740.00/207: Telegram
The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Johnson) to the Secretary of State
[Received September 14—3:50 p.m.]
596. I venture to suggest certain general considerations which may have an important bearing on the formulation of British foreign policy in the Far East.
1. The primary objective of Great Britain is her own security and that of the Empire, which can only be accomplished by a general European appeasement. The country has come to realize that if Great Britain is to play an effective role in bringing this about, she must be strong. A profound lesson has been learned from the Italian adventure in Abyssinia and the successive steps by which Germany has by unilateral action thrown off the last vestige of servitude to the Treaty of Versailles. British rearmament is therefore proceeding at a rapid pace and, with the exception of a small and ineffectual minority, the entire country is back of it. The overwhelming vote last week of the annual Trade Unions Congress at Norwich in favor of the [Page 128] Government’s rearmament program cannot be interpreted as merely an indication of the desire of labor to provide jobs for itself. The ordinary citizen in England, I believe, realizes that the security in Great Britain and the Empire is at stake.
2. With their general objective of European appeasement the British still envisage some revised form of Locarno in which the principal partners will be Great Britain, France, Germany and Italy. Before even preliminary steps toward such an agreement can be taken with any hope of success British rearmament must have reached a large measure of fulfillment; Anglo-Italian rapprochement must be effected; and the aims of Germany must be clarified.
The Foreign Office apparently believes that Mussolini sincerely desires a friendly understanding with Great Britain and I have been informed by a high official of the Foreign Office that the tentative plan for Anglo-Italian conversations to begin in Rome sometime this month came entirely on the initiative of Italy. The exchange of correspondence between the Prime Minister and Mussolini late in July (Embassy’s 522, August 4, 6 p.m.) was likewise said to have been undertaken on Italian initiative.
I do not gather that the development of the Rome–Berlin Axis unduly alarms the British as they apparently feel that aside from similar ideologies of government there is little real community of interest between Germany and Italy other than for bargaining purposes. The Italians on the other hand are more likely to be impressed by complete Anglo-French solidarity than anything else. With regard to Abyssinia as an obstacle to Anglo-Italian rapprochement I venture to suggest that when the ground is laid for real discussion and only that stumbling block remains the British will find some practical way to dispose of it.
Even more essential, however, than the concurrence of Italy is that of Germany in the conclusion of any general pact for European appeasement. The results in that direction have not been encouraging up to the present, Germany’s colonial pretentions may offer serious difficulties. To cite only one instance, the return to Germany of Tanganyika would seriously jeopardize the sea route to India and it is almost unthinkable that Great Britain would voluntarily return this weapon into the hands of Germany. A clarification and precision of Germany’s aims would appear to be an essential preliminary before any multilateral discussions for a peace pact.
3. With Germany and Italy therefore parrying and jockeying for every conceivable advantage vis-à-vis the Anglo-French combination, and with the necessity for Great Britain whose rearmament is not yet effective to proceed with the utmost patience and wariness the difficulty of her position in the Far East becomes apparent. An incautious move in the Far East might precipitate a situation involving the [Page 129] employment of British forces to such an extent as seriously to jeopardize the whole tenuous fabric of the present set-up in Western Europe. Great Britain at this time, with her own security and vital interests at stake, would think long before adopting a Far Eastern policy involving this risk. The danger would appear to be increased by the uncertainty of Japanese objectives in China and by uncertainty as to the real responsibility of the forces controlling Japanese policy.
Until, therefore, the situation in Europe has ameliorated and Great Britain has recovered the commanding position which a reinforced army, navy and air force will give her, she is not, in my opinion, likely to allow her hand to be called in the Far East if there is any possibility of its being avoided.