Historical Documents - Office of the Historian

[Enclosure 1]

Memorandum by the Ambassador in France (Bullitt) of Conversations With the Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs (Beck), the Polish Marshal (Śmigły-Rydz) and Other Members of the Polish Government

In Warsaw I had five conversations with Colonel Joseph Beck, Minister for Foreign Affairs and talks with Marshal Śmigły-Rydz, Count Szembek, the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Wszelaki, Economic Adviser of the Polish Foreign Office, several other members of the Polish Government and a number of ambassadors and ministers. Ambassador Biddle, who was with me throughout nearly all these conversations, informed me that he would report them, and I wish merely to call attention to some of the statements which seem to me of particular importance.

Colonel Beck stated to me that he believed that Germany in the [Page 163] near future would take some action against Czechoslovakia. He did not believe that there would be a frank invasion of Czechoslovakia; but felt that the German Government would provoke some sort of an uprising on the part of the Germans of Bohemia and would then support such an uprising by arms, ammunition, and men from Germany. He and Marshal Śmigły-Rydz both expressed the opinion that France would not intervene to save Czechoslovakia. They both stated that they believed the French Government, before taking any action, would consult the British Government and that the British Government would suggest that the French Government should refer the matter to the League of Nations before acting, and that before the League of Nations had acted, Czechoslovakia would have been conquered.

I disagree with this opinion as I believe that at the present moment the French would mobilize at once in case of a German attack on Czechoslovakia, either direct or through the Germans of Bohemia. I do not know how long this state of mind on the part of the French Government will prevail and I can not guarantee that it will exist next month or the month after.

I asked Beck what Poland would do in case France should become involved in war with Germany because of a German attack on Czechoslovakia. Beck replied that in the hypothetical case I had presented, the casus foederis between France and Poland clearly would not arise. Poland positively would not march. He went on to explain that Poland would fulfill the direct obligations of her alliance with France completely and in case of German aggression against France, Poland would march at once; but that under no circumstances would Poland become involved in protecting French satellites in Central Europe, especially Czechoslovakia.

I asked Beck if he did not feel that there was some possibility that the German attack on Czechoslovakia which he anticipated might be forestalled by the Czechs granting a certain degree of autonomy to the Germans of Bohemia. He replied that he did not believe that Beneš would have sense enough to make this concession. He then added, speaking with a passionate intensity, that if Czechoslovakia should grant autonomy to the Germans of Bohemia, Poland would demand at once autonomy for the three hundred thousand Poles of the Teschen district. The latter statement seemed to me of particular importance.

In discussing the question of Danzig, Beck said that Hitler personally had given Lipsky, Polish Ambassador in Berlin, the most absolute assurances that he cared too much about Germany’s present good relations with Poland to permit the Germans of Danzig to do anything which would be totally inacceptable to Poland. Beck went [Page 164] on to say that he was confident, therefore, that although the situation in Danzig might remain difficult, it would not lead to any intensely unpleasant incidents.

I stated to both Beck and Śmigły-Rydz that I had been informed from French sources in Brussels that Potemkin, former Soviet Ambassador to France who is now Under Secretary at the Soviet Foreign Office, had said that the Soviet Government had decided to give up all preparations for a possible military offensive on the European frontier of Russia and had decided to create on the European frontier of Russia a zone of virtual devastation approximately two hundred kilometers deep for defensive purposes, except along the railroad lines.

Both Śmigły-Rydz and Beck said that they had had no information to this effect. Śmigły-Rydz went on to say, however, that he was convinced from his military intelligence reports that the Bed Army along the European frontier was totally incapable at the present time of taking the offensive; the staffs of the armies on the Polish and Rumanian frontiers of the Soviet Union had been so destroyed by the recent executions and so shaken in self-confidence that any offensive operations were out of the question. He felt, therefore, that the position of Poland vis-à-vis the Soviet Union was today much safer than it had ever been.

I discussed briefly with Beck the recent tension between President Mościcki and Marshal Śmigły-Rydz. He said that he had been able to bring about a reconciliation by calling on both men to remember that the international interests of Poland must be regarded as superior to any personal or internal interest whatsoever. It had been agreed that final authority should rest in the hands of Marshal Śmigły-Rydz. In this connection, Beck went out of his way to say to me that he hoped I had noticed what excellent personal relations existed between him and Śmigły-Rydz when we had been together. I had, on the contrary, noticed that, while Smigly-Rydz seemed completely at ease, Beck was the polite and somewhat fearful subordinate in his relations with Śmigły-Rydz.

I am inclined to believe that the difficulties in Poland which arose from the personal ambitions of Mościcki and Śmigły-Rydz and their respective followers may be regarded as settled for the moment; but the underlying economic situation in Poland is so bad that it is impossible to predict a long period of political stability.

In this connection, both Beck and Count Michael Lubienski, Beck’s Chef de Cabinet, spoke to me of their hope that Mr. Bernard Baruch might follow up the conversations he had had with the Polish Ambassador [Page 165] in Paris, Jules Lukasiewicz, by some action to revive the economic life of Poland and thereby assist the Jews along with the whole Polish population. Beck also said to me that he was extremely grateful that the President, in a conversation which he had had with Count George Potocki, Polish Ambassador in Washington, had said that he would be glad at some future time to use his good offices to promote the immigration of Polish Jews to Central and South America.

In connection with our discussion of the possibility of preserving peace in Europe, Beck said that he hoped I might use my influence with the French Government to obtain the inclusion of Poland in any negotiations for a new Locarno. I replied that, as he knew, the Government of the United States was most careful not to intervene in political arrangements in Europe. He replied that he did not mean official intervention or advice by the American Government. He happened to know that the members of the French Government were often in the habit of discussing their problems with me in an intimate and friendly manner and asked me if I could not take the line of advising the inclusion of Poland in the negotiations for a new Locarno in any such conversations I might have. I replied that I could not do so without authorization from my Government. He then asked me what my own opinion was with regard to the matter and I told him that I believed (which I do) that the inclusion of Poland would be highly desirable.

I gathered from my conversations with Beck and from statements made to me by various ambassadors and ministers in Warsaw that the influence of the British Government in Poland has increased greatly during recent months. The French Ambassador, Noël, for example, said to me that he was able to get little done in Warsaw if he acted alone but that in every case in which he had been supported by his British colleague, the Poles had complied with his requests.

[Enclosure 2]

Memorandum by the Ambassador in France (Bullitt) of a Conversation With the Japanese Ambassador in Poland (Sakoh)

I had an extremely interesting conversation with the Japanese Ambassador in Warsaw, Sakoh, who was Counselor of the Japanese Embassy in Moscow when I was at that post. Sakoh, in the past, has often talked to me with surprising frankness but I am not altogether sure that his frankness in this case was not on orders from Tokyo. Sakoh said that no one in the Japanese Government today knew what was Japan’s policy with regard to China. He hoped and all the members [Page 166] of the Government, including Prince Konoye, hoped that the Japanese military men would be content to get out of Central and Southern China and agree to make peace on the basis of the granting of autonomy to the five Northern Provinces and their demilitarisation. He went on to say that he himself was most fearful with regard to a continuance of the war. Japan’s economic and financial condition was growing worse rapidly and if the war should go on for four to six months longer, he feared economic collapse. On top of this, he feared that when Japan should be exhausted to the utmost degree, Russia might attack and attack successfully.

I should have taken this “confidence” more seriously except for the fact that the Italian Ambassador in Warsaw, who also was a colleague of mine in Moscow, recounted to me an exactly similar conversation that he had had with Sakoh.

[Enclosure 3]

Memorandum by the Ambassador in France (Bullitt) of a Conversation With the Italian Ambassador in Germany (Attolico)

My first conversation in Berlin on November 18th, after seeing Ambassador Dodd, was with Bernardo Attolico, Italian Ambassador in Berlin, who is a close friend of mine. The theme of Attolico’s remarks was that Mussolini desired peace ardently and would be ready to support peace everywhere in return for recognition of the King of Italy as Emperor of Ethiopia. He made the curious suggestion that if the French should object to accrediting an Ambassador to the King of Italy as the Emperor of Ethiopia, they might accredit an ambassador to “The King of Italy and Emperor,” leaving out any definition as to what he was Emperor of! I asked him if he really believed that this somewhat fantastic formula would be acceptable to Mussolini and he said that it would be.

Attolico said that his brother-in-law is in charge of all Italian policy with regard to Spain and that he is, therefore, completely informed on Italian policy with respect to Spain. He said that he could swear to me on his life that the Italian Government had no intention whatsoever of retaining possession of the Balearic Islands or of Ceuta. He said that as soon as Franco had triumphed and danger of Bolshevism in Spain had been eliminated, all Italian troops would be withdrawn. He also swore that Italy had no designs on Tunis.

Attolico then launched into a description of his hopes with regard to the future. He said that he believed that if Ethiopia should be recognized as an Italian possession, it would be possible for Italy to begin conversations for a new Locarno and expressed the belief that the German Government would be ready to begin such conversations. [Page 167] I asked him how Italy would view the inclusion of Poland in such conversations. He said that the Italian Government had already informed the Polish Government that Italy would view with favor the inclusion of Poland and went on to say that he felt Germany would favor the inclusion of Poland, provided that the French should be willing to include as “exceptions” their alliances with Poland and Czechoslovakia but to omit as an “exception” the Pact of Mutual Assistance with the Soviet Union. At the close of our conversation, Attolico said that he was most anxious for me while in Berlin to have conversations with some of the Nazi leaders. He had, therefore, without consulting me, ventured to communicate with Neurath and Goering to tell them that I was coming through town, and that both had expressed the wish to see me. He had gone so far as to arrange an appointment with Goering.

I replied that I had known Neurath well for many years and invariably saw him as a friend on my way through Berlin but that I was extremely hesitant about having an interview with Goering. He said that he had arranged it, however, and hoped most ardently that I would carry it through. As he was obviously in an embarrassing position, I left the matter indefinite until I had had an opportunity to return to the American Embassy and consult Ambassador Dodd. I said to the Ambassador that I left the question entirely to him and should be glad to develop a severe cold or a diplomatic ptomaine poisoning, if he should consider that wise. He said, on the contrary, that he thought it was all right for me to ask Goering some questions.

I therefore saw not only Baron Konstantin von Neurath but also General Hermann Goering.

[Enclosure 4]

Memorandum by the Ambassador in France (Bullitt) of a Conversation With the German Minister for Foreign Affairs (Von Neurath)

My conversation with Neurath on November 18th was less interesting from the point of view of what was said than from the manner in which it was said. As I have seen Neurath many times since the war, he is to me a good barometer of the state of mind of official Germany. I have known him in moods of the greatest pessimism and at other times in the mood almost of a suppliant. I found him on this visit to Berlin supremely self-confident and I found the atmosphere of the Wilhelmstrasse again as cocky as before the war.

I said to Neurath that I seemed to feel from one end of Europe to the other at the present time a genuine desire to end the present discord and to establish a real peace and asked him if he had any similar feeling.

[Page 168]

Neurath replied that Germany certainly desired peace. So far as France was concerned, there was absolutely no outstanding question whatsoever between Germany and France. Alsace-Lorraine had been abandoned by Germany definitely and forever. The national economies of the two countries supplemented each other perfectly and there was no reason why their trade should conflict. On the contrary, it should increase yearly. Furthermore, the French had made it clear that they were ready to return the German colonies that they had been given by the Treaty of Versailles, provided England should take a similar course. Such conflicts as existed between France and Germany were entirely indirect. For example, three million and one-half Germans on the southern border of Germany were being treated as an inferior race by the Czechs, and France was supporting the Czechs. It was exactly as if there were three million and one-half Americans living in a solid block in Mexican territory on the border of Texas, who were being maltreated in every way by the Mexican Government. There would be a constant irritation in the United States and constant bad relations with Mexico until those Americans were being treated in a decent way. The United States could not have close or really friendly relations with any country which was encouraging the Mexican Government to treat those Americans unfairly.

Neurath said that he did not expect this question to lead to war; but he believed that the Government of Czechoslovakia must be brought to grant the Germans of Bohemia a wide degree of autonomy so that they could live their own lives in their own way. The Czechs must learn to be as reasonable as the Poles had been in their recent agreement with Germany in respect of the German minorities in Poland.

Neurath then said that on the whole he was more optimistic about the possibility of bringing about a reconciliation between Germany and France than he was about the possibility of bringing about a reconciliation between England and Germany. He had had only a brief talk with Halifax and it appeared that Halifax had brought no concrete proposals but had come to listen. He feared that the British were going to be extremely stiff-necked on the subject of the German colonies. So far as Germany was concerned, she felt she had a right only to demand the return of the colonies which had belonged to her before the war. If the British should wish to retain any of those colonies they were quite at liberty to make a deal with the Portuguese or the Belgians and give equally valuable Portuguese or Belgian colonies to Germany.

I asked Neurath to explain to me the position of Germany vis-à-vis the Sino-Japanese conflict. He said that Germany desired just one thing, which was the most rapid end possible of the conflict. He [Page 169] feared that if the war should go on and Japan should become seriously weakened, the Soviet Union might attack Japan successfully. He hoped that the Japanese would be content with the establishment of an autonomous régime in North China and that the Chinese would accept this solution. I asked him if Germany’s relations with Japan were sufficiently close for the German Government to exercise any restraining influence on the Japanese Government. He said that they were not, and added that the Anti-Comintern Pact was a large façade behind which there was no building. He could assure me that there were no secret clauses attached to it. (Incidentally, Attolico, the Italian Ambassador in Berlin, made exactly the same statement to me with regard to Italy’s relations with Japan.)

In conclusion, Neurath said to me, “Tell your French friends that we are quite ready to establish the best possible relations with them.” He made it clear, however, that the German Government, so far as peace is concerned, intends to take no initiative.

[Enclosure 5]

Memorandum by the Ambassador in France (Bullitt) of a Conversation With the German Minister for Economic Affairs (Schacht)

I had a conversation with Doctor Hjalmar Schacht which was not altogether without interest. Schacht began by saying that he regretted greatly that nothing had come of his two visits to Paris in the course of which he had attempted to establish the basis for a Franco-German rapprochement He said that he had found Blum extremely reasonable with regard to the colonial question. He then went on to speak of the absolute necessity for doing something to produce peace in Europe before the outbreak of war toward which the Continent was drifting. He prefaced his remarks by saying that he himself today was “completely without influence on that man,” meaning Hitler. He seemed to regard himself as politically dead and to have small respect for “that man.” He said that the one way he could see to peace was through direct negotiations between France and Germany. He did not believe that the conversations which Halifax was about to have with Hitler would lead to any considerable results. Hitler was furious with the British because he had made his one great gesture of political generosity toward the British and the British had not responded by any similar gesture. He had offered to limit the German fleet and the British had quietly pocketed this concession86 and had then made none of the corresponding gestures toward Germany that Hitler had anticipated.

[Page 170]

Schacht said that in his opinion the best way to begin to deal with Hitler was not through political discussions but through economic discussions. Hitler was not in the least interested in economic matters. He regarded money as “filth.” It was, therefore, possible to enter into negotiations with him in the economic domain without arousing his emotional antipathies and it might be possible through the conversations thus begun to lead him into arrangements in the political and military fields in which he was intensely interested.

Hitler was determined to have Austria eventually attached to Germany and to obtain at least autonomy for the Germans of Bohemia. At the present moment, he was not vitally concerned about the Polish Corridor and in his (Schacht’s) opinion, it might be possible to maintain the Corridor provided Danzig were permitted to join East Prussia and provided some sort of a bridge could be built across the Corridor uniting Danzig and East Prussia with Germany.

[Enclosure 6]

Memorandum by the Ambassador in France (Bullitt) of a Conversation With the German Minister for Aviation (Goering)

I said to General Goering as soon as I met him that I should be extremely glad to have his ideas on the prospects of peace and war in Europe and that I wished he would begin by telling me what he thought of Germany’s relations with France.

Goering said that there was no direct conflict whatsoever today between Germany and France. Germany had given up entirely and forever the idea of regaining Alsace-Lorraine. Germany had learned through long experience that the people of Alsace and Lorraine would inevitably be against whichever of the two countries happened to have the sovereignty over Alsace-Lorraine at the moment and would be permanently a source of discord within the country to which they were attached. Germany did not desire to have any half-loyal citizens and, therefore, had not the slightest desire for a return of Alsace-Lorraine to the German Reich.

In addition, the economic systems of France and Germany were completely complementary. It should be possible to develop to a much greater extent the exchange of all sorts of products between France and Germany.

Furthermore, the French had contributed so much to the culture of Germany and the Germans had contributed so much to the culture of France that as two civilized peoples who lived side by side they had a deep underlying esteem for each other. Furthermore, the French and the Germans respected each other as brave soldiers and [Page 171] courageous peoples who were ready to die for their respective countries. In addition, the French Government had indicated that it was prepared insofar as it was concerned, to return the German colonies which had been transferred to France by the Treaty of Versailles. There was, unfortunately, the proviso that France would only take this action if Great Britain were prepared to make a similar concession.

There was, therefore, no cause of discord whatsoever in the direct relations between France and Germany to prevent the closest sort of friendship between the two countries. So far as Germany was concerned, he could say with authority that Germany today was prepared to conclude at once an offensive and defensive alliance with France.

The sole source of friction between Germany and France was the refusal of France to permit Germany to achieve certain vital national necessities. If France, instead of accepting a collaboration with Germany, should continue to follow a policy of building up alliances in Eastern Europe to prevent Germany from the achievement of her legitimate aims it was obvious that there would be conflict between France and Germany.

I asked Goering what aims especially he had in mind. He replied, “We are determined to join to the German Reich all Germans who are contiguous to the Reich and are divided from the great body of the German race merely by the artificial barriers imposed by the Treaty of Versailles.”

I asked Georing if he meant that Germany was absolutely determined to annex Austria to the Reich. He replied that this was an absolute determination of the German Government. The German Government at the present time was not pressing this matter because of certain momentary political considerations, especially in their relations with Italy; but Germany would tolerate no solution of the Austrian question other than the consolidation of Austria in the German Reich. He then added a statement which went further than any I have heard on this subject. He said, “There are schemes being pushed now for a union of Austria, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia either with or without a Hapsburg at the head of the unit. Such a solution is absolutely inacceptable to us, and for us the conclusion of such an agreement would be an immediate casus belli.[”] (Goering used the Latin expression casus belli. It is not a translation from the German, in which our conversation was carried on.)

I asked Goering if the German Government was as decided in its views with regard to the Germans in Bohemia as it was with regard to Austria. He replied that there could be only one final solution of this question. The Sudeten Germans must enter the German Reich as all other Germans who lived contiguous to the Reich.

[Page 172]

I asked if the German Government might not be content if the Czech Government should accord to the Germans of Bohemia a large measure of local autonomy while keeping them under Czech sovereignty. Goering replied that such a concession on the part of the Czechoslovak Government would lead to a temporary appeasement of the situation; but the autonomy would have to be real autonomy and such a solution would not be a final solution. There could be no final solution but the inclusion of these Germans within the Reich.

I asked Goering how he viewed the case of the Germans in other portions of Europe; notably the Germans of Transylvania. He replied that these racial groups were cut off from the main body of the German people and could not, therefore, be joined to it. All that Germany would insist upon would be that they should be treated as equals with equal rights and be permitted to retain their cultural life. The situation of the Germans in Transylvania was extremely unsatisfactory. On the other hand, the Yugoslavs had treated the Germans within their borders with such conspicuous intelligence and fairness that the leaders of the Germans of Yugoslavia had informed him recently that they had no real grievances and that they would resist to the utmost any arrangements in Europe which might envisage their return to Hungary.

Goering then added that the only other two considerable German racial groups which would lie outside the borders of the German Reich, after the Germans of Austria and Bohemia had been included, would be the Germans of the South Tyrol who were now in the hands of Italy and the Germans in Poland. He did not feel that there was a sufficient number of Germans in Italy to warrant a major war for their attachment to the Reich. Similarly the Germans of Poland would have to stay where they were because there were a considerable number of Poles in Germany and all that either Poland or Germany could expect would be that these minorities should be treated on each side of the border with the greatest human consideration.

Goering went on to say that the idea that Germany had any ambitions to annex the Ukraine was pure nonsense. I suggested that one of the reasons it was nonsense was that it would involve first the conquest of Poland and then the conquest of the whole of Central Europe before it could become realizable.

Goering replied that this was so and that in addition Germany had no desire to have territory in Europe except territory inhabited by Germans.

I thanked Goering for giving me such a clear expression of Germany’s intentions with regard to the Continent and asked him if he would pass on to the colonial field.

[Page 173]

Goering said that Germany’s demands in the colonial field were well known. They were for a return of the German colonies which had been taken away from Germany by the Treaty of Versailles. Germany had no right to demand anything but these colonies. On the other hand, Germany had no desire to be stiff-necked about this matter. If England should not wish to return German East Africa or German Southwest Africa, for military and other reasons, Germany would make no objection if England could make an arrangement, financial or otherwise, with Portugal and Belgium for the giving to Germany of Portuguese and Belgian colonies in West Africa which would compensate Germany for the loss of her East African possessions. It was idle to say that Germany could not get raw materials of great value from African colonies; for example, the Cameroons. It was entirely true that today the Cameroons had been very little developed and were producing very little, but with German intelligence and energy applied to them, they could be made to produce materials of the greatest value to Germany. The same was true of many other areas in Africa which today were undeveloped or under-developed. The essential problem for Germany was to feed and maintain her people at a decent standard of living. It was entirely clear that with the increase of population in Germany the soil now in the hands of Germany would be insufficient to maintain this increasing German population. Before the war, when barriers to international trade had been low, it had been possible for Germany to maintain herself by her great international trade. Today barriers were so high that this would soon become impossible. He hoped that there might be a reduction of such barriers and that Germany could find increasing markets for her products but she could not feel safe unless she had a colonial domain which would give her access to her own raw materials.

Goering then went on to say that he deplored greatly the present state of trade relations between Germany and the United States. The trade between the two countries was ceasing to be of any importance which was contrary to all reason. Indeed, Germany was almost isolated from the United States. There were certain countries with which Germany had good relations; and certain countries with which Germany had bad relations; but with the United States, Germany had no relations at all. He then asked me why I believed there was such hostility to Germany in the United States.

I replied that there were many sources of this hostility. All Americans were devoted to the ideal of democracy. There had been a democratic government in Germany, or at least the semblance of a democratic government, which had been destroyed and replaced by Nazi dictatorship. Any governing group which destroyed democracy to replace it by dictatorship would always be unpopular in the United [Page 174] States. Furthermore, the German Government had at the same time attacked with the utmost violence the Jews, the Catholic Church and the Protestant Church. The reaction in America among Protestants, Catholics and Jews had, therefore, been natural, immediate, and intense.

Goering then protested, saying that he was informed that people in the United States believed that the National Socialist Government was attempting to set up a heathen church in Germany. I replied that this was so. He said that it was true that within the Nazi Government there was a small group of people who desired to see a return to the Norse gods, but he could assure me that this movement was completely without importance and did not include more than one percent of the Nazi Party. So far as he, himself, was concerned, he was a Protestant and still attended church services. He had been to church recently on the occasion of the confirmation of his nephew. He thought that the violence of the reaction in the United States probably was due to the Jews. I replied that in some measure it was due to the Jews as was only natural, but that it was not only the Jews but all Americans who were shocked and horrified by the treatment of the Jews in Germany and that the attacks on the Catholic Church and the Protestant Church and on democracy and human freedom were factors of equal importance.

I then added that there was an additional element which was playing a certain role at the moment. It appeared that the Nazi Government was engaged in forming Nazi organizations in the United States. Neither the Government nor the people of the United States could tolerate the formation on their soil of any national group or other group directed by any foreign country. We could not permit Hitler, Stalin, Mussolini or any other dictator to organize groups of agents in the United States. If we should do so, we would soon cease to be a nation and become a mere battleground for the conflicting ambitions of foreign dictators.

Goering said that he considered this entirely reasonable and understandable and if he were an American would certainly not tolerate the slightest interference by any foreign agency in the life of the United States. The German Government had forbidden any German citizen to participate in any way in the formation of such groups. He believed that I would find that such groups were formed by American citizens of German origin. I replied that I felt quite certain that such groups would not be formed without the approval and desire of the German Government. Goering then said: “It is true that certain persons in our Government here believe that we should attempt to organize the Germans, especially of the Middle West, because they feel that if Germany should again become involved in war with France [Page 175] and England, there would come a moment when the United States might again consider entering such a war against Germany and they believe that such groups of organized Germans in the United States might throw their influence decisively against a declaration of war and might prevent the United States entering such a conflict.[”]

I then said that I could merely remind him of two things: The first, that the organization of German groups in the United States during the late war had aroused hostility throughout the entire country against Germany. The second, a conversation which had taken place during the World War between our Ambassador to Germany, Mr. James Gerard, and Zimmerman, who was Acting Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the Reich at that time. Zimmerman had stated to Gerard that the United States could not enter the war because there were five million Germans in the United States who would prevent by force, if necessary, any such action. Mr. Gerard had replied that if there were five million Germans in the United States, there were five million and one lamp posts.87 Goering did not seem to get the point with absolute clarity. I, therefore, added, “and you will understand that, if, as you have said, there are six million Germans in the United States today, who could be organized to influence the action of the United States Government, there are a great many more than six million tree limbs on which to hang them.”

Goering seemed to find this remark entirely reasonable and in a more friendly and intimate tone asked, “What then can we do to improve our relations with the United States?” I replied that he had an excellent ambassador in Washington at the moment who could doubtless inform him better than I could on this subject.

I then asked Goering for his views with regard to the Far East. He said that he believed the Japanese would win the war and succeed in imposing on China precisely what they should desire to impose. I asked Goering if he knew precisely what that was. He said that he believed that the Japanese aim was to organize the Northern Provinces of China thoroughly as a base from which to attack the Soviet Union, since it was obvious that Japan would be compelled to attack the Soviet Union owing to the geographical position of Vladivostok. The Japanese desired to have Central and South China in relative chaos and impotence until they had finished with the Soviet Union.

At this point, Goering asked me why the United States had begun to build battleships for the Soviet Union.87a I replied that I had no [Page 176] information to the effect that the American Government was building battleships for the Soviet Union and I considered such a report highly improbable. Goering said that his information indeed was rather vague on this point.

I asked him what his views were with regard to the Soviet Union at the present time. He said that in his opinion the Red Army on the European frontier had ceased to be a serious fighting force if indeed it had ever been one. He said that the reports of the prowess of Soviet aviation in Spain were extraordinarily misleading. German officers in Spain had analyzed in detail the débris of all Soviet planes that had been shot down behind Franco’s lines. They had discovered that every Soviet plane which had flown with conspicuous success in Spain had been of American manufacture. I asked him if he meant manufactured in Russia on American models. He replied in the negative, and said that the Russians had actually sent to Spain not planes manufactured in Russia on American models but planes every part of which had been manufactured in America. That explained the excellent performance of those particular planes. All his information was to the effect that planes actually manufactured in Russia copying American models were of such inferior workmanship that they could not compare with planes actually built in America. Furthermore, this was true with regard to all Soviet industrial products. They might turn out five thousand tractors in a year but it was extremely improbable that a single one of those tractors would be running two years after it had been put in use. Furthermore, the service of supply of the Russian Army today was in as lamentable condition as it had been in the time of the Czar. In the time of the Czar the Russian Armies at the front were frequently without food or munitions. The service of supply then had been controlled largely by Jews. It was still controlled largely by Jews and, if the Soviet Union should attempt to make war on the European frontier, he would expect a complete collapse of the Soviet Armies because of bad organization. He did not think that today there was the faintest chance of the Soviet Union attempting any offensive operations on the European frontier.

Goering said that he believed the Soviet Army in the Far East was better organized than the Soviet Army on the European frontier; but he felt confident that in spite of the increasing weakness of Japan, the Soviet Union would not dare to intervene in the Sino-Japanese conflict. He then said that the Japanese Army had shown itself to be considerably weaker than expected and that the Chinese, with totally inadequate weapons, had made a very fine defense due in part, he felt, to the presence of German staff officers with the Chinese armies.

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Goering then said that he was surprised to learn that the United States was building battleships which could not possibly pass through the Panama Canal. I replied that I believed his statement was entirely erroneous. He said that he could not admit this; that his information was positive. The newest American battleships could not possibly go through the Panama Canal. I told him that we would have to disagree on this point. He then said that no matter whether we could put our new battleships through the Canal or not, we could do nothing in the Far East to interfere in any way with Japan.

I was indiscreet enough to remark that the combined American and British fleets might be powerful enough to do something although neither Great Britain nor the United States had any desire for any conflict with Japan. Goering replied, “You know that the British Fleet can not operate anywhere at the present time. It is completely pinned down by ourselves in the North Sea and by the Italians in the Mediterranean.”

Goering then said that he hoped I realized there was an intense desire on the part of the German Government to develop better relations with the United States and on this note, pleasantly, our conversation ended.

Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1937, General, Volume I

The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State