793.94 Advisory Committee/136: Telegram
The Consul at Geneva (Bucknell) to the Secretary of State
[Received January 28—8 p.m.]
18. Lord Cranborne46 having expressed the desire to see me, I called on him this afternoon. He was with Mr. Stevenson of the British delegation.
Lord Cranborne said that he was terribly sorry to hear that the Minister47 was ill and therefore was not in Geneva and said that he would be glad if I would give him a message on his behalf. He said that the British, French, Russians, and Chinese had had a meeting this morning and that the Chinese were pressing for some further action on the part of League.
He said that it was pretty definite that a Council resolution would be presented reaffirming the resolution adopted by the Committee of Twenty-three and by the Assembly and in addition calling upon states to collaborate in the action recommended by that Committee of necessity of “refraining from taking any action which might have the effect of weakening China’s power of resistance.”48 He pointed out that such collaboration would mean the end of efforts of conciliation. He said that the Chinese had been anxious to apply article 1749 with its “full regalia” which would, of course, pave the way toward sanctions. This, Lord Cranborne felt, was difficult and perhaps dangerous since Japan would in all probability refuse an invitation to appear and state her case and would probably not be favorably received. The Chinese finally pressed for “one small step in advance,” that is, consultation regarding such collaboration.
The question of possible consultation remained to be considered. He emphasized the fact that no decision had been reached in this respect although he felt that in the event a resolution calling for collaboration of states to refrain from hindering China was adopted the Chinese would immediately press for the further step to consult as to what means this collaboration should take.
Such consultation could take one of four forms: (1) By a reconvening of the Committee of Twenty-three which Cranborne thought was unwise since he did not feel that very much could be accomplished by this means; (2) a reconvening of the Brussels Conference which he thought was perhaps a better move; (3) a private and informal meeting [Page 492] of interested governments which would presumably include the United States; and (4) some committee set up by the Council.
He said that Eden was anxious at all costs to avoid embarrassing the United States and that he felt it wise to inform Harrison of the situation in order that Washington might be “tipped off.” He said that the British position had always been at Brussels and elsewhere that they were prepared to take such action as they felt would be effective but were not prepared to take action which they felt would not be effective.
He said that while one object of the Chinese was to obtain a political gesture another was perhaps that the Chinese wanted to line up the various interested powers to see to what extent they could receive aid from each, that is, that they would say that they needed so many guns, so many tanks, so many airplanes, et cetera, and would then ask each power what it could supply although he thought that inquiries of this kind had already been addressed to those governments.
Throughout the conversation Cranborne was evidently anxious to obtain any indication of what the American attitude would be with regard, to the new Chinese move. I refrained from saying anything more than that I would be glad to transmit the information to Mr. Harrison.
Cranborne concluded by saying that he was most anxious to keep the United States Government fully informed and to avoid in any way embarrassing it and that he would continue to keep it informed of any developments.
I telephoned the above information to the Minister in Bern who asked me to telegraph it to the Department and to explain that he has been ill with sinus but hopes to be able to get about within the next few days.
Department’s instructions are requested.
Later in the afternoon Stevenson informed me that Cranborne wished to speak to me again and I was received by Eden and Cranborne.
Eden said that following Cranborne’s conversation with me there had been another meeting later this evening and that after an extended discussion particularly with regard to the last paragraph the following draft resolution was agreed upon subject to approval of the British and French Governments:
“The Council.
Having taken into consideration the situation in the Far East.
Notes with regret that hostilities in China continue and have been intensified since the last meeting of the Council.
[Page 493]Deplores this deterioration in the situation the more in view of the efforts previously made by the Chinese National Government to promote the unity and prosperity in China.
Recalls that the Assembly has expressed its moral support for China and has recommended that members of the League should refrain from taking any action which might have the effect of weakening China’s power of resistance and thus of increasing her difficulties in the present conflict and should also consider how far they can individually extend aid to China;
Invites those states represented on the Council to whom the situation in the Far East is of special interest to consider, in consultation with other similarly interested powers the possibility of any further steps which may contribute to a just settlement of the conflict in the Far East.”
Eden remarked that if this draft was approved by the governments it would be passed at the meeting of the Council tomorrow morning. Following this action one of the two following procedures would be adopted: (1) the three powers, Great Britain, France and Russia would consult and then make some joint approach to other interested powers, principally intervening [interviewing?] United States and Holland, or (2) that these two governments would be approached through the usual diplomatic channels. He said that for himself he very much favored approaching the governments through diplomatic channels since the first alternative had too much the flavor of presenting an agreed upon program by joint or concerted action. He inquired what I thought my Government would prefer. I replied that I was unfortunately not in a position to express an opinion whereupon he said that he thought he would take it upon himself to say in the private Council meeting preceding the public session tomorrow that in his opinion the second alternative would be much more agreeable to the United States Government.
In discussing the draft resolution he said that he thought that on the whole it was not a bad draft and laughingly remarked that no punitive measures of any kind were mentioned and that the action contemplated might even take the form of consultation with Japan for example or any other of a dozen different procedures. He said that Delbos had remarked that the resolution meant in fact that they were afraid to shake the bad boy out of the tree but that if they could get another and powerful partner they would shake him out very quickly. I received the impression that the draft resolution was more agreeable to the English than to the French who apparently preferred certain changes. Eden said that he thought that the present plan would rather wipe out the other possibilities of consultation described to me by Cranborne and set forth in the first part of this telegram.
- British Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.↩
- Leland Harrison.↩
- See point 13 of report, adopted October 6, 1937, by the League of Nations Assembly, Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i, p. 394.↩
- Of the League Covenant, Foreign Relations, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, vol. xiii, pp. 69, 91.↩