740.00/211
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Davies) Temporarily in France, to the Secretary of State
My Dear Mr. Secretary: Due to limitation of stenographic facilities, I am writing this report to you personally, and will supplement it, upon my return to Moscow, with duplicates with the proper number for the files. I am anxious, however, that you should have the facts herein, as soon as possible.
I have now been absent from the Soviet Union for four weeks. I have, however, been in constant telephonic touch with Mr. Henderson, the Chargé, in whose judgment and effectiveness I have the highest confidence. It had been my intention to return to the Soviet Union by way of Constantinople and the Black Sea. In view of the Mediterranean situation, I concluded it was better not to risk the possibility of accident to an American diplomat (remote though such possibility might be) and decided, therefore, to return by rail—availing myself of an opportunity to stop off in Hungary, Austria, and Germany, en route to Moscow.
The Mediterranean Situation
At this moment the situation looks as though it were clearing up. Should Russia and Italy sever diplomatic relations (which I believe improbable), I still do not believe that it would result in a general outbreak, but would be only confined to activities at long range. The situation in the Far East, where innumerable incidents (any of which would have resulted in war prior to 1914) between Japan and Russia have occurred without serious outbreak of conflict, is significant of Russian diplomacy.
European Peace
The masses, it is generally conceded, are all against war. In responsible quarters one hears more and more that these armament preparations are designed for diplomatic trading purposes rather than for physical use. Generally the opinion is that Germany is not yet [Page 125] “ready”. England is daily getting stronger. Austria could probably be absorbed (peacefully) without the outbreak of general war. Czechoslovakia has about completed her small Maginot line, and would give a stiff resistance to a German “putsch”, of which fact Hitler is being constantly reminded by his military advisors who are against military action now. Russia will not be an aggressor in my opinion, so far as danger to Western Europe is concerned. Italy is hard up and certainly not “ready” internally. With all his swashbuckling, Mussolini has a very cold brain with all his Latin temperament. The real danger is some accident, which might blow up the situation; and that danger is growing, as these crises reoccur and more clearly define the antagonistic interests and as tempers grow shorter. The general opinion is that war will not come until the fall of 1938 or 1939.
Meeting With Beneš—Czechoslovakia
On the second day of September I had an extended conference of one and one-half hours with President Beneš at Prague.
He was delayed by fifteen minutes in meeting his appointment by reason of the fact that he was returning from the country place of former President Masaryk. He had been summoned to the bed-side of the latter who had suffered a paralytic stroke during the night. President Beneš was quite visibly affected by his sorrow. I expressed my personal sympathy and condolences and took the liberty of also stating that the Secretary of State and the President and indeed the whole American people would feel real grief over the possible loss of this great liberal and democrat, the former President of Czechoslovakia.
President Beneš gives the impression of an intellectual. Physically, he is a slight man. The outstanding impression that he gives is one of great moral earnestness, honesty, and well grounded conviction, and also of a very remarkable clarity and liberality of mind.
He described the conditions in Europe; the ideological conflict between occidental liberal democratic thought and the concept of the totalitarian authoritative states. He enumerated the latter as Germany, Austria, Portugal, part of Spain, Italy, Turkey, Yugoslavia in part, Hungary in part, and Poland in part. He listed the other group as England, France, Czechoslovakia, Switzerland, and the Scandinavian countries. Europe, he said, was characterized by the fact that in the Occident the civilization was English and Latin; in the central portion Germanic; and in the eastern portion Slavic. The northern Slavs, he stated, had become “Germanized”. The most occidental and liberal democratic peoples of Central and Eastern Europe were the Czechs. He developed the thesis that historically the Czech people [Page 126] were among the earliest adherents of liberalism and democracy in Europe and were now the frontier of liberal and occidental thought in Eastern Europe. This was the origin of the antagonisms that were projected against his country by Germany and other totalitarian states.
He stated that his Government was in a very strong position; that it had a strong army, (as well equipped and efficient for its size as any in Europe) that the standard of living of the population was higher generally than that of contiguous states; that the percentage of illiteracy was only two per cent; that the base of society and of Government was an agricultural and bourgeois stock; that practically all members of the Cabinet had parents of lowly origin and near to the soil; that the population was politically highly educated; that Masaryk and he and the others had persistently, over the years, conducted campaigns against the penetration of either communism on one side or fascism on the other; that there was danger neither from the right wing nor the left so far as political stability was concerned; that 17 years ago they had projected agricultural reforms and social welfare legislation which had taken the ground from under both communism and fascism; that the people were thoroughly nationalistic and patriotic and devoted to the liberal and democratic ideal.
His opinion was that peace in Europe depended upon England and France; that while Czechoslovakia was hemmed in on all sides, nevertheless it was a staunch adherent of the ideals of liberty and democratic government.
Sudeten-Deutschen
When asked about the situation as to the Sudeten-Deutschen and specifically the possibility of revolt in that section, aided and abetted by penetration of the Germans similar to the Spanish situation, he described at considerable length the character of the territory occupied by the Germans; that it was a narrow strip 2,400 meters [kilometers] in length encircling the Czech population; that of the three million Germans, approximately one million of them were adherents of the Czech Government. In addition thereto, there were 600,000 Czech in the territory; that there were three centers of administration—“forts” which he inadvertently called them; that a large portion of the population of this territory was also Catholic and socialist and opposed to Hitler; and finally, that in his opinion, a revolution from the inside would be impossible. He also stated that in the event of attack by Germany, Czechoslovakia would fight to the last man and to the “bitter end”; that if such an event were to develop it would precipitate a European catastrophe, with the resulting outcome in doubt, and that aggressors were confronted with the possibility that their final condition would be worse than the present.
[Page 127]Relations With Austria and Hungary
When asked with reference to the relationships between Austria, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia—the three elements of finance (Austria), food (Hungary), manufacturing (Czechoslovakia)—he stated that the relations were definitely very much better. When asked as to the Little Entente, he stated that there was a great deal of discussion in the press about the alleged weakening of the Little Entente and that that was a part of the propaganda of hostile forces, but that the Little Entente, he felt sure, was strong and that Rumania would never get away from the paramount necessity of preserving its own territorial integrity vis-à-vis Germany, and that there was no particular significance in the recent Rumanian rapprochement with Poland.
The case which he makes for the justification of a homogeneous state as presently constituted in Czechoslovakia is a very powerful one and such as compels admiration and great respect and sympathy. Considering the tremendous difficulties under which this country has labored, the achievements of Masaryk, Beneš, and other co-workers along the lines of social reform and projection of liberal democratic ideals into the life of the people, command great admiration.
President Beneš is frequently spoken of as one of the most able and brilliant statesmen of Europe. He distinctly left that impression with me.
Respectfully,