793.94/14061: Telegram
The Chargé in France (Wilson) to the Secretary of State
[Received October 13—6:30 p.m.]
1751. The Chief of the Far Eastern Division at the Foreign Office38 said to me this afternoon that the Japanese invasion of South China which has begun with the landing of troops at Bias Bay had been under consideration by the Japanese authorities for a long time. The Japanese Navy had always wanted to take this action but the Foreign Office had opposed it for fear of complications with foreign powers. With the fall of Ugaki39 and decline of Foreign Office influence, the navy view had prevailed.
Hoppenot believed the first Japanese objective will be to cut the railway in the section north of Kowloon and that for this purpose troops will be landed on the east bank of the Canton River in addition to those landed at Bias Bay. After this has been done he expects the Japanese to attack Canton but believes that in order to avoid the difficulties of an approach overland through the mountain and lake regions the Japanese will move troops on junks up the Canton River. He said that the force of some 35,000 men already landed at Bias Bay should be sufficient to cut the railway. A considerably larger force will be needed to capture Canton although his information indicates that the Chinese military at Canton are lukewarm about putting up a strong defense and that recently the best troops which had been stationed there have been moved to the north.
He believes that the Japanese intend to set up an autonomous government in Kwangtung and that while they will be able to accomplish [Page 319] their objectives in this area, including cutting off of supplies going to Hankow from Hong Kong, this will have little effect upon the ultimate outcome of the conflict.
Hoppenot said that he did not like the looks of things. The Japanese are becoming “excited” and unpleasant in conversations in Tokyo between the Foreign Office and the French Embassy and between the Japanese Embassy and the Foreign Office here. The Japanese Embassy had protested because a few Chinese officers and soldiers in mufti had been allowed to cross Tonkin going from Kwangsi to Yunnan. The French Foreign Office had replied that they could not prohibit Chinese transiting Tonkin, that a few Chinese soldiers in civilian attire could not be distinguished from ordinary civilians and that in any case there was no declared war and France had no obligation to prohibit even Chinese troops from crossing Indo-China. The Japanese Embassy, however, maintained its point of view and insisted that the French should do something yeoman [regarding?] situation. Also the Japanese Counselor (the Ambassador is quite ill) had lately protested a decree authorizing the authorities in Indo-China to prohibit the export of iron ore and manganese, Hoppenot had explained that this decree had been issued only in order to permit the prohibition of exports if it should appear in the future that these ores were needed in Indo-China and had pointed out that the decree had not been applied and that Japan was continuing to receive shipments of these ores. Japanese Counselor nevertheless had insisted that Japan had the “right” to obtain these ores and had been unpleasant about the matter.
Hoppenot stated that there was a clear relation between recent events in Europe and the changing attitude of the Japanese. Throughout the month of September it had seemed as if the Japanese attitude in the Far East and the German attitude in Central Europe had been synchronized. The British had noted this as well as the French. Hoppenot expressed the opinion that the only hope of preventing the situation in the Far East from steadily deteriorating would be for the United States to express its views strongly to Japan on the necessity of reasonable behaviour by the latter. I asked if he felt that French interests were menaced by this new Japanese invasion. He said that he feared there would be difficulties concerning the French Concession at Canton and also that the Japanese might seize Hainan. I asked what the French would do in this latter case. He said that France would protest. France would certainly not go to war with Japan over Hainan.
Hoppenot said that the Japanese had charged that shipments of war material to China were continuing to pass over the French railway in Indo-China. The French Government had replied that for [Page 320] the past 2 months not a single rifle had been carried on this railroad and had asked the Japanese Government to produce facts to substantiate its charges. The Japanese had insisted that shipments were going forward all the time and that it would be beside the point to present detailed information. I asked Hoppenot if it were really true that the French were not letting any shipments of war material go over the railway to Yunnan. Hoppenot said that this was absolutely true. I remarked that this was bad luck for the Chinese. He said that it was indeed bad luck but no matter how much the French might love the Chinese they could not risk war with Japan on their account.
I asked if the Russians were increasing their shipments of war materials to China. Hoppenot replied that they were. They also were sending large numbers of aviation instructors as well as a number of military experts to take the place of the German mission. With the cutting of the Canton–Hankow Railway, the shipment of Russian war material will have to be overland via Sinkiang since the Burma route is not yet in condition.