740.00/225: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State
[Received November 22—4:25 p.m.]
1646. This morning I discussed the European situation with Delbos. He said that he was extremely apprehensive that Germany would in the near future make some sort of drive against Austria. It was clear that the Germans were determined in one way or another to incorporate Austria in the German Reich and he felt that the time might not be far off when they would act. He did not believe that there would be any immediate German action against Czechoslovakia.
He felt that the best chance of beginning negotiations which might lead to a peaceful settlement of the situation in Europe or at least postponement of war would be in the colonial domain. France and England could not offer Germany “concessions” in Austria and Czechoslovakia because in the first place such action would be dishonorable and in the second place the Germans would say that the Austrians and the Germans of Bohemia belonged to them of right and there was no concession whatsoever involved in permitting them to fall into the hands of the Reich. In the colonial domain on the other hand France and England had something to give and could therefore demand something in exchange. He felt therefore that through the door of colonial concessions it might be possible to enter into fruitful negotiations.
He believed that if some progress could be made in the colonial field it might not be impossible to begin conversations for a new Locarno. He was not averse to including Poland in those conversations but felt that he would have to include Czechoslovakia as well if he should include Poland.
I asked Delbos if there were any possibility that the French Government in any future Locarno negotiations would make “exceptions” with regard to the French allegiances [alliances] with Poland and Czechoslovakia but would omit an “exception” dealing with the treaty of mutual assistance with the Soviet Union. He said that he felt that would be impossible. French public opinion had to be considered. The Government unquestionably would be overthrown by the Communists. Moreover he doubted the wisdom of abandoning the Soviet Union at this moment as he still feared greatly that Germany and the Soviet Union would come to an immediate agreement if France should abandon Russia altogether.
He said that as far as he was concerned he favored making concessions to Germany piecemeal in order to stave off war but in a democracy it was intensely difficult to make piecemeal concessions and whose [Page 159] public opinion would very much prefer to submit to a fait accompli rather than make a concession which might be much less objectionable than the fait accompli.
With regard to Italy Delbos said that neither he nor Chautemps would object to accrediting an Ambassador to the King of Italy, Emperor of Ethiopia, if that were the only bone of contention between France and Italy. He was now convinced that the Italians had no intention of remaining in the Balearics; but the Italians were conducting the most furious campaigns by radio and other sorts of propaganda against France in the French colonies in North Africa and in the Near East. They were, moreover, paying an enormous number of agents in Paris to stir up trouble. If France could get a real understanding with Italy in return for the appointment of an ambassador, that would be an extremely cheap bargain; but he did not believe that Mussolini was inclined to make any such bargain.
He had as now no information whatever with regard to the conversation between Eden [Hitler?] and Halifax but had been promised full information tomorrow.