852.00/6771
Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Welles)
The Spanish Ambassador called to see me at his request. He told me that he carried with him an instruction from his Government to request the Government of the United States to support the request of the Spanish Government at the Non-intervention Committee in London that the withdrawal of “volunteers” from Spain be determined only in proportion to the number of foreigners fighting on each side. The Ambassador maintained that the Spanish Government had only at the outside 18,000 foreigners fighting in its ranks and that on the Insurgent side there were between 60 and 80,000 Italians, 10 to 13,000 Germans, and a considerable number of Poles and Portuguese in addition to the Moorish contingents. From the point of view of the Spanish Government, if an equal number of volunteers were withdrawn from both sides, the Loyalist forces would be crippled to such an extent as to make their defeat a foregone conclusion.
The Ambassador then made me a very eloquent analysis and interpretation of the President’s Chicago speech and supported the request of his Government by a declaration that the President’s speech required the active participation of the United States on the side of the democracies of the world and that the present opportunity afforded was an instance of where the influence of the United States in behalf of democracies could be usefully exerted. He also referred specifically to the address of the Secretary of State of September 19 in defense of this thesis.78
[Page 426]I replied to the Ambassador that the hope and faith of the President in democracy as the “hope of the world” had been expressed on many public occasions and that there was no doubt anywhere in the world as to the policy of the President in this regard. I further said that, of course, the President had emphasized and reemphasized his belief that the United States should actively engage in the search for peace and that we had done so and would continue to do so in all ways which we considered appropriate and practical. I said, however, that the Ambassador was well aware that the policy of this Government could only depend upon the support of public opinion and that whatever the sympathies of the American people might be with regard to the tragedy in Spain, nevertheless, the Congress of the United States in representation of the people had made it clear that it desired the Government of the United States to adopt an attitude of strict neutrality as between the contending parties in Spain and that it was determined to avoid, in so far as the United States was concerned, any involvement or entanglement which might create a situation where the United States might be drawn into hostilities. At this juncture the Ambassador launched into an exposition of the injustice of this point of view and said that it was the first time in the history of the civilized world where a legally constituted government had been prevented from obtaining the materials it required in its own legitimate self-defense. I then continued by saying that as the Ambassador knew from his many conversations with the Secretary of State, we believed that those European powers geographically closer to Spain and more directly involved in the situation which had been there created and who were represented in the Non-Intervention Committee in London had assumed primary jurisdiction of the difficulties involved and that the United States had determined to remain aloof from those negotiations; that in view of all these facts and in view of all the circumstances involved, it seemed to me that it would be counter to the considered and determined policy of the United States now to interject its opinion with regard to a specific question being debated in the Non-intervention Committee. I told him that the matter was, of course, one which I should wish to consult the Secretary of State about and that I would lay the request before him. I said to the Ambassador, however, that unless the Secretary of State disagreed with the opinion which I had already expressed to him, he might consider the attitude of this Government as that which I had outlined. I said that in the event that the Secretary of State felt differently than I, I would then inform him of what action, if any, the Secretary of State desired to take.
When he left the Ambassador said that I would, of course, realize that he was acting under strict instructions and that very frequently [Page 427] if he were using his own judgment, requests of this character would not be made but that he had no other alternative. I expressed to the Ambassador my appreciation of his courteous consideration and my regret that he personally was under such a continuous strain because of the presence of members of his own family in many of the cities which are now being bombarded.
- Department of State, Press Releases, September 25, 1937, p. 239.↩