852.00/9025: Telegram
The Ambassador in France ( Bullitt ) to the Secretary of State
[Received March 9—11:25 a.m.]
429. Quinones de Leon called on me at 6 o’clock this afternoon. He was extremely tired and seemed very depressed. He referred to the fact that the Duke of Alba had been appointed Spanish Ambassador in London whereas he had not been appointed Spanish Ambassador in Paris and said that it was due to the fact that the Duke of Alba had fought to get the job whereas he had preferred not to be Ambassador in Paris. His attachment was after all to the King. Nevertheless he seemed most disappointed.
He went on to say that he had had a terrible night because Bonnet had got him out of his bed at 4 o’clock this morning to tell him that the Communists in Madrid were assaulting the French Embassy there and that the members of the French Embassy were defending themselves and had asked him if there could not be an immediate entry of Franco’s troops to save the French and Spaniards still in the French Embassy in Madrid. He had been up until morning attempting to produce some action by Franco’s general headquarters. This morning the news had arrived that General Miaja had overwhelmed the Communists and that the French Embassy was safe.
He then said to me that he had received the message from Burgos for which he had been waiting. The reason the reply had been delayed had been that the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs at Burgos had insisted on leaving his post to take command of troops for the entry into Madrid and the new Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs had had to travel from Bern to Burgos and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs had been overwhelmed with work during this period.
The message that he had received was in Spanish of which he would give me a French translation. He then read:
“We cannot admit that there should be conditional recognition; but we reiterate the statements made recently to the British and French Governments in the announcements of policy by General Jordana. (See my telegram No. 364 of February 25, 1 p.m.) The generosity of the Generalissimo and the conduct of the authorities and courts after the occupation of Catalonia constitute a guarantee of equity and justice for all Spaniards not culpable of crimes.”
Quinones de Leon then stopped.
I asked what reply he had had with regard to my question in respect of the readiness of the Franco Government to protect the lives and property of Americans and to fulfill the obligations of a Spanish Government under international law and treaties. He replied “that goes without saying.” I answered that in so far as the American Government was concerned as indicated by my question to him it did not go without saying and that I should like to have a statement on the subject. He then said that he was authorized to say that “the Spanish Government in reciprocity is fully prepared to protect the lives and property of Americans and to fulfill the normal obligations of a Spanish Government under international law and treaties.”
He added that he could give me a statement of his own in addition which would be merely a repetition of words in the announcements of policy by General Jordana referred to above.
I replied that this did not appear to be especially valuable and added that I should like to be entirely sure of the exact words that he on behalf of the Franco Government wished to have transmitted to the Government of the United States. I then wrote out in his presence the statements contained above in quotation marks and Quinones de Leon agreed that this was the accurate text of the communication he was authorized to make.
He then added that “the courts of criminal justice would apply only the laws existing on the 16th of July 1936.” I replied that this statement was contained in the announcements of policy of General Jordana but I had been shocked to read in the London Times of Tuesday March 7 the summary of a law on “political responsibilities” signed by General Franco last month designed according to the preamble to punish all persons who contributed by act or omission “to forge Red subversion, maintain it incandescent for more than 2 years and place obstacles in the path of the providential and inevitable triumph of the National movement.” (I assume that you have the text of this law.)
I called Quinones de Leon’s attention especially to the minute instructions drawn up for the manner in which charges are to be made out and substantiated, and read him the following from the London Times of March 7:
“Charges may result (1) from sentences pronounced by military courts; (2) from denunciations in writing by any person or juridicial body; (3) through the initiative of the regional courts. Political responsibilities will have been incurred by ‘all persons who from October 1, 1934 to July 18, 1936 shall have contributed to create or aggravate the subversion of all kinds of which Spain has been victim as well as all who since July 18, 1936 have opposed the National movement in fact or by grave passivity’. By virtue of the foregoing definition everybody [Page 762] whether union or association who had anything to do with the Asturian rising, the Frente Popular or the elections of February 1936 is outlawed. A list of 25 political parties, trade unions and Nationalist groups is given including not only the Communist, Anarchist and Socialist Unions, the Basques and the Catalans, but also the most moderate of the Republican groups. The Freemasons are specially denounced with the exception of those who recanted before July 18, 1936.
The property of parties outlawed is declared forfeit to the state. A detailed list of other cases considered punishable is given including persons who have left governmental Spain and who within 2 months had not entered Nationalist territory.
Three degrees of punishment are established involving (1) depression of office, (2) restriction of liberty including exile to Africa or imprisonment, (3) confiscation of property or fines. There is to be no death penalty for political responsibilities but widespread confiscation of property and possible imprisonment.”
I said to Quinones de Leon that I was certain that it would shock American public opinion to learn that “grave passivity” had been made a crime and pointed out that although there was to be no death penalty for “political responsibilities” all other penalties were to be inflicted and every one in the Republican area except active Franco sympathizers was to be placed in the position of a criminal. I asked Quinones de Leon how this law could be reconciled with the statement that the courts of justice would apply only the laws existing on July 16, 1936.
Quinones de Leon said that he was at a loss to reconcile the two documents. They seemed to mean that no one would be shot except on the basis of the laws existing on the 16th of July 1936.
Quinones went on to say that Basteiro, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the present Madrid Junta, had been in touch with Franco throughout the civil war and that he was certain that the surrender of Madrid would be brought about within the next 2 or 3 days. He added that personally he had great confidence in General Franco who was well disposed toward the King and the Monarchy. The Requetes were also in favor of the restoration of the Monarchy. The Phalangistas, however, were most opposed and he did not know how things would work out in Spain. It was obvious that the task of governing Spain now would be a terribly difficult one.
It seems obvious from the foregoing that at the present time in the flush of victory General Franco’s Government is not inclined to make any promises worth having with regard to reprisals. I doubt indeed that under present circumstances any promises on this subject are worth having. The reconstruction period after a civil war marked by such extreme brutalities as the Spanish civil war is certain to be darkened by cruelties and persecutions. Moreover, we know from previous experience with the Soviet Government that all [Page 763] promises of dictatorships after civil war are relatively valueless. The event depends on the character of the dictator.
The British Ambassador in Paris and Daladier and Bonnet seem to believe sincerely that the British and French Ambassadors in Burgos will be able to do much to restrain Phalangist brutality and they have confidence in the personal character of Franco.