviet Union. If he does, it might be best for us to continue to follow the line that until we see a change in the treatment accorded to American citizens in the Soviet Union on the part of the Soviet Government, we feel that in the interest of good relations between the two governments, it would be wise to reduce to a minimum the number of American citizens in the Soviet Union. It is not believed that it would be advisable to endeavor to solve this problem by an exchange of notes for two reasons:

1. In view of the uncertainty of the future we cannot afford to promise definitely that we will allow American citizens to go to the Soviet Union in cases where it is useful for the Soviet Government to have them;

2. Any promise on the part of the Soviet Government to give us most-favored-nation treatment with regard to the freedom of travel of American citizens in the Soviet Union would be of little value since the travel of all foreigners, including even that of Germans, is so restricted that we would not be able to use such a Soviet promise in endeavoring to improve the position of our own nationals in that country.

It seems, therefore, that this problem can be solved only by a change in the attitude of the Soviet authorities with regard to American citizens already in the Soviet Union.

Under extraneous matters which the Soviet Ambassador continues to inject into the conversations fall various problems connected with the Baltic States. Although the Ambassador thus far has limited his demands of recognition of Soviet conquests to the Baltic, there seems to be little doubt, in view of the development of conversations between Great Britain and the Soviet Union, that if he should receive any encouragement with respect to this area, his demands will be enlarged to include Eastern Poland, Bessarabia, etc. His demands with respect to the ships and frozen funds, of course, merely represent Soviet endeavors to drive a wedge into our whole policy of refusing to recognize Soviet conquests in Europe and perhaps later in Asia.

It will be observed that under the heading of American complaints or requests we have thus far gained nothing, unless the Soviet agreement to establish an American Consulate General in Vladivostok may be considered as a concession arising from these conversations.¹⁹ If the opportunity presents itself, it is suggested that it be made clear to Mr. Oumansky that the establishment of a consular office in Vladivostok has no direct connection with the outcome of the conversations. Our request for such an office was made prior to the opening of the conversations and we feel that since there are two Soviet consular offices at present on the Pacific coast,²⁰ our consular office should be opened in Vladivostok without further delay and regardless of the outcome of the present conversations. You may care to point out that we are appointing Mr. Ward, now First Secretary in Moscow, as Consul in Vladivostok and are ordering him to proceed as soon as possible to that city for the purpose of arranging for offices, living quarters, etc., and for the opening of the Consulate General. You may care to add that we appreciate the decision taken by the Soviet authorities to permit the opening of the consular office and that we are depending upon their sympathetic cooperation for the successful conduct of the office.

The difficulties encountered by our Embassy in Moscow have not been appreciably lightened as a result of the conversations. It might be well to impress this fact upon Mr. Oumansky. It will be noted from Mr. Steinhardt’s telegram that he brought the following matters to the attention of Lozovsky, the Assistant Commissar for Foreign Affairs, on the afternoon of November 19:

1. The continued difficulties of the Embassy in protecting and assisting American citizens in the Soviet Union arising from the lack of cooperation on the part of the Soviet authorities.

(a) The reluctance of the Soviet authorities to grant the Embassy access to persons in prison claiming American citizenship. (It will be noted that since this conversation the Soviet authorities have permitted the Embassy to see another American citizen in jail.)

(b) The failure of the Soviet authorities to permit American citizens in certain areas under Soviet control to depart to the United States, or even to appear at the Embassy in order to arrange for travel documents.

(c) The refusal of the Soviet authorities to grant permission for the Soviet wives of American citizens to leave the Soviet Union in company with, or to join their husbands.

(d) The refusal of the Soviet authorities to give American citizens in transit through Moscow the necessary time with which to obtain requisite visas, including Soviet exit visas.

2. The continued lack of consideration shown by the Soviet authorities with regard to the Embassy and members of the Embassy staff, as for example:

(a) The unfriendly treatment still shown by the Soviet Customs authorities which was recently illustrated by their act of damaging certain foodstuffs destined for the Embassy by thrusting iron rods through the containers.

(b) The quadrupling of freight charges on food shipments from Vladivostok to Moscow so that at the present time the rate exceeds 2000 rubles a ton.

(c) Arresting without notice another Soviet employee of the Embassy, leaving his wife and 6-months-old child without any means of support. (This is the fifth employee to be arrested.)

(d) Refusal to permit installation of a gasoline container within the Embassy premises, although similar containers have been installed by the Soviet authorities in like premises. (This refusal means much loss of time and inconvenience.)

(e) The failure of the Soviet authorities thus far to grant additional quarters to the Embassy which is desperately in need of them since its work has been greatly increased as a result of the taking over by the Soviet Government of the Baltic States and Eastern Poland and the refusal of the Soviet authorities to permit the maintenance of a consular office in Riga.

18. Not printed.
19. For correspondence concerning the negotiations for the establishment of an American Consulate General in Vladivostok, see pp. 460 ff.
20. The Soviet Union maintained a Consulate General in San Francisco, California, and a Consulate in Los Angeles, California.