741.62/196: Telegram
The Ambassador in Germany (Dodd) to the Secretary of State
[Received 5:30 p.m.]
279. We have as yet been unable to ascertain with any degree of definiteness exactly what transpired at the recent meeting of Hitler and Halifax.
1. Certain officials of the Foreign Office have, however, outlined to a member of the Embassy staff “the Chancellor’s foreign policy” on certain outstanding points, intimating that were these questions raised during the interview the German position would presumably be expressed in general conformity therewith. In any event these points are believed to be of interest as an expression of German policy.
- (a)
- Germany undeviatingly desires British friendship.
- (b)
- The real question expressed or unexpressed from the German point of view is not however, what Germany will give in exchange for such friendship but rather what Great Britain can do if she does not come to an agreement with Germany.
- (c)
- There is no necessity for Germany to make her position clear. That has already been done. It is the British position which is not clear anywhere in the world.
- (d)
- As a corollary of the foregoing it is apparent that the British must choose between a reasonable understanding with Germany or a definite tie up with France, Czechoslovakia, and Russia, or endeavor to “muddle through”. In the event of Great Britain’s pursuing the [Page 160] former course Germany will respect the integrity of the Empire. Should Great Britain follow either of the two latter Germany must look to her own deliberating in the face of the respective contingencies envisaged.
- (e)
- An “understanding” with Germany would include primarily that Great Britain must “understand” that Germany will not be content until the return of her pre-war colonies or their general equivalent. Germany is not asking for precise territories or their exact equivalent acre for acre. Should either Great Britain or France declare any area to be essential to them Germany would not expect its return. Germany furthermore makes no stipulation respecting the time or method of such return, but is interested only in its accomplishment and is willing to leave all details to London and Paris.
- (f)
- Germany has no intention of initiating a European war and will exert every means to prevent being drawn into a European war should one occur. Germany has no alliance or military arrangement with Italy. Should, for example. Great Britain go to war with Italy over the Mediterranean question, Germany’s present attitude is that she would remain neutral. Germany however is not unregardful that certain advantages would presumably accrue to her from the weakened position of the participating powers following such a war.
- (g)
- Germany has no quarrel whatsoever with France. In view of the Maginot line and general French military establishments, Germany regards France as being defensively a first class power. Upon the completion of Germany’s Rhineland fortifications, France will however be reduced offensively to a second class power.
- (h)
- Germany desires nothing respecting Czechoslovakia except autonomy or at least “equal treatment” for the German minority.
- (i)
- Germany contemplates no move respecting Austria but will leave that situation to work out through internal evolution.
- (j)
- Respecting the Far East Germany is not offering herself as a mediary in the Sino-Japanese conflict. Despite, however, her anti-Communist agreement with Japan, or in any way because of it, Germany is in a position to exercise good offices between the two parties inasmuch as Germany perhaps more than any other power desires an end to the conflict. In the first place in common with other powers Germany wishes to salvage and safeguard her interests in China. In the second place Germany does not desire a weakened Japan which a protracted conflict might bring about.
2. The Chief of the Political Division of the Foreign Office speaking specifically of the Hitler–Halifax conversations said they were extended, covered a wide range and presumably touched upon a number or perhaps all of the points enumerated above. They could be characterized by stating that they were strictly conversations not negotiations, that they developed no sensational elements, and that nothing whatsoever was reduced to writing. Although there was nothing remotely approaching an agreement on substantive points an understanding was reached respecting what he termed “procedure” [Page 161] which he felt might be of the highest political importance. He emphasized the importance which the Foreign Office attached to this by stating that a summary of this result had been telegraphed to all German diplomatic missions for their information but not at least at the moment for disclosure to foreign governments. He stated, furthermore, that a full disclosure of what had developed in this respect would shortly be made public, the inference being that this would take place in the form of communiqués by the two Governments.
3. An official of the British Embassy without disclosing anything precise on the Hitler–Halifax conversations nevertheless characterized this happening as a turning, or as a beginning of a turning, toward realities in London policy. How far it would develop along these lines would, he felt, naturally depend among other things on home reactions. He said that Great Britain could not sustain the current enmity of Germany, Italy, and Japan, that she must choose at least one of these with which to come to terms, and that of the three an arrangement with Germany seemed to be the most expedient.
He admitted, however, that he was unable to say whether London’s approach to Berlin might not primarily contain elements of a maneuver to bring pressure upon Borne.
His interpretation of the Hitler–Halifax meeting was nevertheless that it certainly marked “an attempt at a refund”. If it proved to be a real beginning as he believed was the case, the next step might probably be a visit of Neurath to London and perhaps a return visit of Chamberlain to Berlin.
4. Italians here give evidence of being disturbed over the potentialities of the Halifax visit.
5. Based on a belief here that German economy is progressively deteriorating the apprehension is expressed in certain diplomatic circles that when the pinch actually comes a danger will arise of Germany’s being driven to desperate international courses or at least as characteristic of the present German type of government, that the regime will undertake an external “diversion”. This opinion thus feels that an association in some form between London and Berlin might operate as a restraining influence and is therefore hopeful of its accomplishment.
There also remains a school of thought which is distrustful of any “help” being given Germany in the fear that it would operate as an encouragement to an unwelcome and disturbing expression of German external policy.