793.94 Advisory Committee/137: Telegram
The Consul at Geneva (Bucknell) to the Secretary of State
[Received January 29—8:55 a.m.]
20. My 18, January 28, 9 p.m. The Polish permanent delegate telephoned this morning and asked me to come around as soon as possible. He said that he wanted to speak very privately and unofficially and asked if I could say whether the attitude of the United States Government with regard to the Sino-Japanese dispute had grown any stronger since the Brussels Conference and if they were now prepared to take a stronger line. He said that the British delegation were telling him that this was the case but that his own information did not support this.
I replied that I regretted that I was not in a position to express any opinion with regard to any change in the attitude of the American Government which has been consistent all along.
Komarnicki then went on to say that he objected very much to the way the British, French, and Russians were attempting to put over the draft resolution in the Council, which he considered not only objectionable but highly dangerous. If it was decided to apply article 16, well and good, but to ask him to agree to and give his blessing to Soviet aid to China which might reach dangerous proportions was something that he did not feel he could do. Such a resolution would be subject to many interpretations and he felt that some of these interpretations might be exceedingly dangerous. His attitude would probably be greatly changed if he had any assurance that the United States Government were in favor of or interested in such a resolution and its implications but failing this he opposed it bitterly.
He went on to say that the British-French-Russian move was pure bluff; that Eden, Beylard [Litvinov?], Delbos were anxious to achieve a personal triumph in the Council so that they could go home to their governments and point with pride to what they had achieved here but that for his own part he did not feel that conference of [or?] his Government should or could contribute to such a bluff. It was impossible for Poland to be a pawn in a political game which did not concern her and which contained such dangerous possibilities.
Poland he said objected to having three powers sit down in secret, decide upon a draft and then present it to the other members of the Council for them simply to accept whether they liked it or not. On what article of the Covenant was this draft resolution based? What was hoped to be accomplished by it? Poland had the greatest moral sympathy for China but a war between China and Japan did not directly affect Poland. He had no intention of voting for a resolution which might bless a Russian adventure with Japan.
[Page 495]I repeated that I was not in a position to express any opinion on the subject of either the draft resolution or of any change in the American French [sic].
Council meeting has been postponed until 5 this afternoon.