Office of the Historian

793.94/14058: Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

Tokyo, October 13, 1938—5 p.m.
[Received October 13—10:15 a.m.]

665. Our 657, October 12, 11 [10] a.m.36

1.
The Naval and Military Attachés,37 in appraising the landing of Japanese forces on the South China coast, agree that: (a) the primary purpose is to block ingress into China of arms and munitions over the only railway leading from a port not under Japanese control. Whereas such supplies are also being received from Indo-China and Russia, the quantities are probably not large when compared with the volume received over the Hankow-Kowloon line and probably insufficient to meet Chinese needs over a long period of time; (b) the fact that this move was made now and not later, say after the capture of Hankow, seems to indicate that the Japanese High Command had satisfied itself that the main Chinese forces intend to retreat from Hankow to the south and southwest. This would be a rational course for the Chinese to follow, as the five southwest provinces must hereafter provide the greater part of the resources of money, personnel and material for continued resistance. In view of these considerations, an advance along the railway toward Hankow is probably contemplated.
2.
Careful search of press comment this morning reveals little of Japanese objectives, military and political, not covered in the appraisal [as?] outlined. Editorials emphasize: (a) the importance of cutting off military supplies shipped through Hong Kong; (b) the importance of depriving the Chinese forces of their last substantial base of operations; (c) the need for “correcting the misapprehensions of the [Page 318] Kwangsi–Kwangtung faction who have long been a thorn in the side of Sino-Japanese cooperation, concerning the strength and motives of Japan”; and (d) the importance of Japan and other concerned powers guarding against the Chinese exploiting the complicated international situation in South China to involve Japan with third powers, notably Great Britain.
3.
We have been unable to obtain comment from any responsible Japanese which would offer basis for the tempting conjecture that the move in South China was made at this time to hasten settlement of the general military situation in anticipation of European developments discussed in our 655, October 10, midnight.

Repeated to Hong Kong for Chungking.

Grew
  1. Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i, p. 476.↩
  2. Capt. Harold M. Bemis, U. S. N., and Maj. Harry I. T. Creswell.↩