852.00/6696: Telegram
The Chargé in France (Wilson) to the Secretary of State
[Received 11:40 a.m.]
1453–1455. In the course of a conversation with Léger yesterday afternoon he stated that it had been clear ever since the declaration of Mussolini last August following the capture of Santander, in which he publicly proclaimed Italian intervention in Spain, that the situation arising out of the fact that Italy was violating the traditional intervention [Page 421] obligations while France and England were living up to them could not be tolerated indefinitely. The “show down” would have taken place earlier if it had not been for the submarine attacks in the Mediterranean which had created a new situation that had to be dealt with urgently. Now that this situation had been cleared up through the Nyon Arrangement and the Paris meeting which had resulted in Italy’s adherence to the Nyon Arrangement the British and French Governments had agreed that the time had come to find out exactly what the intentions of the Italian Government were: whether in short Italy wished war or peace. In proposing to Italy by the note of October 2 that there should be three-cornered conversations on the question of withdrawing volunteers, the French and British Governments had in no way tried to drive a wedge between Italy and Germany. There had been no reason to invite Germany to these conversations since it was not Germany that was installed in the Balearics and it was not Germany that had intervened so openly in Spain. Also England and France had not intended to remove question of the withdrawal of volunteers from the competence of the London Committee but had intended that if the proposed conversations with Italy led to any agreement then the question should come before the committee for final determination. It was evident, however, that Mussolini was seeking every possible pretext which would cause further delay; and in the meantime the French Government had reliable information that Mussolini was continuing to send reinforcements to Spain and additional airplanes to Majorca.
Léger said that the sole desire of the French Government was that the Spanish conflict should be settled by the Spaniards themselves, and that while it would undoubtedly be preferable for France to have a government on the other side of the Pyrenees which was inspired by republican principles rather than a government in debt to Fascist Italy, nevertheless, France was willing to take her chances being able to deal with Franco if he should win the civil war. It was the continued occupation of Spanish territory by Italian Government forces which the French Government could no longer permit.
I asked Léger whether he thought that Mussolini could withdraw Italian forces from Spain before a decisive victory by Franco after much risk of loss of prestige in his own country which might threaten the regime. Léger said that Mussolini was certainly in a difficult position. The Spanish war was unpopular in Italy; the Italian forces in Spain had not volunteered to go there but had been conscripted and sent there. Also the economic strain on Italy of maintaining expeditionary forces in Ethiopia, Spain and Libya was very great. To withdraw from Spain without obtaining compensation for all the effort expended there would be a risk. On the other hand he wondered if Mussolini could afford to refuse to withdraw his troops from Spain [Page 422] thereby inevitably obliging Great Britain and France to modify their policy as to non-intervention and creating a situation in which the risks of war would become much greater: the continuance of a policy by Mussolini which would bring about this situation would certainly not be popular with the Italian people.
Léger said that the purpose which the French and the British Governments now had in mind in agreeing to go again to the London Committee was to obtain with as little delay as possible a categorical answer yes or no whether Italy would bring to an end her intervention in Spain and her occupation of part of that country. If Italy refuses then England and France will recover their freedom of action. What use they will make of this recovered freedom is not a matter which concerns the London Committee but one which concerns the two countries alone in the protection of their own interests.
I inquired where matters stood regarding the proposed Nine Power Conference on the Far Eastern question.76 Léger said that he supposed it would take place in Brussels at the end of this month. He went on to say that it was clear that as long as the present tension existed in Europe it would be impossible for France or for that matter for England to take part in any common action in the Far East which might involve or imply at some later stage the furnishing of armed forces. He said, for instance, that if consideration should be given to the idea of economic sanctions against Japan it would be necessary to go further and to consider means of protection for the smaller powers which would incur retaliatory action on the part of Japan. It would be impossible for France under present conditions existing in Europe to contribute effectively to such means of protection. Furthermore, France herself was vulnerable in the Orient as regards Indo-China and France under present conditions could not subscribe to any action in the Far East which might require the furnishing of additional means of defense for France’s possessions there. Léger said that it was regrettable that this situation existed which seemed to facilitate aggression in the Far East but the situation was a fact and had to be faced.
- See vol. iv, pp. 1 ff.↩