[Enclosure]
Memorandum by the Ambassador in Italy (Phillips)
In accordance with instructions, I arrived at the Palazzo Venezia at
six-fifty, ten minutes before the appointed hour for my reception
[Page 58]
by the Duce. While I was
waiting in the ante-room, Ciano and Alfieri (Minister of Popular
Culture) passed me and were cloistered with the Duce for fifteen or
twenty minutes. Ciano asked me for a copy of the President’s
letter,6 which I
gave him and which he took with him to the Duce. It was quite
evident, therefore, that the Duce spent this intervening time
studying with his two advisers the copy of the President’s message
in advance of the delivery of the original.
When I entered the Duce’s office, Alfieri had already left. Ciano was
present, however, throughout the entire conversation although he
contributed nothing to it. After expressing my pleasure in having
this occasion to see His Excellency, I handed him the President’s
letter, which he went through the form of reading carefully. When he
had finished, I read to him slowly the memorandum7 which I had been instructed to
present with the letter. Having concluded that part of the
memorandum dealing with the Plateau region in southern Ethiopia and
Kenya, the Duce interrupted by saying that this suggestion was
impracticable,—that this particular region in Ethiopia was inhabited
by a people who were wholly unsympathetic to the Jews, and that he
had already offered a far better region northeast of Addis Ababa, a
proposal which, however, the Jews themselves had not received
favorably. Thereupon, he opened a map of Ethiopia, examined the
suggested Plateau region, and showed me somewhat vaguely the area
which he had already suggested for Jewish colonization.
When I had concluded the memorandum, I said that, with his
permission, I would like to express certain personal views, and I
hoped that he would not misunderstand if I spoke with frankness.
Mussolini asked me to proceed. He was aware, I said, of the strained
relations between the United States and Germany. This unfortunate
situation was largely the result of the methods (and I emphasized
“methods”) which had been and were continuing to be employed by the
German Government in forcing certain elements of the population to
leave the country. These methods had greatly shocked public
sentiment in America. The Duce interrupted me by recounting the
iniquities of the German Jews and of Jews in general, their lack of
loyalty to the country of their residence, their intrigues, and the
fact that they never could assimilate with any other race. He
admitted that this lack of assimilation was a strong point in their
favor and showed their remarkable racial strength. He told me of the
financial frauds which were being practiced by the Jews and showed
me a little book in German containing photographs of counterfeit
bills for huge amounts of German marks. I was impressed by his
[Page 59]
apparently genuine
antagonism to the Jews. He went on to say that, in his opinion,
there would not be one Jew left in Germany, and that other European
countries—and he mentioned in particular Rumania and Hungary—were
confronted with the same problem and were finding it necessary to
rid themselves of their Jewish elements. There was no room for Jews
in Europe, and eventually, he thought, they would all have to go. I
reminded him that this forced emigration from Europe had created an
international problem and one with which we in the United States
were vitally concerned. It was not a question solely for those
states from which the emigrants departed, but it had become a
serious world problem. Mussolini mentioned Russia as the natural
continent which had ample spare room for Jews, although he admitted
that Jews did not appear to be anxious to go there. No one, he said,
seemed to have thought seriously of Russia in this connection. He
mentioned the vast tracts of unoccupied lands in North America and
compared this with the congested areas in Europe. I replied that we
Americans seemed already to be doing our part in that we had already
a large Jewish population and that Jewish emigrants from Germany
were free to come to the United States within our quota. I told him
of the work of the London Committee and that certain progress had
been made, largely through the efforts of the State Department, in
ascertaining what other countries were willing to do with regard to
admission of these refugees, but I gave him no particulars
concerning the numbers of Jews which individual countries might be
willing to absorb.
Mussolini felt that the present program of finding refuges for these
emigrants in various countries was more in the nature of a
palliative than a solution. He expressed the opinion that the Jews
should have a state of their own which need not be necessarily a
large or important one but at least a territory where there could be
a Jewish capital and government. In this way, he said, the Jews in
other parts of the world would occupy a position similar to other
foreigners living abroad and could be handled accordingly. He
admitted that it would be difficult to find a suitable place on the
globe for a bona fide Jewish state but he seemed convinced that that
was the only answer to the problem.
I found it necessary to bring him back several times to the original
inquiry as to whether he would join with other leaders and states in
trying to find a solution. Finally he agreed to do so and said that
I could assure the President that he and the Italian Government
would gladly cooperate with the President and with other states in
this international endeavor. I reminded him of the importance of the
forthcoming meeting in London between the representatives of the
London Committee and the German Government, and I asked him
[Page 60]
whether he could do anything
to be of assistance in this connection. He replied that he would do
so but he did not elaborate as to how far he would be willing to go
in this direction. He said that the continual public condemnation of
Germany’s actions had immensely stiffened the German attitude and
actually had increased the determination to deal drastically with
the situation. He thought that probably very little could be done
with the German authorities unless there was a cessation of these
attacks. I interjected that, in view of the widespread public
opinion in America against Germany because of the methods employed
by the German Government, it would be next to impossible to suppress
the attitude of Americans in general. I expressed appreciation of
his offer to help and said that I would convey it to Washington and
that I was sure the President would be also highly appreciative. I
ventured to express the hope that he would find some occasions on
which he could publicly ally himself with the movement, and he
seemed to think that this might be done.
During this entire discussion, Count Ciano remained standing and
offered no comment or suggestion.
Although I was disappointed by the Duce’s rejection of the
President’s suggestion regarding the use of the Plateau region in
southern Ethiopia and Kenya, I left with the feeling that something
had been accomplished in enlisting his appreciation of the magnitude
of the international problem. That he was willing to help in solving
seemed to me something gained.
William Phillips
Rome, January 3,
1939.
