711.008 North Pacific/443: Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

46. Our 19, January 11, 6 p.m., Alaska Salmon Fishery.

1. The following is the text in translation of an informal letter which Yoshizawa handed today to Dooman:

“My Dear Mr. Dooman: I refer to your call on me on January 11, when you spoke of the various conditions in the United States affecting the question of salmon fishing in waters near the coast of Alaska and when you handed me informally a paper dealing with that subject. You pointed out that, in view of the increasing desire for a fundamental solution of this question by legislation, there were indications that Congress would proceed to discuss and consider such legislation.

In view of your connection with this case since its inception you I are aware that it was realized that the immediate need was, through mutual understanding and by exercise of patience on the part of the competent authorities of the American and Japanese Governments, and after overcoming numerous complications, to seek a practical solution which would reserve all discussions based on international law. Finally in March last year there was reached an agreement of views and a provisional solution was effected. As a result of that arrangement the survey vessel belonging to the Department of Agriculture and Forestry whose operations apparently have caused concern to the American authorities, was not despatched last year to Alaska, and it is understood that no plans are being made for it to operate in those waters during the coming season. Consequently, I firmly believe that there cannot be discovered or anticipated one fact occurring between March of last year until-today which can be regarded as a direct basis for renewal of agitation with regard to this question. Toward the end of last year you stated to me informally that there were one or two members of Congress who planned to provide a fundamental and permanent solution of this question on the basis of the so-called ‘Continental Shelf claim by resort to the process of legislation. As a matter of fact, the Japanese Embassy at Washington and the Consulates in the various places which are concerned in this matter have been carefully on the alert for indications of trends in American public opinion on this question, and there have been no reports on this subject from these offices, the statement therefore that there have occurred developments in connection with this matter which make it necessary that the Department of State again raise this question could not have been anticipated; and I believe that you will understand the reasons for my astonishment when you made your recent informal suggestion.

Public opinion in the United States which, since the breaking out of the conflict with China has not hesitated to manifest antipathy toward Japan, has taken a still further turn for the worse since Ambassador Grew despatched his official note of October 6, 193846 and [Page 211] public opinion in Japan, realizing that fact, is showing indications of feeling that the attitude of the American Government which had up to that time been a comparatively fair one is undergoing a change. The frequent references recently attempted in American newspapers to application of so-called economic sanctions against Japan are also being widely noticed. If in these circumstances when there has been offered no direct reason and when less than a year has elapsed since a provisional solution was reached the question were today again to be raised suddenly various conjectures would arise with regard to the motives of the United States and I am sure that you will realize that there would be cause for apprehension of the adverse effects of such conjectures on relations between our two countries.

It is not necessary for me to dwell on the innumerable difficulties which lie in both countries in the way of formulating a so-called fundamental solution of this question. Assuming that these difficulties could be eliminated or surmounted and that a solution is not absolutely impossible the fact is that, in my opinion, the present would be most inopportune time for giving consideration to this question. For these reasons I have not transmitted your informal suggestion to my superiors or discussed it with the concerned governmental department: To have done so would not, in my opinion, have served any useful purpose. I have thus laid the facts before you frankly and hope that you will report them carefully to Ambassador Grew in order that he may place the Department of State in a position to understand the circumstances.

Sincerely yours,

Seijiro Yoshizawa”

2. Yoshizawa added orally that the sentence in his letter “assuming that these difficulties could be eliminated or surmounted and that a solution is not absolutely impossible” was not to be interpreted to mean that the Japanese Government would be disposed at some time in the future to enter discussions along the lines of the “Continental Shelf” doctrine. He said that when his letter was being considered by the Foreign Office the Treaty Bureau desired to revise the sentence under reference in order to make it clear that the Japanese Government would not in any circumstances consider unilaterally renouncing its right under international law as at present understood. However, he had obtained the Treaty Bureau’s approval of his letter only on condition that he make it clear to us that the Japanese Government does not intend to enter into conversations which would lead to any discussion of such rights.

Grew