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Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Moffat)
The British Ambassador called this afternoon. He said that the other night at the White House the President had made an eloquent statement of the way Britain and America had solved their differences [Page 316] over Canton Island.31 Canton, however, was a mere detail in the bigger problem of trans-Pacific aviation and he did not see that the promise of the President’s speech was being carried out in this bigger field. Canton and Enderbury were of use for one purpose only. Britain had met us more than half-way in Canton Island but we had done nothing to meet them half-way with respect to flying from the Antipodes to Canada.
The Ambassador added that he was frankly on a fishing expedition to find out what developments, if any, there had been. I told him in brief that as far as aviation was concerned we had never admitted that it was part and parcel of the problem of the sovereignty over Pacific islands. In fact we were planning, in our reply to the last British note, to state that the use to which islands were put had scant bearing on the question of who owned them.
To take up the question of the islands first: We felt the British had had a legitimate cause for criticism in that we had never given them the list of the islands we claimed. This we would shortly do and Britain would find it a relatively short list. We proposed, before dealing with arbitration or other means of settlement, to see if we could not handle the matter by direct conversations. If we could not solve it we could probably at least reduce it to very small proportions.
The Ambassador made the remark that he was certain that his government would be disinclined to recognize our claims, feeling that British title to most of the islands was secure beyond peradventure of doubt. I made a light allusion to the fact that British Atlases some fifty or sixty years ago referred to the general area where our claims lay as “American Polynesia”. The Ambassador then said that in any event if we did not “come across” on the matter of aviation the British Government would not see any quid pro quo toward compromising with us. I suggested that a question of fact was not always a matter involving quid pro quos.
With regard to aviation I said that the feeling particularly in the armed services was as strong as ever against letting any foreign aircraft into Hawaii which was a vital strategic center for us. The Ambassador inquired whether the matter had been considered “on a statesmanlike basis” or whether we had merely accepted the bureaucratic dicta of the Departments. I told him that I could say this much, namely that the highest representatives of the armed forces had given the matter careful thought.
In that case, the Ambassador said he would offer a suggestion,—this was that we should not reply with a non-possumus but should give [Page 317] a delaying answer in the hopes that the situation might change within a year or so.
The Ambassador added that of course he did not wish to make an issue of it, but there was always pressure from New Zealand to cancel the Pan American contract in the absence of reciprocal rights. Not wishing to give away our sources of information I did not tell the Ambassador that according to our information the pressure to cancel the contract came not from New Zealand but was being placed by Great Britain on New Zealand.
The rest of the conversation dealt with the Ambassador’s plans for departure and reminiscences over the years we had known each other in Constantinople and elsewhere.
- See remarks made by the President in proposing a toast to His Majesty, King George VI of Great Britain, June 8, 1939, Department of State, Press Releases, June 10, 1939, p. 499.↩