852.00/6806
The Ambassador in Spain (Bowers), Then in France, to the Secretary of State
[Received October 30.]
Sir: I have the honor to report that the latest retreat of England and France before the threat of Mussolini in the matter of the withdrawal [Page 423] of the Italian army from Spain leaves little doubt that there will be no withdrawal of these troops. The retreat is all the more astounding in view of the public declarations of Mr. Eden and Delbos, one week before, that unless the Italian reply was soon forthcoming, and unless it was favorable, there would be an immediate opening of the French frontier, and the restoration to the Spanish Government of its right under international law to buy arms and ammunition to defend itself against the military rising and the foreign armies.
The reference of the matter of withdrawal to the Non-intervention Committee which has, without a protest to the violators of the nonintervention agreement, permitted near 100,000 of the Italian army and probably 20,000 of the German to be sent quite openly into Spain, cannot possibly end in anything but failure. Neither London or Paris pretend seriously to think otherwise.
The sole purpose, certainly notorious, of Mussolini, in demanding and securing the reference to the discredited Non-intervention Committee, is to create interminable delays. In the initial speech of the Italian representative on Saturday (October 16) it is clear that Mussolini, if driven into a corner, will propose withdrawals on both sides, man for man. Since at the extreme estimate there are no more than 30,000 bona fide foreign volunteers fighting with the Government, and since the Italian army probably numbers now close to, if not more than, 100,000 soldiers, and there are as many as 20,000 of the German, it is clear enough that a man for man withdrawal would, after eliminating every foreign volunteer with the Government, leave as many as 90,000 of the Italian and German armies on Spanish soil. Naturally, the Spanish Government will not agree to this.
It should be kept in mind that the Spanish Government has agreed to a withdrawal of all foreigners fighting in Spain on both sides; naturally it will never agree to a man-for-man withdrawal.
Since the “crisis” has been reached, ending in the reference to the Non-Intervention Committee, there appears to be not a scintilla of doubt that more of the Italian army has invaded Spain. We have very circumstantial stories of the landing on October 9th in Cadiz of Italian soldiers estimated at between 6,000 and 7,000; of their transfer by lorries from Cadiz to Seville, with these lorries making an uninterrupted stream throughout the day upon the highway. This should be and probably has been reported upon by our Consulate at Seville.
The purpose of Mussolini unquestionably is to cause interminable delays and during the futile wrangling more and more Italian troops will be poured into Spain.
I would call attention to the immediate effect of this policy if permitted by the British and the French. At this hour military operations of major importance are in process on the Aragon front. The [Page 424] French Consul at Saragossa, a manufacturer in Saragossa, and an active supporter of General Franco, has just returned to Saint-Jean-de-Luz with the information that the insurgents have assembled in and near that city the most tremendous stores of arms and ammunition he has ever seen. The Government has an unusually large army there, now on the offensive and making some progress, but I understand that should these operations continue long it will fall short in the ammunition necessary for such an intensive offensive.
It will thus be seen that the vital interest of the Government is involved in the opening of the French frontier to the sale of arms and ammunition which the Government is prepared to pay for in cash. With General Franco constantly, and notoriously, receiving more arms and ammunition without purchase from Italy and Germany, the continuance of the closing of the frontier, making impossible the acquisition of arms and ammunition for the Government, amounts to a very definite contribution on the part of England and France to the insurgent cause. The program of Mussolini is to hold off all relief from the Government until the operations in Aragon are finished by pretending to a serious consideration of the plan for the withdrawal of troops.
I have no hesitancy in expressing the conviction that the British Government is entirely partial to this plan of Mussolini. I base this conviction on the fact, (1) that from the first week of the war the British Ambassador here has been an open and bitter partisan of the rebels, (2) that the misrepresentations and suppressions of Mr. Eden in the Commons can leave no doubt of the profound dislike of the present British Government for the Government of Spain, and (3) that the British Chargé d’Affaires in Valencia, Ogilvie-Forbes, who was really neutral, has been displaced by Mr. Leach who, according to information from everyone from Valencia I have seen, is very nasty toward the Government. I refer you to Mr. Thurston’s telegram77 in which he notes that all the Diplomatic Corps attended the opening of the Cortes with the exception of Mr. Leach who boasted that he “would not give them that satisfaction”.
The almost pathetic anxiety of the French to hold on to their understanding with England has been taken advantage of in London to force France into policies clearly dangerous to France. Now that the recent elections have sustained the Popular Front Government in France to the full, it is thought here that its position has been so strengthened that the British will have some difficulty in preventing the French from opening the frontier very soon unless a genuine agreement is made by Mussolini. In that event it is thought that the British will have to stand with France. However, I have heard from two men here from Salamanca, one the Secretary of Sangroniz, [Page 425] that the insurgents are convinced of the support of Chamberlain who has been exchanging private letters, described by the informants referred to as “love tokens”, with Mussolini.
The military operations in Aragon may mark a turning point in the war. If General Franco, after weeks of preparation, the concentrating of an unprecedented amount of war material in and about Saragossa, and the concentration there of the greater part of his Moorish and Italian troops, fails to win a smashing! victory, there seems little possibility of the war ending this winter.
Since the writing of this despatch Mr. Eden in his speech at Bangor has struck a clearer and more courageous note which, on its face, may indicate a real stiffening in the British attitude toward Mussolini’s demands and his impertinences.
Respectfully yours,
- Despatch No. X–234, October 5; not printed.↩